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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, I examine the role performance plays in the adversarial criminal jury trial. The initial 
motivation behind this inquiry was the pervasiveness of a metaphor: why is the courtroom so 
frequently compared to a theatre? Most writings on this topic see the courtroom as bearing what might 
be termed a cosmetic resemblance to a theatre, making comparisons, for instance, between elements 
of costume and staging. I pursue a different line of argument. I argue that performance is not simply 
an embellishment of the trial process but rather a constitutive feature of the criminal jury trial. It is by 
means of what I call the performance of tradition that the trial acquires its social significance as a 
(supposedly) timeless bulwark of authority and impartiality.  
 
In the first three chapters I show that popular usage of the term ‗theatrical‘ (whether it be to describe 
the practice of a flamboyant lawyer, or a misbehaving defendant) is frequently laden with pejorative 
connotations and invariably (though usually only implicitly) invokes comparison to a presupposed 
authentic or natural way of behaviour (‗not-performing‘). Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault 
and Pierre Bourdieu I argue that, whatever legal agents see as appropriate trial conduct (behaviour 
that is ‗not-performing‘), they are misrecognising the performative accomplishments and demands 
required of both legal agents and laypersons in the trial. This performance constructs and maintains a 
gap between legal practitioners and laypersons which is essential to maintaining the status of the legal 
profession, and which continually positions the trial in legal and popular belief.  
 
I then look at specific moments of ‗anxiety‘ where alterations to traditional procedure provoke debate 
as to the otherwise unnoticed or unarticulated value of live performance. In Chapter 4, I examine the 
growth of the private advocacy training industry that frequently positions lawyers as actors. 
Resistance to the idea of acting demonstrates the tainted status of performance terminology as well as 
legal agents‘ belief that lawyers are acting naturally. I argue instead that lawyers have always been 
trained in acting: an habituated performance style I term legal naturalism. In Chapter 5, I examine the 
television broadcasting of trials. Some legal agents argue that broadcasting risks ‗theatricalising‘ the 
trial—causing participants to ‗act up‘. However, this overlooks the fact that the court has a long 
history as a source of popular entertainment. I argue that resistance to broadcasting also stems from a 
reluctance to remit control of the trial to external producers. Broadcasting invites greater scrutiny into 
a process that if not always fair, needs to be believed in as fair and has historically been tightly self-
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regulated by the legal field, through its reliance on live performance‘s ‗essential‘ quality—its inability 
to be captured and subsequent disappearance. In Chapter 6, I examine the debates around CCTV 
testimony, which demonstrate a consistency of belief in live or ‗face-to-face‘ confrontation to produce 
juridical ‗Truth‘ that can be traced back over 800 years.  
 
The final chapter of this thesis examines sexual assault trials. This chapter brings together all of these 
sources of anxiety. Although often termed ‗exceptional‘, sexual assault trials highlight how essential 
live performance is to manufacturing the authority of ‗The Law‘ through the weight given to 
demeanour assessment, and because these trials make visible the sustained symbolic violence 
characteristic of adversarial criminal trials that is particularly traumatic for sexual assault 
complainants. Examination of sexual assault trials also reveals the double-edged position of 
performance in the trial. The exploitation of the symbolic value of live performance is the source of 
much trauma, yet the performance of tradition is also essential to maintaining popular belief in the 
adversarial criminal jury trial. 
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Prologue 
 
Outside the Darlinghurst branch of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Taylor Square, 
Sydney, there are six designated smoking areas; an implicit nod to the stress this building 
houses, something otherwise not given away by the imposing frontage.1 Designed by 
architect Mortimer Lewis in 1844, the courthouse is in Old Colonial Grecian style, dominated 
by the six-columned sandstone façade. Directly behind the old courthouse stands 
Darlinghurst Gaol.2 Built using convict labour from the early 1820s onwards, more than 70 
prisoners were executed here in its day. Surrounded by 7-metre high walls, the gaol‘s 
makeshift gallows was set up inside the walls at such a point that those watching from the hill 
at Green Park could witness the executions. There are still underground tunnels linking the 
gaol to the Court. None of this is visible from the front of the courthouse, however. The 
wings that flank the central columns of the courtroom were added in the 1880s and they hide 
the old gaol looming behind. 
 
The courthouse is set back behind a long black fence and green hedges that provide a buffer 
from the noisy street. Engraved on the sandstone pylons at the street entry to the courthouse 
are scales of justice. ―SCALES OF DRUNK INJUSTICE‖, someone has graffitied in chalk 
next to one of them. Over time, the courtroom has ended up in an odd spot, on the corner of a 
large, busy and ugly intersection, best known as part of the parade route in Sydney‘s Gay and 
Lesbian Mardi Gras. Diagonally opposite stands the Courthouse Hotel, and upstairs, the 
Judgement Bar. 
 
As I sit waiting to enter the courtroom, a man walks to the flagpole and raises the flag of New 
South Wales, witnessed by a handful of Sherriff‘s Officers. Not far from him, another man 
carrying a camera in one hand, with a tripod over his shoulder, wanders down the driveway 
and begins to set up his equipment, pointing his camera towards the entrance to Court No. 3. 
                                                 
1
 New South Wales will hereafter be shortened to NSW.  
2
 The Darlinghurst Gaol was originally known as the Woolloomooloo Stockade.  
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Today a woman is on trial for manslaughter; she is accused of deliberately poisoning her six-
year old daughter. 
 
Several distinct groups begin to converge outside the courtroom as we sit and wait for the 
court to open. Firstly, there are the relatives, or at least one person whom I take to be the 
mother of the defendant. In a floral print dress, she stands stiffly, clutching her book, The Life 
You Were Born to Live. Secondly, there are the journalists. Lounging on the benches, leaning 
against the sandstone walls and smoking, they are identifiable by their copies of the Daily 
Telegraph, and their expressions of boredom. Finally, there are the legal practitioners, a 
different breed altogether. The robed barristers billow up and down the driveway, balancing 
their wigs on top of sheafs of papers in their arms. The solicitors are in sober suits (except for 
the slightly rakish defence solicitor in purple), and their assistants (invariably in black) wheel 
around carry-on suitcases like air stewards with nowhere to go. The groups don‘t talk to one 
another.3 The legal practitioners give the journalists in particular a wide berth and baleful 
looks. The journalists seem unfazed; they largely ignore the lawyers anyway. 
 
As I cross the threshold of the courtroom and the door swings shut behind me, the noise from 
the street is blocked out and I feel like I have travelled through time. The courtroom is, 
literally, awesome. I am in a space with high ceilings, clusters of old-fashioned electric lamps 
and carpet in a rich deep red colour with paisley patterning. The walls are painted in panels of 
pastels, olive and pale brown and the benches, tables, gallery and dock are all fashioned of 
glossy dark wood. At the front of the courtroom rises the judge‘s bench which is illuminated 
by shafts of light coming from the skylight in the ceiling. Above the bench is the English 
royal coat of arms: in the centre, the shield represents England, Scotland and Ireland. A lion 
wearing a crown supports the shield on the left side, whilst a rearing unicorn appears on the 
right. Above them, the English sovereign in the guise of another lion with a small crown, 
paws the top of a large coronet on which it is reclining. The crest bears the legend Honi Soit 
Qui Mal Y Pense. Beneath it is emblazoned Dieu et Mon Droit.4 
                                                 
3
 Except the defence solicitor who flanks the mother of the defendant during breaks in proceedings.   
4
 Honi Soit Qui Mal Y Pense is the motto of the Order of the Garter, a chivalric society dating back to 14
th
 
century England. It translates literally as ‗Shame on him who thinks ill of it‘ (and more generally ‗evil on he 
who thinks evil‘). The literal meaning is arguably less important than its continual association with the only 
remaining order of Knights and Ladies who have pledged loyalty to the Sovereign (Prince William was admitted 
as a Knight of the Order of the Garter in June, 2008). Dieu et Mon Droit literally translates as ‗God and my 
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A sign on the railings dividing the public gallery from the court proper tells us to switch off 
our mobile phones, which suits the surroundings; this courtroom is not made for mobiles This 
particular courtroom has been in continuous operation for well over a hundred years. There is 
a box for the ‗governor of the gaol‘ that remains empty. The boxes the media occupy have 
‗jury-in-waiting‘ painted on them in fine gold script. There is only a large table for the 
prosecution and defence. With no room to store their masses of books and papers, the legal 
assistants park overloaded steel trolleys and carry-on suitcases in the pathways. This gives a 
slightly ad-hoc feeling to the set-up, a small reminder that any trial is simply a fleeting 
moment in a much longer history of the courtroom itself.  
 
As I sit on the hard wooden bench in the public gallery at the back of the courtroom, my view 
is dominated by the dock that looms directly in front of me and that is, with the exception of 
the judge‘s bench, the focal point of the room. The dock is like a tall and roofless cubby 
house, complete with a small flight of stairs. Its large dimensions make it difficult to see the 
witness or the legal practitioners from the public seating as questioning takes place between 
the dock and the judge‘s bench. I am joined by the defendant‘s mother who is the only person 
sitting with me in the otherwise empty public seating. As we wait, we watch the defendant—
her daughter—walk into the courtroom. Dressed in a white pinstriped suit, she smiles at her 
mother and lets herself into the dock.5 She swings the door shut behind her, walks up the 
short flight of stairs and sits with her back to us.  
 
We rise as we hear a ceremonial knock signifying the entrance of the judge, who enters 
bewigged and in scarlet red. We bow to the judge as he inclines his head slightly, and once 
the judge takes his seat, we are allowed to sit too. The bow feels awkward and only the robed 
barristers manage it without looking like extras from The King and I. The moment we sit, I 
realise why the dock is so high. As the defendant resumes her seat, she and the judge lock 
eyes from across the courtroom, the dock clearly designed to place her in this exact spot; face 
                                                                                                                                                        
Right‘. It was adopted by Henry V as his personal motto and signified his divine right to rule, and has been 
retained by subsequent English monarchs. Both mottos emphasise the authority of the monarchy, even in a 
contemporary and considerably less autocratic legal system. The relationship between the crown and the 
courtroom is traced in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
5
 After four years of attending courtrooms, I have found that, typically, the only members of the public who are 
ever present are me and the defendant‘s mother.  
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to face, and eye-to-eye with the judge. Not long after the defendant has sat down, she rises 
again as the jury enters and only resumes her seat when they have shuffled into their chairs. 
The jury is mostly women, and they are blocked from my view. I can only see one 
particularly young man who looks barely 18. The defendant looks at them as they enter, but 
no one really looks at her until she is seated again and looking away. Because her back is to 
me, I cannot see her expression. The public seats really are the bum seats in the courtroom. 
 
The judge begins this day‘s proceedings by warning the jury about the surrounding media 
attention. Pointedly ignoring the journalists occupying the jury-in-waiting box, he tells the 
jury that although media interest cannot be helped, it is their duty to ignore them. ―You are 
only to regard the evidence you see and hear in this courtroom as a factor in your decision-
making‖ he tells them. The journalists do not seem too bothered by this. They come and go 
frequently, barely bowing and ignoring the irritable expression of the judge. In fact, they 
seem the least in awe of anyone here. 
 
Most visibly in awe are the witnesses. Before each witness testifies, he or she must be sworn 
in. This is done standing, and facing the judge. The witness makes eye-to-eye contact with 
the judge, and the familiar statement heard in so many television shows (i.e. ―do you swear 
by Almighty God that the evidence …‖) suddenly takes on the form of a serious, personal 
vow. Most of the witnesses today swear by Almighty God to tell the truth, with only the 
expert witness, the forensic pathologist, choosing to swear ―solemnly and seriously‖.  
 
As each witness is questioned at length, I am finding that getting to the relevant information 
is an exhaustive process, as the barristers first exclude every piece of information that is not 
relevant. For instance, even though the only findings of note for the pathologist are about the 
deceased‘s stomach contents, the barrister must first ask the pathologist about every other 
aspect of the examination to confirm that these are not important. In addition to this drawn-
out mode of questioning, there is a surprisingly long pause between witnesses where no one 
does anything at all. Some jurors glance dully about the room, I look at my feet, and the 
judge simply stares straight ahead. For a manslaughter trial, it is surprisingly boring. 
 
The proceedings also verge at times, for me, on the absurd. The police officer reads from his 
previous written statement when answering questions, which means he keeps repeating the 
expression ―owner of the premise‖ and then informs the court ―the vomit was 10 cm in 
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diameter‖.6 Then there is the intractable forensic pathologist who, unlike the other witnesses 
who seem eager to respond correctly to the questions asked of them, repositions every 
question asked him, frequently objecting to the tenor of the questions that require a concrete 
opinion, such as whether or not the drug in question was responsible for the child‘s death. 
Despite being a witness for the prosecution, the pathologist refuses to state that he is certain 
as to how the defendant‘s daughter died, how much of the drug in question was administered, 
or when it was given, and whether a pre-existing medical condition may have contributed to 
her death. He seems irritated at having to give an opinion at all. The prosecution tries to ask 
him the ―main‖ cause of death. He responds: ―that‘s so general and hypothetical‖, and gives 
the crown prosecutor a challenging stare.   
 
Conversely, another witness, a doctor at the hospital where the deceased‘s brother was 
treated, seems excited to be there. She speaks very fast and eagerly, but much too softly for 
the cavernous courtroom. The defence barrister, whipping his billowing black gown over his 
arm, eventually asks her to speak up, saying dryly: ―We‘re dealing with a 19th century 
building. No doubt beautiful, but not very helpful‖.  
 
Everyone laughs, including the defendant. Yet, only half an hour later, questioning the 
pathologist, the defence barrister says: ―In regards to the teeth…I‘m sorry, I‘m making the 
deceased sound like a horse. I apologise to the accused‖. In the brief silence that follows, I 
wonder how we had all managed to forget that we were talking about the death of a 6-year-
old girl. I look at the defendant‘s back again, remembering that it is her daughter who has 
died, and that she is now facing prison and separation from her family. I wonder what she is 
thinking and wish I could see her expression, as she sits silently, watching from her enclosed 
tower. I realise then that at this moment everyone in the courtroom is looking at her. Under 
our collective gaze in this enormous courtroom, shut in the dock, her body seems very small 
and very exposed.   
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Normally in New South Wales, a witness can only use their previous written statement to ‗revive‘ their 
memory if the court allows them. However, police officers are entitled to read from written statements. See the 
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) ss 32, 33.  
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I 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
Whoever planned this auditorium in the newly built Beth Ha‘am, the House of the People […] had a theatre in 
mind, complete with orchestra and gallery, with proscenium and stage, and with side doors for the actors‘ 
entrances. 
       Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem 7 
       
 
 
 
I enjoyed the courtroom as just another stage—but not so amusing as Broadway. 
    Mae West, Goodness Had Nothing to Do With It 8 
                                                 
7
 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann In Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), 
4.   
8
 Mae West, Goodness Had Nothing to Do With It (New York: Prentice Hall, 1959), Chapter 7.  
13 
 
 
 
Theatricality 
 
This thesis begins with the pervasiveness of a metaphor. Why is the trial so frequently 
compared to the theatre? On first impressions, this may be considered unremarkable. After 
all, many contemporary practices draw the comparison (from sporting events, to war, to 
fashion). As outlined in the prologue, it is easy for an audience to recognise certain 
‗theatrical‘ features in the trial; for example, the costuming, staging and the ritualised 
behaviour required of those in the courtroom. However, what is remarkable is the consistency 
with which the epithet ‗theatrical‘ has been attached to trial practice. References to the trial as 
‗theatrical‘ occur as far back as the 1580s. Not only is this almost 500 years ago but it is also 
nearly as long as the formal theatre—in other words, a building where dramas are staged—
has existed in England.  
 
Despite the popularity of the metaphor, or perhaps because of it (as what is self-evident 
hardly warrants further investigation), exactly why and how this metaphor has been used has 
never been analysed in detail. Closer examination reveals that the metaphor involves more 
than an acknowledgement of shared features. In fact, usually, the more a trial is deemed 
‗theatrical‘, the more it is believed by the writer to have strayed from some implicit belief of 
what the trial is meant to be or meant to do. These largely unstated goals of the trial are 
positioned as irreconcilable with the goals of the theatre. The metaphor is therefore structured 
by a dichotomy. The trial is about truth-telling and high stakes, and the theatre is about 
artifice and entertainment. In other words, the theatre is about ‗performing‘, and the trial is 
about ‗not-performing‘ or behaving naturally.  
 
Since the 19
th
 century in particular, the courtroom has been styled as a place for 
dispassionate, impartial weighing of facts to determine an outcome. For legal agents, it is 
when something disrupts the trial process that the trial can become ‗theatrical‘. Theatricality 
consequently often has heavily pejorative connotations for legal agents, and is associated by 
them with artificiality and falsehood. This attitude is in keeping with Elizabeth Burns‘ 
14 
 
argument that a pejorative conception of ‗theatricality‘ can only exist if there is an implicit 
dichotomy being made between natural and theatrical behaviour.9  
 
Yet, as Burns argues, what is or is not termed theatrical is a matter of recognition of 
conventions. Something is ‗theatrical‘ if someone watching determines it to be so based on 
his or her culturally specific knowledge and experience. Burns argues, therefore, that the 
‗theatrical‘ is not a series of specific definable signs, but rather the ―double relationship 
between the theatre and social life‖. For Burns, theatrical practice is ―both formed by and 
helps to re-form and so conserve or change the values and norms of the society which 
supports it‖.10 Theatre can therefore be conservative or transgressive, but theatre both affects 
and is affected by society‘s collective consciousness, in a relatively dialogic relationship.11 As 
a theatre audience, Burns argues that we expect the theatre to challenge our beliefs, or reflect 
them, or provide a commentary on our social behaviour. However, Burns argues that when 
this ―doubling‖ takes place outside the formal theatre, it is ―commonly unrecognised, or, 
when recognised, regarded as bizarre, perhaps disreputable, presumptuous, in any case 
deviant‖.12  
 
Following Burns, I argue that outside the discursive space of the theatre, transgression of, or 
deviation from convention—behaviour that stands out—is ‗theatrical‘. For laypersons, the 
trial will seem ‗theatrical‘ because of shared conventions such as costume and staging. 
However, for legal agents, the ‗theatrical‘ is behaviour that deviates from habituated 
courtroom practice: when a defendant ‗acts up‘ for example, as opposed to behaving 
appropriately or naturally (‗not-performing‘). What is ‗theatrical‘ has traditionally been 
positioned as an interruption that attempts to derail the trial as a serious place to discover the 
truth.  
 
                                                 
9
 Elizabeth  Burns,  Theatricality:  A  Study  of  Convention  in  the  Theatre  and  in  Social  Life  (New  York: 
 Harper  and  Row,  1973), 3-4.   
10
 Burns, Theatricality, 3-4.   
11
 Burns‘ argument is reminiscent of Victor Turner‘s argument as to the ―spiralling‖ interrelationship between 
theatre and social life. See Victor Turner, ―Are there Universals of Performance in Myth, Ritual and Drama?,‖ 
in R. Schechner and W. Appel, eds., By Means of Performance: Intercultural Studies of Theatre and Ritual 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 8-18. 
12
 Burns, Theatricality, 3-4. 
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My argument is, however, distinct from those of previous writers. This thesis analyses what 
performance does in the adversarial criminal jury trial. Rather than seeing the role of 
performance in the trial as a form of embellishment (or a form of deviance), I argue that 
performance plays a constitutive role in the adversarial criminal jury trial. Understanding 
how performance operates in the trial is crucial to understanding how the trial both gains and 
retains its social significance in the broader community. Ultimately, a trial is a collective 
performance of belief. How this performance, what I call the performance of tradition, takes 
place is the major argument elaborated in this thesis.  
 
My choice of the word ‗tradition‘ in performance of tradition is intended to refer to a number 
of ideas. Firstly, ‗tradition‘ evokes long-standing repetitive practices (or customs) that have 
become relatively naturalised. In this thesis, I am arguing that the trial is full of such markers 
or symbols of ‗tradition‘ that are not only inherited practice but also have distinct ideological 
and practical purposes that are frequently overlooked by those writing about the trial. 
Secondly, the term ‗tradition‘ refers to Hobsbawm‘s concept of ―the invention of tradition‖, 
whereby the manufacturing of mythologies enables certain power imbalances to be 
sustained.13 Unlike Hobsbawm‘s argument, however, this work follows a 
Foucauldian/Bourdieuian sociological bent whereby ‗power‘ is not taken to be permanently 
located in one place; rather performance plays an essential role in retaining, constructing and 
naturalising certain power relationships in the trial, and the trial itself in society. I will outline 
my argument later in the chapter. Firstly, however, it is necessary to define the other terms I 
am using, and clarify the scope of my investigation.  
 
My slippage of terms from ‗theatre‘ or ‗theatrical‘ to ‗performance‘ in the above paragraphs 
is deliberate. Throughout this thesis, I use the term performance rather than theatre to 
distinguish my argument from the traditional pejorative connotations of ‗theatrical‘ as 
employed by other writers. As I will show, ‗theatricality‘ as advanced by legal agents relies 
on what is a relatively narrow understanding of ‗theatre‘. My  usage  of  performance  is, 
instead,  intended  to  encompass  a  broader  range  of  cultural  production  than  that 
 suggested  by  legal  writers, ranging from marked to unmarked forms, and encompassing 
                                                 
13
 See Eric Hobsbawm, ―Inventing Traditions,‖ in The Invention of Tradition, Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, 
eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).  
16 
 
main-stage theatrical practice as well. As Schechner argues, behaviour is Performance 
Studies‘ ―object of study‖.14 
 
Schechner notes that almost anything can be a performance for someone, somewhere. 
Elizabeth Burns also argues that it is the audience which determines what is and is not 
performative. For both writers, it is the mode of reception that determines and therefore 
shapes the construction of an event as performative.15 As such, throughout this thesis, I am 
delimiting what I believe to be the pivotal role of performance in the adversarial criminal jury 
trial, based on a reading methodology inflected by ethnographic observation of trial processes 
in Sydney and London between 2004 and 2008. The distance of my experience from those of 
legal agents—the cross-disciplinary nature of this thesis—allows me to recognise and analyse 
certain practices as performative in the trial. However, it is this same distance that means I 
cannot access the embodied knowledge of what it means to participate in a trial. Instead, I 
have tried throughout this thesis to get a sense of Michael Baxandall‘s ―period eye‖ in my 
analysis of criminal trial processes.16 This involves interrogating practices that seem 
particularly strange to me as though I was in a foreign country or time. This method is 
germane to the trial because, as I will emphasise throughout this thesis, unless you are a legal 
practitioner (or perhaps a journalist or repeat offender) the courtroom is a very strange place.  
 
As I outlined in the prologue of this thesis, walking into a courtroom is like walking into 
another world; a world where few actions can be taken for granted and where we laypersons 
rely on guidance to know what to do. The actions we perform in a courtroom are strange and 
feel unnatural. There is a sense of self-consciousness throughout, particularly when we are 
                                                 
14
 Richard Schechner, Performance Studies: An Introduction (New York:  Routledge, 2002), 1. In choosing to 
define the terms ‗theatre‘ and ‗performance‘ in this way I do, however, take into consideration Glen 
 McGillivray‘s  argument  that  the  relationship  between  theatre  and  performance  can  be  analysed  as  a 
 value‐laden  discourse  whereby  the  term  ‗performance‘  has  gained  its  eminence  by  limiting  significantly 
 the  potential  of  the  term  ‗theatre‘  to  that  of  the  conventional  stage. See  Glen  McGillivray, 
 ―Theatricality:  A  Critical  Genealogy‖  (PhD  diss.,  University  of  Sydney,  2004). 
15
 Burns, Theatricality, 3-4. 
16
 Baxandall writes about 15
th
 century Italian art, arguing that to understand art from the past requires us to 
attempt to not only learn about its context but also to learn how to see art as people in that time did, rather than 
presuming that humans have a stable and unchanging way of interpreting and experiencing art. See Michael 
Baxandall, Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy: A Primer in the Social History of Pictorial Style 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).  
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asked to bow or when we listen to people swear by ―Almighty God‖. Although courtrooms 
are technically open to the public, my experience over several years has shown that the public 
seating is almost invariably empty, except in the cases of very high-profile trials. Even then, 
often journalists act as our surrogates. There is nothing natural for laypersons about 
courtrooms. This ‗strangeness‘ for laypersons when they are in a trial is as important to this 
thesis as the ‗naturalness‘ of legal agents. Both are part of a collective performance.  
 
This thesis is limited to examination of the adversarial criminal jury trial, which operates in 
Britain, the U.S. and most (current or former) Commonwealth countries (except Scotland and 
Malta). However, my primary (but not exclusive) focus is on Australian processes, as it is 
only Australian trial processes that I have had access to on a regular basis. Having only spent 
a limited amount of time in courtrooms in the U.K, and none in the U.S., I cannot with any 
authority analyse those procedures except as may be inferred from the broadest general 
features of adversarial trial. Daniel Stepniak, in his book Audio-visual Coverage of Courts, 
notes that: 
To ensure that meaningful inferences could be drawn, the chosen jurisdictions needed to share key legal 
and political traditions. Thus, all five jurisdictions [the U.K., U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand] 
share a British common law tradition, an independent judiciary in which judges perform a comparable 
role in adversary proceedings and appeal hearings, and have a commitment to democratic rights and a 
transparent publicly accountable judicial system.
17
 
I follow Stepniak, using the relatively similar systems primarily to draw ―meaningful 
inferences‖. I am examining a trial process that relies on partisan evidence gathering and 
determination of facts by a jury. As such, I refer to overseas processes such as those in the 
U.S. and the U.K. that share these features. Generally, however, this is either to illuminate the 
source of Australian practice, or to serve as contrast.18 It is only in Chapter 5, where I 
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 Daniel Stepniak, Audio-Visual Coverage of Courts: A Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 7. 
18
 This is also because the Australian Law Reform Commission [Hereafter ALRC] interrogates trial methods 
used overseas when considering Australian processes. This is unlike the U.S. where there is often less 
willingness to seek alternatives from overseas when discussing law reform. An example of this preference for 
internal processes in the United States is evidenced by the movement of ‗originalism‘, which places the U.S. 
Constitution as the founding irreducible statute of the nation. Although British common law is acknowledged in 
this theory as being a source of the Constitution, anything subsequent to the Constitution is extrinsic to U.S. 
18 
 
examine the broadcasting of trials, that I undertake any significant canvassing of overseas 
processes. This is primarily because Australia itself draws on these examples in the 
broadcasting debate and because our own experience of broadcasting trials is too limited and 
ad hoc to allow meaningful conclusions to be drawn.  
 
I also concentrate on the criminal jury trial. Only the criminal trial process requires the 
presence of the accused‘s body in the courtroom, something I will later argue to be integral to 
the concept of the performance of tradition.19 I have chosen to look at only the criminal jury 
trial (rather than trials presided over by a judge or judges) because the jury trial is the 
crossover between a specialised area (law) and the laity (the jury).20 This thesis concerns 
itself with the collective performance of both laypersons and legal agents and how the 
relationship between them constitutes and perpetuates certain beliefs about ‗The Law‘. As 
‗The Law‘ operates under the assumption that all legal processes are open to the public 
(except in exceptional circumstances), this form of trial is the ideal setting in which to 
analyse the relationship between laypersons and ‗The Law‘.     
 
In choosing to focus on the criminal jury trial, I am aware that I am perhaps giving a 
misleading weight to its importance within the legal justice system as a whole. Statistically 
speaking the trial is a rarity. Due to its heavy cost, plea bargains to avoid it are commonplace, 
and encouraged. Added to this, the wait for trial, and the complex pre-trial procedures take up 
far more of anyone‘s time than the trial itself. Indeed, the experiences of waiting for trial are 
                                                                                                                                                        
State sovereignty and internal legal regulation. See Johnathan O‘Neill, Originalism in American Law and 
Politics: A Constitutional History (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007).  
19
 In non‐criminal matters, a defendant‘s presence depends on whether he or she is also a witness. 
20
 In a criminal jury trial, it is the judge‘s duty to determine questions of law [e.g. the admissibility of evidence] 
and the jury‘s duty to determine questions of fact. A judge has the opportunity of ‗summing up‘ to the jury 
where he or she can lay out what he or she believes to be the most salient points for the jury to keep in mind 
during deliberation. A judge can also direct a jury to dismiss a case on the basis of insufficient evidence (this 
usually occurs after the prosecution has presented their case). However, a judge may not direct a jury to dismiss 
a case because he or she questions the quality of the evidence and believes a conviction would be unsafe and 
overturned on appeal. In Australia, the High Court clearly outlines that ―[t]he judge has no power to direct the 
jury to enter a verdict of not guilty on the ground that, in his view, a verdict of guilty would be unsafe or 
unsatisfactory‖. The High Court states that the trial judge‘s power must be limited to determinations of law and 
law alone, and that there should be no ―interference with the traditional division of functions between judge and 
jury in a criminal trial‖. See Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207, 207.  
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equally, if not more, important in the experience of the justice system. Legal historian John 
Langbein critiques Douglas Hay‘s Marxist legal history, ―Property, Authority and the 
Criminal Law,‖ which is preoccupied with criminal procedure and specifically the criminal 
trial as an example of the systematic power imbalance of the legal system. Langbein quotes 
Richard Sparks, who describes criminal procedure as:  
[a]t the margins of social life […] the most generally useful laws are likely to be the ones that define 
[…] ownership and control [of the means of production], and not some ancillary laws that promise to 
thump individuals for rather trivial kinds of tampering with those means.
21
  
Langbein goes on to say: 
The criminal law is simply the wrong place to look for the active hand of the ruling classes. From the 
standpoint of the rulers, I would suggest, the criminal justice system occupies a place not much more 
central than the garbage collection system. True, if the garbage is not collected the society cannot 
operate and ruling-class goals will be frustrated, but that does not turn garbage collection into a ruling-
class conspiracy.
22
 
My focus is a narrow one partially by necessity. Although I have attended criminal appeals, 
and non-criminal matters, it is simply beyond the scope of this study to overgeneralise as to 
the nature of criminal trial procedures. However, although I concur with Langbein in 
acknowledging that the criminal jury trial is a statistical rarity (and that most people may 
never be involved in a criminal jury trial), I believe that Langbein and Sparks underestimate 
the importance of what the criminal trial represents. The adversarial criminal jury trial is 
where the lay and the law meet, not only physically, but also crucially in terms of social 
beliefs about the legal system. In the public imagination, the trial is ‗The Law‘.  
 
Lastly, as this is a cross-disciplinary thesis, it is important to clarify some legal terminology 
before proceeding. As I have already outlined, I use the term ‗adversarial‘ to describe our 
system of law, rather than ‗common law‘ because it better serves the key arguments I make 
throughout this thesis about the influence partisan evidence gatherers have had in shaping 
how we understand ‗The Law‘ and our relationship to it. Consequently, I use the term 
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 Richard Sparks, ―A Critique of Marxist Criminology,‖ Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research 
Volume 2 (1980): 159, quoted in John H. Langbein, ―Albion‘s Fatal Flaws,‖ Past and Present 98.1 (1983): 119. 
22
 Ibid., 119. 
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‗inquisitorial‘ to describe European trial processes.23 When I do use the term ‗common law‘, 
it is to describe judge made law—the body of precedent that judges consult to make 
determinations regarding questions of law.24 Finally, when I use the term ‗civil‘ throughout 
this thesis, I am referring to non-criminal matters.25  
 
Structure  
 
I begin this thesis with a short history of the English criminal trial. I examine three different 
phases in the history of the trial: trials by ordeal, the altercation trial and the adversarial trial. 
I outline the importance of live performance to each form of trial and the premium that is 
placed on a defendant‘s physical presence in the courtroom, arguing that the trial stages a 
kind of power transaction that helps to naturalise the authority of legal agents—what I term 
the performance of tradition. Finally, I show how ‗theatricality‘ became associated with 
falsehood in legal writings. 
 
Having traced the role of performance in the trial historically, in Chapter 3 I look at the 
contemporary writings about the perceived relationship between the theatre and the trial. I 
show how many of these approaches still tend to see the trial as a form of conflict resolution 
and theatrical practice as largely cosmetic or deviant intrusions into the process. In the second 
half of the chapter, I introduce my own theoretical framework, which draws on a number of 
disciplines, particularly sociological theory and the work of Michel Foucault and Pierre 
Bourdieu, to examine what I argue to be a crucial gap in understanding between legal agents 
and laypersons in the trial. This gap is vital in understanding how the performance of a trial 
helps position legal agents and the trial itself in popular belief.   
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 The ‗adversarial‘ system is distinct from the ‗inquisitorial‘ model used in Europe. In the inquisitorial system it 
is the court, rather than the defence or prosecution, that gathers evidence. The dominance of lawyers in the trial 
is specific to the adversarial tradition.   
24
 The term ‗common law‘ has several applications. As Richard Chisholm and Garth Nettheim observe, the 
phrase ―can mean a system of law based on the English system [e.g. Australia is a ‗common law‘ country], or 
rules of law created by the courts rather than by the legislature, or the rules of common law as distinct from the 
rules of ‗equity‘‖. In this thesis I am using the phrase ‗common law‘ to distinguish judge-made law from 
parliamentary legislation. See: Richard Chisholm and Garth Nettheim, Understanding Law: An Introduction to 
Australia‟s Legal System (Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007), 17. 
25
 ‗Civil‘ can also be used to describe the ‗inquisitorial‘ model of European trials, supra n.19. 
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In Chapter 4, I examine the mediation of the trial by legal agents and show how they acquire 
advocacy skills. I do this by looking at two forms of advocacy training: pupillage and the 
more recent private advocacy training industry, which is frequently explicitly acting-oriented. 
The controversy surrounding this approach reflects the tainted status of performance in legal 
practice. I argue that what lawyers often misrecognise as ‗natural‘ or appropriate behaviour it 
is in fact what I term legal naturalism, an embodied performance style adopted and 
habituated through pupillage. Finally, I show that legal naturalism is not merely a series of 
semiotic signals, but also reflects and perpetuates a naturalised dominance over laypersons 
fundamental to the adversarial model of evidence testing. 
 
Having examined mediation of the trial, in the following two chapters I turn my attention to 
the mediatisation of the trial. In Chapter 5, I look at the television broadcasting of trials, and 
in Chapter 6, I examine the replacement of a live witness with CCTV testimony. In each 
chapter, I show that alteration to traditional practice creates significant anxiety. In terms of 
broadcasting, this is partially because of a belief that televising a trial changes the way in 
which criminal proceedings will be received by the public (that it may ‗theatricalise‘ 
proceedings). However as I argue, it is also because the legal field relies on the seeming 
paradox of the closed but open trial. That is, although trials are technically open to the public, 
they are relatively opaque to the uninitiated. This buffer between public understanding and 
legal procedure (―practical obscurity‖) is considered necessary by many legal agents to 
protect internal regulation of the trial process from outside influence.  
 
When examining CCTV testimony usage in Chapter 6, I argue that this form of mediatisation 
poses a challenge to the trial as a live practice. Consequently, this has led to an explicit 
articulation of the perceived link between live presence and truth-telling. Debates around the 
use of this technology show that there is a deep reluctance to tamper with traditional methods 
of evidence testing, even if these forms of evidence testing have become increasingly 
problematic for the ‗vulnerable witnesses‘ for whom the technology was developed. As I 
demonstrate, belief in the necessity of live bodies sharing the same space is also predicated 
on the exploitation of confrontation by legal agents who believe that pressure is a positive 
influence in reaching the truth.   
 
All of the practices outlined above—the exploitation of confrontation, naturalisation of legal 
agents‘ dominance, and the premium placed on live performance—come together in Chapter 
22 
 
7 of this thesis which examines sexual assault trials in NSW and recent legislative reform to 
this area of law. Although sexual assault trials are often classified as ‗special‘, I argue, 
instead, that they make visible the performative imperative of all trial participants in the 
adversarial system. I also show how this performance naturalises degrees of abuse and 
inequity. Finally, I will argue that attempts to reform sexual assault trial practice raise much 
larger questions about traditional methods of evidence testing in the adversarial trial. These 
broader questions regarding the double-edged nature of performance and the future of the 
adversarial criminal jury trial frame the conclusion of this thesis. 
23 
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Trials, Truth-telling, and the Performing Body: a History 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The trial has been ordained by the common law as the process by which truth will be distinguished from 
falsehood. 
Chief Justice Peter Underwood, ―The Trial Process: Does One Size Fit All?,‖ 26 
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 Chief Justice Underwood, ―The Trial Process: Does One Size Fit All?,‖ Journal of Judicial Administration 
15.3 (February 2006): 166. 
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Introduction 
 
Throughout the history of the adversarial criminal jury trial, legal agents have frequently 
equated performing with lying. I will examine in this chapter how performance became 
associated with falsehood in the legal world. The pejorative view of performance espoused by 
legal agents also implies that they generally do not see the trial itself as performative. This is 
because they have learned to view the trial as a place whose function is primarily to 
distinguish the truth. In this chapter I go on to argue that this idea of ‗non-performing‘ is a 
misrecognition, resulting from a failure to account for the trial as more than a form of conflict 
resolution.27 In the epigraph above Peter Underwood, Chief Justice of the Tasmanian 
Supreme Court, argues that ―the trial has been ordained as a process that distinguishes truth 
from falsehood‖ and I believe that performance is central to this concept of ordination.28 
 
The adversarial criminal jury trial must continually be performed to secure and perpetuate its 
place within the juridical field and the broader community. I call this process the 
performance of tradition. I will show how the performance of tradition can be observed 
throughout three major phases in the history of the English criminal trial: trial by ordeal, the 
altercation trial and the adversarial trial, covering the period of roughly the late 12
th
 century 
up until the current day.29 These legal models were each formulated under and reflect specific 
                                                 
27
 Misrecognition is a term coined by sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu argues that those working within a 
particular area of endeavour (or field) internalise and naturalise the logics of that field relatively unconsciously. 
This unconscious embodiment means they may misrecognise what they are doing. For example, a barrister 
learns that lawyers facilitate conflict resolution and represent clients in court. However, a barrister also 
unconsciously naturalises (and does not question) the dominance of the lawyer in a courtroom process. 
Consequently, the power and control a barrister has over lay participants is not something of which he/she is 
(usually) consciously aware. This is a form of misrecognition. I elaborate on this and other aspects of 
Bourdieu‘s sociological theory in the following chapter. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production: 
Essays on Arts and Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
28
 Underwood, ―The Trial Process,‖ 166. 
29
 This chapter traces the history of the criminal trial as it developed in England. However, as this is where the 
U.S. and Australia have inherited their trial system (albeit with some modification) the account is relevant for 
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historical conditions. However, I will show that each process is as much concerned with 
securing and extending the position of legal agents and the juridical field as it is with 
resolving conflict (or finding ‗truth‘).30  
 
Analysis of these three forms of trial shows a shift from explicitly violent control over the 
body, to a subtler and more implicit form of social violence.31 I will comment on how this 
reflects the development and professionalisation of the juridical field as well as (and within) 
the wider shift in governance from heavy control to the far more self-regulated, embodied 
and differentiated form of power that marks Liberalism. Although explicit violence in the 
trial is over time replaced by increasing use of symbolism, I will show that the symbolic has 
real, violent effects, and that our current adversarial trial process still involves significant 
control and coercion.32   
                                                                                                                                                        
these countries as well. Both the U.S. and Australia inherited British common law up until the date of 
colonisation. As such, the U.S. inherited English law as it existed in the late 17
th
 century, and Australia inherited 
English law as it existed up until 1828 (varying from State to State in each country). Regardless of independent 
developments subsequently (particularly in the U.S. following independence), all three countries had an 
adversarial criminal jury trial in place by the mid 19
th
 century. Australia was the latest country of the three to 
acquire this, as it was only in the 1840s that the last of the convict states (such as NSW) renounced military 
tribunals and adopted the jury trial, after repeated requests from the population (the first criminal jury trial was 
held at Berrima, NSW in 1841). For more information, see G.D. Woods, A History of Criminal Law in New 
South Wales: The Colonial Period 1788-1900 (Sydney: Federation Press, 2002). For more information on the 
development of U.S. law subsequent to independence, see Lawrence Meir Friedman, A History of American 
Law: Third Edition (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005).  
30
 The trial by ordeal is an exception as it was a process of the Church. My analysis of this form of trial shows 
that it upheld and emphasised the authority of the church (and more accurately the local priest). This reflects the 
‗pre-legal‘ era where common law and the juridical field were not formalised enough to have their own discrete 
secular process. Although there were lawyers at this time, they were ecclesiastical lawyers trained through and 
by the church. Ecclesiastical laws are Canon laws derived originally from the law of the Apostles. This form of 
law became foundational to inquisitorial law in Continental Europe (known alternatively as ‗civil law‘). The 
adversarial system (or ‗common law‘ system) does not share this genealogy, developing distinctly from Roman 
law.   
31
 By using the term ‗social violence‘, I mean to incorporate both Foucault‘s idea of the disappearance of the 
body and its replacement with a psychological discourse, as well as Bourdieu‘s concept of symbolic violence. I 
outline and extend both of these ideas in the subsequent chapter. See Bourdieu, supra n. 27; Michel Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Penguin Books, 1975). 
32
 To attempt to catalogue completely the historical evolution of the adversarial criminal jury trial is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. The origins of the adversarial criminal jury trial also remain hotly disputed. Rather I am 
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Finally, I will reflect on the continuities and discontinuities between previous models of 
truth-seeking and our current practice. I will particularly comment on the most marked 
feature of the current adversarial trial: the dominance of the lawyer. I will show how the 
expanded role of legal agents has led to an increasingly mediated criminal trial. This has had 
the inverse result of decreased agency for lay trial participants. I argue this is because legal 
agents have tended to present themselves as ‗protectors‘ between ‗The Law‘ (presented as a 
product of state power) and the individual. As I will show, reliance on mediation has become 
central to our current adversarial criminal jury trial.  
  
Some Clarifications about Common Law and Use of Sources  
 
Although the historical overview I present below concludes in the 19
th
 century, this is not to 
suggest that there have been no major changes since then. However, the basic structure of the 
adversarial trial—the presence of prosecution and defence lawyers as formalised mediators—
does hold from the 19
th
 century. The historical account detailed below is informed by three 
key legal historical works: John H. Langbein‘s The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial, 
David Cairns‘ Advocacy and the Making of the Adversarial Criminal Trial 1800-1865 and 
J.M. Beattie‘s Crime and the Courts in England.33 This account is also supplemented as far as 
                                                                                                                                                        
following Foucault‘s advice: ―Instead of privileging law as a manifestation of power it would be better to try 
and identify the different techniques of constraint that brings it into play‖. This is what I literally set out to do in 
this chapter: to examine what different techniques of ‗constraint‘ are involved in the trial‘s model of truth-
seeking and how changes to these ‗constraints‘ illustrate the changing historical conditions they were formulated 
under. See Michel Foucault, ―Society Must be Defended,‖ in Michel Foucault, Ethic: Essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-1984, P. Rabinow, ed. (New York: The New Press, 1997), 59.    
33
 John H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); David 
Cairns, Advocacy and the Making of the Adversarial Criminal Trial 1800-1865 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1988); J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England 1660-1800 (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 
1986). Whilst this chapter details the experiences of trial participants throughout history, it is worth 
remembering that the writings I am drawing on are written almost exclusively by men about men. Until 
relatively recently, women were not allowed to practice law or be involved in the law-making process. Women 
could also not inherit or own property, as their property belonged to their parents or male relatives when they 
were single and reverted to their husbands upon marriage. Women also could not bring criminal charges unless 
it related to the death of their husband. However, women did have the right to be convicted of a criminal felony. 
For more information about the particular experience for women in the courts, see Jennifer Kermode and 
Garthine Walker, eds., Women, Crime and the Courts in Early Modern England (London: Routledge, 1994).  
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is possible with contemporary writings dating back to the 1100s as well as transcripts from 
plea rolls, The Old Bailey Sessions Papers, and medieval and Puritan advocacy training 
writings.34   
 
This chapter is concerned with the role of performance in the history of the criminal jury trial. 
However, no legal historical documents before the late 16
th
 century make explicit reference to 
performance. One of the first times the word ‗theatre‘ does appear in legal writing is in 1583 
in the writing of Sir Thomas Smith and when it does, he is referring to the Roman theatre.35 It 
is only towards the end of the 16th century and later that the idea of ‗theatrical‘ comes to 
circulate in legal documents. As has been outlined above, this relates to a certain kind of 
performance—one that is linked with artificiality that will be explored later in the chapter.  
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 Old Bailey Sessions Papers are trial transcripts of criminal proceedings. The Sessions Papers started as street 
pamphlets by lay newspersons and were a form of early tabloid press, printed for those who wanted to know 
what was happening that week in the courtrooms. Legal authorities eventually co-opted these pamphlets when 
they recognised the value of keeping trial transcripts. The earliest Sessions Papers date from the late 17
th
 
century. These are available online at www.oldbaileyonline.org. By ‗advocacy training writings‘, I refer to 
material written expressly for lawyers‘ benefit. This material has a long history in England and includes 
guidebooks, glossaries and lectures, the earliest ones referenced here dating back to the 14
th
 century. Ancient 
Greek and Roman advocacy training material naturally dates back much further.  
35
 In Thomas Smith‘s time, although there was a fixed court at Westminster dating from the reign of King John, 
most of the courts were on rural circuits and held only periodically (quarter sessions after Michaelmas, 
Christmas, Easter, and Trinity Sunday). Thomas Smith uses the term ‗theatre‘ when he answers those who claim 
this amount of sessions is insufficient. Smith draws an analogy to Cato and Rome, when Cato was asked if ―the 
pleading place in Rome might be couered ouer with canuas as their theaters were, to the intent that the plaintifs 
and defendantes that were there might pleade their matters more at ease‖. Cato responded ―Nay, for my part I 
had rather wish that al the waies to the place of pleading were cast ouer with Galthrops [caltrops, a thorned 
plant], that the féete of such as loue so well pleading, should féele so much paine of those pricks in going thither 
as their heads do of the Sunne in tarrying there‖. In other words, as Smith goes on to explain, courts should not 
be comfortable or pleasant lest this encourages idle pleaders. Smith goes on to comment: ―good labourers and 
quiet men could be content to ende their matters at home by iudgement of their neighbours and kinsfolke‖. We 
may infer from this that firstly, courts are meant to be a place of last resort for disputes that cannot be resolved 
privately and secondly, that the vexatious litigant was obviously alive and well by the 1500s. See Thomas 
Smith,  De Republica Anglorum the Maner of Gouernement of Policie of the Realme of England, Compiled by 
the Honorable Man Tomas Smyth, Doctor of the Ciuil Lawes, Knight, and Principall Secreatie Vnto the Two 
Most Worthie Princes, King Edwarde the Sixt, and Queen Elizabeth, Vol 2.2 (London: Henrie Midleton for 
Gregorie Seton, 1583), 53.  
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My analysis of sources relating to the performance of tradition starts in the 12
th
 century at the 
beginnings of an English national secular legal system.
36
 This presents particular problems 
for the current day researcher. As this is more than 300 years before the introduction of the 
printing press in England, the materials relating to early criminal procedure are extremely 
scarce and often considerably fragmented. In addition to this, common law or lex non scripta 
(literally ‗law not written down‘) is where we derive the vast majority of our legal heritage.37 
The common law tradition emphasises the oral practice of law, and not statute (unlike the 
civil, or inquisitorial law used in much of Europe). Judges make decisions based on already 
existing case law. This is referred to as stare decisis: the decisions reached by previous 
judgments that are binding on a judge.
38
 Consequently, any documentation of common law is 
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 Trials by ordeal predate the 12
th
 century, however this chapter analyses English national secular legal practice. 
Although to set a date on when national secular law is permanently established will always be somewhat 
arbitrary, a generally accepted point is in 1166 with the Assizes of Clarendon. The Clarendon Act permanently 
established circuit courts staffed by judges appointed by the King, rather than leaving judgements in the hands 
of local landowners (although there were circuit courts established prior to this, they fell into disuse under King 
Stephen). This was a deliberate decision by the king at the time, Henry II, to protect and extend centralised 
power. I have chosen this period, then, to trace the foundation and formalisation of the legal profession and its 
relationship with the nascent national secular legal system. By the time trials by ordeal were operating in the late 
12
th
 century they were the end-point of an established secular legal system. However, the legal profession was 
far from formalised and the King‘s Justices were usually members of the King‘s Household, with no formal 
legal training.  
37
 Although the literal meaning of lex non scripta is ―law not written down‖ (as opposed to lex scripta which 
refers to parliamentary statute), this does not mean that these laws are oral. As Matthew Hale defines it: ―I do 
not mean as if those laws were only oral, or communicated from the former ages to the later, merely by word; 
for all those laws have their several monuments in writing, whereby they are transferred from one age to 
another, and without which they would soon lose all kind of certainty […] but I therefore stile those parts of the 
law leges non scriptae because their authoritative and original institutions are not set down in writing in that 
manner or with that authority that acts of parliament are; but they are grown into use […] BY A LONG AND 
IMMEMORIAL USAGE, and by the strength of custom‖. Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of 
England: And an Analysis of the Civil Part of the Law (London: H. Butterworth, 1820), 21.  
38
 Stare decisis refers to the binding nature of appellate court decisions on lower courts. In Australia, decisions 
by higher courts are binding on lower courts and generally, a court will not overturn a previous finding by itself 
unless there is a significant reason to doubt the decision. The definition of stare decisis and whether it is a 
binding rule, or a customary practice, does however remain contested and complex. The degree of onus on the 
judge to follow stare decisis also differs across jurisdictions. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to account fully 
for this debate. However, P.S. Atiyah and Robert Summers make the argument that although the practice of 
stare decisis was interpreted relatively strictly in England in the early 20
th
 century, more recently it has become 
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not a coherent body of rules. This means that general accounts by eyewitnesses of what 
happened at a particular trial also have to be considered carefully as they tend to present what 
may be a general and historically specific trend as a concrete practice.  
 
One of the earliest English legal writings (attributed uncertainly to the judiciar Ranulf de 
Glanville, and referred to as the Glanville Treatise) is a good example of this tension. Writing 
in 1187, Glanville states that ―[a]lthough the laws of England are not written, it does not seem 
absurd to call them laws. For if, merely for lack of writing, they were not deemed to be laws 
then surely writing would seem to supply to written laws a force of greater authority than 
either the justice of him who decrees them or the reason of him who establishes them‖.39 
Although Glanville extols the virtue of oral practice and the authority of the judge as 
emblematic of common law tradition, the very act of writing this treatise recognises the 
power of the written word in terms of formalising a legal system. The need to formalise 
through writing, however, is never simply documentation. As Paul Brand points out, referring 
to the Glanville treatise, ―national custom [is] also in part a deliberate legislative creation‖.40  
 
Written accounts of English legal proceedings always involve some form of retrospective 
smoothing out of inconsistencies. The difficulty that arises from the use of such material is 
that there is a danger of believing that trial practice has always been as formal and customary 
as the writing suggests. The text of Glanville itself says ―[i]t is, however, utterly impossible 
for the laws and legal rules of the realm to be wholly reduced to writing in our time, both 
because of the ignorance of scribes and because of the confused multiplicity of those same 
laws and rules‖.41 In fact, at best we can only speculate on how much each trial as an oral 
                                                                                                                                                        
looser, whereby ―the authority of a court‘s own prior decisions depends largely on the persuasiveness of the 
reasoning of those earlier courts‖. The authors still argue that despite this softening of the literal interpretation of 
stare decisis in England, it remains far stricter than the practice in America. See P.S. Atiyah and R. Summers, 
Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 118-120. 
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 Ranulf de Glanville, Tractatus De Legibus & Consuetudinibus Regni Angliae Tempore Regis Henrici Secundi 
Compositus, Iusticia Gubernacula Tenente Illustri Viro Ranulpho De Glanuilla Iuris Regni & Antiquarum 
Conseutudinum Eo Tempore Peritissimo. Et Illas Solum Leges Continet & Consuetudines Secundum Quas 
Placitatur in Curia Regis Ad Scaccarium & Coram Iusticijs Vbicunque Fuerint (London: A. Islip, 1604) quoted 
in M. Evans and R. Ian Jack, eds., Sources of English Legal and Constitutional History (Sydney: Butterworths, 
1984), 21. 
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 Paul Brand, The Origins of the English Legal Profession (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 17.  
41
 Glanville quoted in Evans and Jack, Sources, 22.  
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practice (or, indeed, discrete performance) conformed to the later generalised descriptions of 
trial proceedings, and whether the limited records that document proceedings accurately 
reflect the majority of trials. As such, while my analysis of early trial practice will draw on 
these documents, exactly what took place in the trials of 800 years ago is something of which 
we can never be certain.   
 
Trial by Ordeal  
 
In 1201, the third year in the reign of King John, Agnes of Chilleu was murdered. Agnes 
lived in Eastwivelshire, Cornwall, and suspicion immediately fell upon William Fisman who 
lived in her village. When the Cornish Eyre (the rural circuit court) was held in 1201, 
presided over by the King‘s Justices, the representatives of the ‗hundred‘ of Eastwivelshire 
gathered at Launceston with the representatives of Kerrier, Powdershire, Triggshire, 
Pydershire, and Lesnewth.42 After being sworn, the representatives from Eastwivelshire 
related Agnes‘ murder and their suspicions. They stated that Fisman had been heard 
threatening Agnes of Chilleu‘s ―body and goods‖ the day before her murder. The ‗jurors of 
presentment‘, formed from knights from four different villages in the area, declared there to 
be a reasonable suspicion that Fisman had murdered Agnes.43 However, as there was no 
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 F.W. Maitland, ed., Select Pleas of the Crown: Volume 1—A.D. 1200-1225 (London: Bernard Quaritch, 
1888), 3. The ‗Eyre‘ is essentially a grand hearing where the King‘s Justices travelled to (six) different shires in 
England to hear from each of these areas (‗sheriff‘ comes from ‗shire-reeve‘). Representatives (male 
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Thomas Smith‘s time, they were held four times a year. Other records indicate that earlier Eyres were held only 
twice a year. For detailed description of the Eyre, see Daniel Klerman, ―Was the Jury Ever Self-Informing?,‖ in 
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(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 58-80.  
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 Although they are referred to as ‗jurors‘ in the Pleas of the Crown, the ‗jurors of presentment‘ more closely 
resemble (and indeed are the genesis of) the grand jury that decides at a hearing whether there is enough 
evidence to charge an accused. In America, the grand jury is required to hear all indictable federal criminal 
charges. On a State level, about half of America‘s states use grand juries for criminal and non-criminal hearings. 
In the U.K., the grand jury was replaced in 1933. In Australia, too, there are no longer grand juries, with the 
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absolute proof of the crime (Fisman was not seen in the act), and Fisman did not confess at 
the Eyre he was consequently ordered to ―purge himself by water under the assize‖.44  
 
The rudimentary records of this case that have come down to us go no further than this. 
However, the details of such an ordeal are well enough known from other sources to provide 
a detailed example of what might have happened.45 On the Christian Sabbath, the day of the 
ordeal, the person accused would be in the company of the local priest, with whom he had 
stayed since the previous Tuesday.46 He would be living an ascetic existence, praying and 
fasting for three days, subsisting on bread, water and watercress. 47 On Sunday, the person 
accused would rise at dawn to pray with the priest before attending Mass with the whole 
village. After the mass concluded, he would be stripped naked in the church. A linen 
loincloth would be tied to hide his genitals. He would then be led in a formal procession from 
the door of the church to the pool of water set aside for his ordeal. During this procession, the 
townspeople would pray and chant liturgy with the priest. The pool would be roughly 12 feet 
deep and 20 feet wide, the surface partially covered by wooden boards on which the priest 
and the person accused would stand.  A rope would then be ―bound around his loins‖ and 
another knot tied to where the longest hairs on his head reached.48 His hands would then be 
tied together under his knees. He would now be naked but for the loincloth, bound, and 
hunched over on the wooden boards before the priest and the village. The person accused 
                                                                                                                                                        
exception being provision 354 in Victoria‘s Crimes Act, which allows private citizens to apply for a grand jury 
hearing when the Department of Public Prosecutions refuses to prosecute.  
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 It is likely that Fisman was present at this Eyre, as all defendants were compelled to attend. The plea rolls 
themselves do not always record this information, however, nor do they record whether the sentence passed is 
carried out. The ‗assize‘ is a reference to the 1166 Assize of Clarendon. The Clarendon assize also formalised 
the ‗jurors of presentment‘.  
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 In the following account of Fisman‘s ordeal, I am drawing on an account of an ordeal that dates from 
somewhere between 1070 and 1130. This account can be found in Margaret Kerr et al., ―Cold Water and Hot 
Iron: Trial by Ordeal in England,‖ Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 22.4 (Spring 1992): 573-595. 
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 By using the term ‗person accused‘ rather than ‗the accused‘, I am making a distinction between the person 
sentenced to undergo an ordeal and a person committed to a modern trial. Although both have been accused of a 
crime, in the trial by ordeal, the person is deemed malcreditus, or probably guilty. This means that they are not 
comparable to the defendant of our contemporary trial, who is presumed innocent until found guilty at trial.  
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 As I will detail later in the chapter, the ordeal by water was almost exclusively used to try males, and not 
females, consequently I will refer to the person accused as a male in this account.   
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 Ibid., 583. The detail about the knot tie is unclear. It may indicate that men at that time had hair that grew past 
their shoulders  and that the knot would be fixed at the spot around his back where the longest hairs reached.  
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would know that if he sank to where the knot was tied around him, he would be saved and 
immediately drawn out of the water by the witnesses under order from the priest. If he 
floated, however, he would be found guilty and subsequently hanged. Lowered slowly into 
the freezing water by a few villagers, the body of the person accused must have hung from 
the rope in suspended animation, between being lifted and being lowered, being saved and 
being damned.     
 
As history does not record what happened to almost any other person sentenced to ordeal 
under the assize (including Fisman), it is difficult to be certain about exactly what happened 
during these trials. We do know that in the ordeal by water, the accused was stripped, and we 
know that he was lowered or thrown into the water. If he sank, he would be saved, and if he 
floated, he would be damned.49 We also know that this ordeal was primarily reserved for the 
peasantry and overwhelmingly for men. Women were usually sentenced to a different ordeal: 
trial by hot iron.50  
 
Another plea roll entry from the same Eyre in Cornwall records a person being sentenced to 
this ordeal. Wulward of Wadebridge, from Pydwedshire, complains that a marauding gang 
has robbed him. The jurors of presentment at the Eyre name no fewer than seven suspects. 
Six of the suspects are male, and one female: “Wulward of Wadebridge was burgled. And 
Odo Hay, Lawrence Smith, Osbert Mediciner, and Benet his son, William Miller, Robert of 
Frokemere, and Maud his sister, are suspected of the burglary by the jurors of the hundred 
and by the four nearest townships, which are sworn‖. The sentence of the King‘s Justice is 
―Let the males purge themselves by water under the Assize, and Maud by ordeal of iron‖. 51 
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 Interestingly, the inverse has also been documented in Europe, where sinking was a sign of guilt (God‘s hand 
pushing the accused under the water) and floating being saved. Although the account of trial by cold water is 
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Why men and women were sentenced to different ordeals will be explored later in this 
chapter.52 It is sufficient to note at this point, however, that Maud of Frokemere‘s ordeal 
would have been radically different in practice to that of William Fisman. The framing of the 
event, on the other hand, would have been remarkably similar.53 In this ordeal, Maud would 
be living with the priest, fasting and praying. The ordeal would also take place on the 
Sabbath. Before Mass, the priest would place the (cold) iron before the altar. Maud would 
attend Mass along with the rest of the village. This time, however, the priest would remove 
his chasuble or tunic that forms the outermost layer of his garments.54 The priest would then 
use a pair of tongs to take the iron placed before the altar. Singing Benedicite Omnia Opera 
(The Song of Creation) the priest would place the iron in the fire in the church. After 
sprinkling the iron with holy water, the priest would celebrate Mass while it heated. The 
villagers would be present throughout the entire ceremony.  
 
After Mass, the priest would then take the iron off the fire and lay it on wood, before reading 
the gospel. The iron would again be sprinkled with holy water. Only then would Maud be 
given the iron that she had to carry in her right hand for nine paces. Once this was done, 
Maud‘s hand would be bound for three days. On the third day, the priest would examine her 
hand (again watched by the villagers). If the burn of the iron had festered, this proved her 
guilt and she would be executed. However, if the wound was clean, this determined that 
Maud was innocent of all the charges laid against her. In this instance, Maud, the priest and 
the villagers would ―give praise and glory to God‖. 55  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
sword. Sadly again there is no record as to whether Odo underwent one ordeal, or both. See F.W. Maitland, ed., 
Pleas of the Crown, 5. 
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Robert Bartlett, Trial By Fire and Water: The Medieval Judicial Ordeal (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 94.  
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The Body as God‟s Instrument 
 
Trials by ordeal, whether by fire, water, battle or (presumably the preferred option) ―blessed 
bread‖, flourished during Anglo-Saxon and Norman England until 1215, when a Papal decree 
banning priests from officiating at ordeals saw the end of this form of trial.56 There are two 
striking continuities between the two forms of ordeal outlined above. Firstly, there is the 
physical violence inflicted on the person accused. Trials of ordeal were quite literal. The body 
of the person accused was forced to undergo pain and violence to ‗test‘ his or her guilt or 
innocence. These ordeals were trials of the body as God‘s instrument, and when a person 
underwent the ordeal, he or she was submitting his or her body to the Will of God. 
 
The physical body of the person accused was the crucible in which his or her godliness was 
weighed and judged. Submission was total, and the outcome was entirely left up to Divine 
Judgement, as God was believed to intercede directly in the outcome. In this respect, the 
ordeal was similar to undergoing a religious test, like the trials of the saints. Indeed, this 
resemblance is quite explicit in some forms of ordeal, such as the bearing of the cross (which 
was not practised widely, if ever, in England). The rigid dichotomy of salvation and 
damnation in this form of trial suggests that they involved more of a final judgement about 
the soul of the accused than simply a determination of guilt or innocence in a specific crime.  
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 Trial by battle was introduced by the Normans after 1066. The right to trial by battle was not formally 
abolished until 1819 in England. In some ways, this is less like other ordeals as it is what Robert Bartlett calls 
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The idea of God directly intervening in the outcome of an ordeal was also seen as blasphemous. 
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The danger and violence of each form of ordeal varied, but any method risked the life of the 
person accused to varying extents. Even in what was probably the safest method—the case of 
trial by hot iron—the possibility of developing a lethal infection cannot be ruled out. In the 
ordeal by cold water, as Sadakat Kadri has pointed out in The Trial, ―[t]hose who sank 
convincingly enough were vindicated and, with luck, resuscitated‖.57 Underlying these 
immediate physical ‗trials‘ was the very real threat of failing the ordeal. If this happened, the 
accused would be executed by the state. The body of the person accused was therefore 
literally in suspended animation: strung between life and death for the length of the ordeal. 
 
The second striking continuity is the heavily religious content and context. Ordeals reveal a 
great deal about the hierarchies of 12
th
 century England. The outcome of a trial by ordeal may 
nominally have been determined by God‘s judgement, but it remained a social process that 
was organised, performed and judged by the (Catholic) Church or, more accurately, its 
representative on the ground, the local priest. The performance of the ordeal was not simply 
emphasising the authority of God (arguably as a means of alleviating blame for inflicting 
violence). The ordeal also naturalised the crucial role of the priest as mediator between God 
and the community. It was only through the priest‘s attendance, administration, and blessing 
that God would become part of the ordeal and sanctify the proceedings. In the trial by ordeal 
the relative passivity of the physical body was used by the Church to illustrate its subservient 
position as being an instrument of not only God, but also subject to the will of the Church.    
 
This emphasis on the role of the priest as mediator reflects the dominance of the Church in 
England in the 12
th
 century. In this feudal country, very few people would ever travel more 
than a few miles from their birthplace, and consequently their connection with the two seats 
of power in the country—the church and the King‘s court—was indirect, through their 
contact with their local priest and feudal lord. However, although the King was (arguably) the 
apex of the hierarchy, it was the Church as an institution that wielded the most influence at 
this time.58 For the villagers on the ground, they would have far more contact with their local 
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 Stating that the King was the apex of the hierarchy is an oversimplification, as the competing interests of the 
Church and the monarch caused a great deal of debate and bloodshed (notably Thomas Beckett‘s) in the 12 th 
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priest than they ever might with their feudal lord. By the 12
th
 century, the Church was a 
―great corporate body‖ whose reach extended into every village.59  
 
The Church was also a developed profession and industry that controlled the distribution of 
knowledge in the country, due to the literacy and record keeping of the priests. In the 12
th
 and 
13
th
 centuries the population of England was overwhelmingly illiterate (and this condition 
extended to much of the aristocracy; only the clergy were reasonably certain to be literate) 
where learning was in the hands of the very few. At this time, transcripts of cases (recorded 
in Plea Rolls and documentation of the Curia Regis) were only just beginning; consequently, 
there was only a very nascent common law.60 Added to this, there was no formal secular legal 
training, with the King‘s Justices usually being members of the King‘s household who 
worked part-time (in fact, the only systematic legal training was ecclesiastical law).61 In terms 
of law, the only relatively professionalised field was the Church, and it is only the Church 
that could provide the means of systematic legal recourse to have binding authority over a 
community member in a feudal society.62  
 
The Trial by Ordeal as a Performance of Tradition  
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From a modern perspective, the trial by ordeal seems a strange and violent practice. Indeed 
many contemporaries, particularly legal practitioners, would be loath to believe that there is 
any continuity between this form of trial and our contemporary adversarial criminal jury trial. 
There are certainly radical differences. For example, if we understand the purpose of any kind 
of trial to be either conflict resolution or a means of fact-finding, then the trials by ordeal 
would have to be excluded from this category since evidence and testimony have no role in 
the proceedings. This function, instead, belongs to the ‗jurors of presentment‘ at the Eyre.63 
The trials by ordeal do not further information about the details of the alleged crime itself, 
and the trials by ordeal do not necessarily specifically determine whether or not the accused 
has committed the crime. The ordeal‘s determination regarding the salvation or damnation 
(the life or death) of the accused is a broader judgement on his or her soul. Indeed, there are 
several documented cases where accused people confessed before the ordeal took place and 
then passed the ordeal.64  
 
However, it is also easy to overestimate the violence or strangeness of these ordeals. Popular 
ideas regarding trials by ordeal tend to see them as a form of torture being applied randomly 
and baselessly. This is without strong foundation. Ordeals were only ever used when the 
‗jurors of presentment‘ had strong basis for suspicion. This jury was not simply a clique of 
superstitious witch hunters. Instead, it was a well-informed selection of local representatives 
who were likely to have had personal knowledge of the accused, accuser and alleged crime. 
The plea rolls refer to jurors debating the value of different kinds of evidence, including 
hearsay and eyewitness testimony. The standards applied then are not dissimilar to now, with 
hearsay not being considered reliable as proof, and eyewitness testimony being carefully 
considered.  
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 The Eyre is the closest equivalent to the trial as we understand it today—a forum which determines the 
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 Kerr et al., 578. 
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Indeed, some writers take this defence of trials by ordeal even further. For example, in a 1992 
article, Margaret Kerr et al argue that a case can be made for the trial by ordeal as 
―therapeutic‖.65 Kerr and her colleagues note that statistically those persons accused were 
quite likely to ‗pass‘ the trials by ordeal and they consequently suggest that the ordeals were 
somewhat deliberately staged. An example of this alleged ‗staging‘ is the very low rate of 
women sentenced to ordeal by cold water. Whilst we can never be certain why this is, Kerr‘s 
article presents the case that this is because women were far more likely than men to float.66 
In other words, the authors of this article argue that the trial by ordeal (conducted by the 
church) may well have been a means of protecting people from the dangers of the secular 
law, where there was little in the way of nuanced sentencing and all felony convictions 
attracted death by hanging.  
 
However, although there may be some truth to the idea of the church limiting state-
sanctioned murder, ultimately the theory of the ordeal as ―therapeutic‖ is unconvincing.67 
This is because of the undeniable violence of the ordeal itself, with proof of guilt or 
innocence pivoting around possible burns, drowning and other injuries. Beyond this, there is 
the attached threat of execution. A person accused could not rely on the priest‘s moral 
conscience to pass him/her safely through the ordeal. Coupled with this, the vast majority of 
those who passed the ordeal were immediately banished by the State. The innocence 
determined by the ordeal clearly did not translate into acquittal of suspicion. Anyone who 
was under heavy enough suspicion to be sentenced to ordeal was therefore probably guilty 
(malcreditus), even if there was no absolute proof.  
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The trials by ordeal were indeed radically different to contemporary trial practice, even if 
they were not random acts of torture. However, I would nevertheless argue there is continuity 
between this form of trial and our contemporary adversarial criminal jury trial. Maureen 
Mulholland observes: 
Although these ordeals were tests, they can legitimately be described as trials […] since they took place 
in a forensic context, albeit a religious one, and they were conducted by representatives of authority 
whose jurisdiction was accepted by the participants, and whose definitive decision or judgment would 
be accepted as binding by them and by the society in which they functioned.
68 
The real value of the ordeal lay in the presence of the community. The village was always 
present at the ordeal. Although this allowed ordeals to be painted as a form of localised 
redress (and to some extent it was), not to mention a form of entertainment, what the ordeals 
also did was enact over and over again the authority of the church over the community.69 The 
trial by ordeal was a trial in the sense that it was mounted by an authority that had binding 
and accepted jurisdiction over the population. Bartlett comments: ―The privilege of 
conducting ordeals enhanced the dignity of their [the Church‘s] jurisdiction and, in many 
cases, placed in their hands the power to decide guilt or innocence‖.70 The priest pronounced 
whether a villager lived or died based on the signs given from God. The physical body of the 
accused was visually and violently made subject to the will of God through the Church. 
Therefore, the ordeal became both a representation and enactment of the power of God‘s 
Judgement (both real and symbolic). An alleged crime was co-opted by church authorities 
and reconfigured into the discourse of the Church. Guilt or innocence became the dichotomy 
of being saved or being damned which was then witnessed by the community.  
 
The power and violence of the ordeal arguably displaced the authority of the secular law. By 
putting the ordeal in the hands of the Church, a clear message was sent to the populace about 
their role in the social order. In anthropological terms, this function may be read as a form of 
social control. However, the important distinction I make to this, and to Barlett‘s comment 
that ordeals ―enhanced the dignity‖ or power of the priests, is that the trial by ordeal did not 
merely reflect the authority of the Church: it helped manufacture it. This is an amendment to 
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Chief Justice Underwood‘s argument as well. The trial is not ―ordained‖, rather trial 
participants continually reassert the trial‘s ordination through repeated performance. It was 
the public doing of the trial by ordeal that lent authority to the Church and the local priest, 
rather than the trial by ordeal simply being a by-product of authority.  
 
In this way, the trial by ordeal enacted repeatedly the relative frailty of the physical body of 
the human, the awesome power of God, and (most importantly) the Catholic Church as 
intermediary. The repeated violent subjection of the body, the cooption of the proceedings by 
the Church, the heavy use of religious symbols and sacred language emphasised the 
appearance of antiquity and immovability in what was in fact not a static institution but rather 
a growing field of practice whose agents (or at least many of the bishops and archbishops if 
not every local priest) were constantly seeking to extend their power and authority. This 
constantly re-enacted process of legitimation is what I define as a performance of tradition. It 
is this performance of tradition that remains the consistent feature of all three forms of trial 
outlined in this chapter, including our contemporary adversarial criminal jury trial.   
 
 “Lord how bloody Mother Broom is!”: The Altercation Trial  
 
On the 11
th
 of September 1739, John Broom was murdered. Broom, who lived in St. Paul 
Shadwell, died from a stab wound to his leg. His wife, one Susannah Broom, was arrested for 
the crime, and subsequently tried. The charge read as follows: 
Susannah Broom, of St. Paul Shadwell, was indicted, for that she, not having GOD before her Eyes, &c. 
on the 11th of September, in and upon John Broom, her Husband, feloniously and traiterously did make 
an Assault, and with a certain Knife made of Iron and Steel, val. 1 d. which she the said Susannah had 
and held in her Right Hand, him the said John, in and upon the Inside of the Calf of the Right Leg, did 
strike, stab and thrust, giving him a mortal Wound of the Length of four Iuches, and the Depth of two 
Inches, of which mortal Wound he instantly died.
71
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 This is a verbatim extract from the Old Bailey Sessions Papers, including the inconsistent spelling of ‗iuches‘ 
and ‗inches‘. The use of the term ―traiterously‖ refers to the allegiance a wife owed her husband. A wife 
murdering a husband was equivalent to a servant murdering their master. Old Bailey Proceedings Online 
(www.oldbaileyonline.org, 27 April 2008, hereafter OBSP, all accessed 27
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 April 2008) December 1739, trial 
of Susannah Broom, (t17391205-2).  
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Susannah Broom‘s trial was held at the Old Bailey on the 5th December 1739, less than three 
months after the murder. The following is an extract from the proceedings: 
 
        Prisoner:      Did you ever see me take up any Edge-Tool, any Scissars, or Knife , to abuse him with? 
 
Coombes:  I have seen her beat him several times with the Poker, and have heard him cry out Murder!  
She came to Mrs. Birch, about a Month before this Fact was committed, in a desperate    
passion and said, This Man won‘t pay my Rent, - I shall be murdered for him. I have seen her 
go down the Street with him, and as she has gone along with him, she has beat his Head 
against a Sash-Window, and broke it.  
Prisoner:      Fye upon you! He went to get a Stick to beat me with; - did he not? 
72
 
No less than eight people testified, including the Brooms‘ neighbour, William Allen.73 Allen 
testified that Susannah Broom was the ―wickedest woman on earth‖ rejecting her defence that 
her husband physically abused her. All the witnesses accused her of maltreating her husband 
by locking him out. This was because, according to Susannah Broom, her husband was 
spending all his money on ―whores‖. The transcript of the trial goes for a number of pages in 
considerable detail. The depth of information provided by these records allows insight into an 
unhappy marriage more than 250 years ago. This is because by the 18
th
 century, case 
judgements were assiduously recorded, reflecting the now entrenched place of the secular 
common law system.  
 
Susannah Broom was found guilty, condemned to death and subsequently executed. 
However, unlike her predecessors in the trials by ordeal, Mrs Broom was allowed to give her 
account of the story, as witnessed in the above interchange. The process is what John 
Langbein calls ―altercation‖, where ―the victim and the accusing witnesses engage the 
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 Allen‘s testimony was as follows: ―William Allen: ‗I knew the Prisoner and her Husband: He was an old 
Man, about Sixty. I live in a Room adjoining to that in which they liv'd. About three Months ago, - I can't tell 
the Day of the Month, but it was the Night the great Thunder and Lightning happen'd, about One or Two 
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defendant in a confrontational dialogue about the circumstance of the alleged offense‖ with a 
jury determining a defendant‘s guilt or innocence.74 The earliest written reference to the 
altercation trial is seen in Sir Thomas Smith‘s De Republica Anglorum in 1583; however, it 
was in practice from the mid-13
th
 century.75 In his chapter on trial process Smith says: ―These 
[trials] be set in such a place as they may see the Judges and the Justices, the enquest (jury) 
and the prisoner, and heare them, and be heard of them all‖.76 The level of detail the trial went 
into was relatively unrestricted and both accuser and accused could relate their story in full.77 
As Smith comments, the accuser may say (after being sworn): ―I knowe thee well ynough, 
thou robbest me in such a place, thou beatest mee, thou tookest my horse from mee, and my 
purse, thou hadst then such a coate and such a man in thy companie‖.78  
 
Normally, as Smith observes: ―the theefe will say no, and so they stand a while in 
altercation‖.79 The altercation trial‘s content was a relatively informal argument between the 
plaintiff and the defendant. Accuser and accused spoke for ―himselfe‖ or herself as did the 
witnesses. The jury spoke too. There was no counsel and no mediation of any kind, except for 
the king being represented in the body of the judge. Although by this time the legal 
profession had formal training, lawyers were not involved in criminal matters.80 The concept 
of lawyer as mediator was believed to hinder a fair trial, rather than facilitate it. Lawyer 
William Hawkins, commented in Pleas of the Crown in 1721:  
Every one of common Understanding may as properly speak to a Matter of Fact, as if he were the best 
Lawyer. It requires no manner of Skill to make a plain and honest Defence. The Simplicity and 
                                                 
74
 Langbein, Origins, 13. 
75
 After the ending of trials by ordeal, most of Europe was looking for a new means of trial. The English 
eventually (after a period of indefinitely detaining those accused of a crime) extended the function of the Eyre 
into determining final guilt or innocence through use of a jury (who were separate to the jurors of presentment). 
This form of trial is very similar to adversarial procedure, with the exception of the absence of counsel.  
76
 Sir Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum, 80.  
77
 Although considering the average length of these trials was about 15 to 20 minutes, the detail must have been 
somewhat restricted by the presiding King‘s Justice. 
78
 Sir Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum, 80.  
79
 Ibid., 80. 
80
 Lawyers appeared in litigations and various other non-criminal suits. By the 1400s, they were thriving as a 
profession, with the establishment of the Inns of Courts leading to a relatively professionalised apprenticeship 
system that insured a steady growth of legal practitioners. For more information on the development of the legal 
profession in medieval times, see Paul Brand, The Origins of the English Legal Profession, supra n. 40.  
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Innocence artless and ingenuous Behaviour of one whose conscience acquits him, has something in it 
more moving and convincing than the highest Eloquence of persons speaking in a Cause not their own.
81
 
Hawkins‘ statement affirms the belief in the trial as a means to find the ‗truth‘. His reference 
to a ―plain and honest‖ defence arises from the belief that artlessness is innocence, and that 
simply watching a person conducting his or her own defence (and behaving ‗naturally‘) will 
allow a jury to make an informed decision as to his or her innocence or guilt. Consequently at 
this point in history it was a defendant‘s embodied performance in the courtroom, not simply 
his or her words, that was believed to be the key to whether he or she was telling the truth. 
This assessment of credibility through a defendant‘s embodied behaviour is still a feature of 
the adversarial criminal jury trial today.  
 
The Jury in the Altercation Trial 
 
The structure of the altercation trial was considerably formalised in comparison to the 
proceedings of the Eyre from which it developed. In the Eyre, all the landed population had 
to attend to swear an oath to the King. However, the spatial arrangement of the Eyre was 
relatively unregulated (as far as we know). In the altercation trial, however, defendants were 
for the first time deliberately placed facing the Justices and the jurors in a designated space 
(which later became the dock). The accused and accuser were also formally required to 
confront one another in this public space. This confrontation of two parties conducting their 
own prosecution and defence allowed a jury to determine the truth of what happened: ―When 
the Judge hath heard them say inough, he asketh if they can say any more: if they say no, then 
he turneth his speeche to the enquest (jury). Good men (saith he) ye of the enquest, ye have 
heard what these men say against the prisoner, you have also heard what the prisoner can say 
for himself‖.82 
 
The way in which the jury deliberated also shifted throughout the time of the altercation trial. 
The original jury of altercation (in the 13
th
 and 14
th
 centuries) was almost identical to the 
jurors of presentment at the Eyre. That is, the jurors were a group of locals with knowledge of 
the details, circumstances and people involved in the alleged crime. Personal knowledge of 
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the defendant was valued as an asset of early juries. Clearly, the assumption was that people 
who knew the defendant would be more likely to know whether he or she was lying or not. 
The early jury‘s assessment of a defendant during his or her trial was considered through a 
personal knowledge of those involved, as well as grounding in the evidence of the case.  
 
However, the increase in population, and the growth of fixed courtrooms led to the 
development of hubs, or small legal worlds in specific areas, notably the Inns of Court around 
the Old Bailey and Westminster.83 Legal actions were held in these places for administrative 
ease. This meant that the jurors selected at a trial were no longer necessarily from the 
accused‘s area and no longer had personal knowledge of the circumstances of the crime. This 
resulted in a jury that was not ―self-informed‖.84 Consequently, juries became far more reliant 
on the mediation of the courts to inform them as to the circumstances of the case.  
 
What resulted was the concept of ‗impartial demeanour assessment‘: the practice by which a 
jury is expected to assess the credibility of a witness through observation, despite having no 
prior knowledge of the person and his or her customary behaviour. I argue that the 
development of the impartial jury is at least partially a retrospective justification for what was 
a by-product of economic development and the growth of the juridical field. Whilst legal 
agents have subsequently valorised the concept of impartiality in the jury, this valorisation 
also cloaks the jury‘s increasing passivity. Once juries were no longer personally involved in 
the case, they no longer provided evidence of their own or debated matters, relying wholly on 
the courts for information. Consequently, juror interjections in the altercation trials became 
less and less frequent. Whilst the rise of the lawyer and the adversarial trial sounded the death 
knell of the active jury, the developments of the altercation trial had already placed the jury 
on a path to increasing passivity and reliance on legal agents.  
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Truth, Demeanour and Storytelling: Reading the Body 
 
The shift in the role of the jury led to a reconceptualising of the role of the body in the 
criminal trial. Both trials by ordeal and altercation trials required the presence of the body of 
the accused. Altercation trials remained trials of the body to the extent that the truth would be 
determined through demeanour assessment. The major difference in belief structures is that 
rather than God intervening directly (as in the trials by ordeal), in the altercation trial God‘s 
will is carried out by the State, and the wisdom to see the truth (or sniff out duplicity) is given 
to the triers of fact (the jury and the judge) by God.  
 
The slightly mystical power of demeanour assessment also entails a lack of accountability for 
the decision; demeanour assessment was not necessarily considered subjective by the King‘s 
Justices at the time because what the triers of fact were reading through confrontation was a 
message revealed by a higher authority.85 In this respect, it would certainly be incorrect to 
assume that the rise of the altercation trial somehow alluded to an entirely secular trial. As 
John Fortescue, writing in the 15
th
 century, comments: ―For as the Apostle saith: All power is 
from ye Lord God. Wherefore the lawes, that are made by man, which thereunto hath 
receiued power fro[m] the Lord, are also ordained of God‖.86 This is certainly reflected in the 
biblical styling of the charges against Susannah where she is accused of not ―having GOD 
before her eyes‖. The altercation trial is certainly a more secular proceeding, relying far more 
on evidence and testimony than previously, however, the context remained heavily religious, 
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combining elements of the divine along with elements of the monarchical state. This is in 
keeping with the belief at the time that the King was ordained by God and represented God‘s 
will on earth. The King‘s authority was the binding jurisdiction over the community who 
subjected themselves to his will.87   
 
The Altercation Trial and the Performance of Tradition 
 
The altercation trial was not wholly secular, then, but it was far less violent than the Church 
facilitated trials by ordeal. In the above trial, Susannah Broom did not undergo visible, 
physical torture to determine her punishment, although the threat of subsequent execution 
remained (and was fulfilled). Other aspects of trial were also more advantageous to the 
defence. Susannah Broom had a considerable amount of agency that Maud of Frokemere and 
William Fisman never had. In the ordeal, a defendant‘s passive body was the instrument of 
the voice of God, but, comparatively speaking, in this altercation trial, Susannah Broom had 
more power and had her own voice. 
 
However, despite this agency, altercation trials remained in many ways quite draconian. 
Although witnesses, juries, complainants and defendants could all speak, the defendant was 
still unable to provide sworn testimony. This may have risked a jury inferring the accused 
was untrustworthy. Added to this, although there were witnesses, their roles were strictly 
defined. Witnesses for the defence were not allowed to do anything but make assertions about 
the defendant‘s character. The only person able to narrate the defendant‘s story was the 
defendant him or herself. Susannah could not bring witnesses to support her version of 
events, which means that the more witnesses summoned by the prosecution, the more 
overwhelming the testimony seemed against her. 
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This was aggravated after the mid-16
th
 century because of the pre-trial role of the Justice of 
the Peace. Enacted in legislation in 1555 (although undoubtedly in service before this), the JP 
was charged with helping the accuser prepare materials for prosecution. The JP had the 
power to execute search warrants and interview witnesses. However, his responsibility was 
only to gather evidence for the prosecution, not the defence. This resulted in an extremely 
lopsided situation (as evidenced above by the eight witnesses testifying against Susannah 
Broom).   
 
Further, in contrast to the assistance given to the accuser by the court, the defendant was, 
extraordinarily enough, not informed of what he/she was charged with until the arraignment 
where, for the first time, it was translated from Latin and read aloud in the place of trial. This 
in particular seems like a major disadvantage to the accused, but as Beattie comments: ―It 
was believed that the truth would be most clearly revealed if the prisoner was confronted with 
the evidence only in the courtroom so that the jury could judge the quality of his immediate 
unprepared response‖.88 The emphasis on immediacy and spontaneity was central to this 
mode of trial. A trial seldom lasted more than 15 to 20 minutes and in the court at 
Westminster the two sitting juries on each side of the courtroom were rotated onto each trial. 
While one jury deliberated a verdict, the other jury heard a new trial.89 In this kind of trial, the 
accused could only answer the charges immediately and honestly and by his or her 
‗artlessness‘ and ‗honest demeanour‘ either acquit him or herself or by his or her 
untrustworthy exterior and lack of spontaneity and ‗truth‘ be condemned. 
 
Whilst altercation trials were not violent forms of torture, they involved a high-stakes form of 
performance for the defendant. The jury would judge the accused‘s demeanour and behaviour 
during the trial through procedures where the odds were stacked against the accused. These 
procedures predate any presumption of innocence. They also reflect a kind of economic 
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rationalism on the part of the state. While the immediacy of someone‘s response was 
presented as a gateway to truth-telling, the question of cost also undoubtedly figured. The 
incredible speed with which these trials were conducted suggests a legal system trying to get 
through as many trials as efficiently as possible and it was perhaps initially somewhat 
convenient to value immediacy as associated with truth-telling although it subsequently 
became an entrenched belief that is still pertinent in the contemporary adversarial criminal 
jury trial.  
 
The symbolic context of the altercation trial also further reduced a defendant‘s poor chances. 
Firstly, the accused was usually kept in gaol until their appearance. Unless they were 
wealthy, they did not have access to clothes and means to wash. This meant that by the time 
they came to trial, they were often filthy. Defendants were also frequently in chains that, like 
their inability to be sworn, allowed the jury to infer that they were untrustworthy, guilty 
and/or dangerous. The subjection of the defendant deliberately emphasised his or her frailty 
before the might of legal majesty which had reached a pitch with the establishment of 
permanent court buildings, the first at Westminster Hall in 1215, followed by several others 
in major towns, including the Old Bailey in London. These courtrooms, like those of today, 
were grand spaces filled with symbols of religious and secular authority. By the 17
th
 century 
(if not before) judges were wearing robes of state and wigs. The purpose of these 
surroundings was to emphasise and naturalise the law of the land as dictated by the absolute 
monarch and as orchestrated by the legal profession.
90
  
 
The altercation trial as a performance of tradition benefited from orchestrating a defendant‘s 
guilt, whereby individuals threw themselves on the mercy of the state, both during the trial 
and after (if they were found guilty) enacting over and over again their insignificance and 
dependence. This means that although the proceedings were less explicitly violent, and more 
symbolic, the symbolism did not replace violence, but rather cloaked it in ceremony. 
Significant control and coercion continued to underlie the altercation trial.
91
 All of this both 
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reflected (and helped construct) the power of the King‘s Law as mediated through legal 
agents who were part of an increasingly professionalised juridical field.  
 
Adversarial Trial: The Rise of the Lawyer 
Adversary procedure presupposed that truth would somehow emerge when no one was in charge of 
seeking it.
92
 
Plaine words are brought, from plow & country plain,  
To finde plaine deedes, a friend to plainnes cace,  
In open court, then plainnes doth complain  
Of wrong receiud, before true Iustice face,  
The pleading there, begins, but hath no end,  
A yeere or twaine, runs on with reasons great,  
Both parties so, much time and wealth doth spend,  
Whiles lawyars talk at barr in cold and heat:  
The matter oft, scarse woorth a lock of hey,  
Begun of nought, doth breed an endlesse pley. 
93
 
 
The transformation from the altercation trial into the adversarial procedure, best defined as a 
trial where the defence probes and tests the prosecution‘s case, can be attributed to one key 
factor: the rise of counsel.94 Over the course of several hundred years, the lawyer slowly 
infiltrates and eventually comes to dominate criminal proceedings. There is also a direct 
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inverse effect for the defendant. Whereas in the altercation trial the defendant told his or her 
own (unsworn) story in full, over the same several hundred years there is a gradual silencing 
of the defendant. Eventually, by the 1820s Cottu, a French observer of English courts, could 
remark ―the accused does so little in his own defence that his hat on a pole might without 
inconvenience be his substitute at trial‖.95 
 
This growth of legal representation by third party specialists is charted revealingly in the Old 
Bailey Session Papers. By the 1790s the defence counsel are often clearly present, as seen in 
the 1781 trial of Bennet Harbourne and Henry Haslam for theft. In these Sessions Papers 
Harbourne says ―I leave my defence to counsel‖.96 In that same year, Elizabeth Harris was 
tried and acquitted of murdering her child. The Sessions Papers from her trial show clear 
evidence of cross-examination by a defence counsel. She herself says nothing.97   
 
Two major shifts happen during the transformation from altercation to adversarial procedure. 
Firstly, the job of storytelling is transferred from the defendant to the lawyer. Secondly, the 
confrontation between the plaintiff and defendant becomes by proxy: while both remain 
present in the courtroom (although the plaintiff does not have to be unless testifying), it is the 
lawyers who are effectively on the front line, with the defence testing the case of the 
prosecution. Direct clashes between plaintiff and defendant become almost non-existent, 
except in isolated cases where the defendant waives his or her right to counsel.98  
 
Previously, the defendant telling his or her own story was his or her lifeline: ―There was 
divers other People who said they had been Juggled out of their Money by her. She had little 
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to say for her self, the Jury found her Guilty‖.99 As William Hawkins argued in 1721, it was 
the ―artlessness‖ of the defendant that was believed to be the key to unlocking the truth. 
However only one hundred years later, An 1836 Parliamentary inquiry (that resulted in 
defence counsel being officially allowed into the courtroom) found: ―It can seldom happen 
that an ordinary defendant can in such as situation (as a trial) possess the coolness and talent 
requisite for the task‖.100 By the mid-19th century, the accused was in need of talent and was 
believed to be disadvantaged without it.101 Indeed, by 1836 self-representation was seen as 
virtual suicide, summed up eloquently by William Garrow, notorious 18
th
 century criminal 
defender, and one of the early stars of the Bar, who wrote in the margins of one of his cases: 
―This prisoner was one of innumerable instances of persons who by making a speech 
occasion their own conviction‖.102 In the adversarial trial silence became not only beneficial 
for a defendant but also became subsequently enshrined as a right.103   
 
Evening the Odds  
  
This gradual process of ‗lawyering up‘ is attributed by John Langbein to an attempt to even 
the odds for the defendant. The altercation trials were heavily stacked towards the accuser. 
The growth of prosecution counsel made the disproportionate representation even more 
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89. Under s 20(2) of the same Act, a judge may ‗comment‘ on a defendant‘s failure to give evidence, but cannot 
imply that this silence signifies guilt. However, controversially in the U.K., this right to silence was overturned. 
From 1994 onwards, if a defendant refuses to answer a question put to him, a court and jury ―may draw such 
inferences from the failure or refusal as appear proper‖. See: Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
(U.K.), c 34-37.  
52 
 
extreme. Consequently, barriers to defence counsel in England were slowly lowered with the 
intention of providing protection for the accused.104 Initially this defence counsel was only 
allowed to assist the defendant in cross-examination. The defence counsel was explicitly 
barred from presenting any kind of narrative (in fact from any kind of speaking for the 
defendant). These restrictions demonstrate the importance attached at this time to the 
defendant‘s performance, in terms of his or her physical presence, demeanour, consistency of 
story and confrontation with the plaintiff. The reluctance to have someone else speak for the 
defendant is expressed eloquently by English legal writer Ferdinando Pulton, writing in the 
16
th
 century. Pulton commented: ―If counsel learned should plead (the defendant's) plea for 
him, and defend him, it may be that they would be so covert in their speeches, and so shadow 
the matter with words, and so attenuate the proofs and evidence, that it would be hard, or long 
to have the truth appear‖.105  
 
However, as Langbein observes, defence counsel usually managed to evade the legal 
limitation on narrative by asking long and complicated questions. Inevitably, judges could not 
control this because the more defence counsel was employed, the more they expanded and 
naturalised their roles as protectors of the individual from the potential tyranny of the judges 
and the State. Added to this, the increasingly formal legal procedure and the growing 
complexity of precedent and case law meant that counsel was required to navigate the 
proceedings for a layperson who was less and less likely to understand what went on during a 
criminal trial. The last barrier to fall was the restriction on defence counsel making opening 
and closing statements. Eventually the defendant was silenced and the lawyer dominated. 
   
                                                 
104
 This need for protection was also helped along by the disgraceful Stuart treason trials of the 17
th
 century 
where defendants were arrested, imprisoned, refused counsel and not told what they were charged with. This 
was, as observed, relatively standard procedure in felony trials but increasingly seen as unacceptable in trials for 
treason. See Langbein, Origins, 67-107.  
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 Ferdinando Pulton, An Abstract of All the Penal Statutes Which Be Generall, in Force & Yse Wherein Is 
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Maiors, Bailiffes, Customers, Comptrollers of Custome, Stewardes of Leets and Liberties, Aulnegers and 
Purueyours and What Things by the Letter of Seueral Statutes in Force They May, Ought, or Are Compellable 
to Do (London: Christopher Barker, Printer to the Queenes Maiestie, 1578), 107.  
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The Artificiality of Performance  
 
It is during the slow rise of counsel, from civil court practitioner to the dominant presence in 
the legal process that the first explicit references to the trial as ‗theatrical‘ occur. These 
references do not predate the mid-1500s, suggesting that those employing the analogy rely on 
the concept of the ‗theatre‘ as meaning a building that puts on plays, as opposed to earlier 
understandings of the term theatrical.106 All of these documents in which such references 
appear directly relate to the legal agent (primarily the lawyer) as performer. These writings 
also divide into two streams. The first stream is the writings by lawyers where the texts focus 
on career advice. One of the earliest examples of such advice is written by Jean Bodin, a 
French jurist. Published after his death in 1606 (and written some time during the late 1500s) 
Bodin draws on a theatrical analogy, that of role-play, to show how a magistrate should 
discharge his duties: 
As for the Magistrat, for that he is to regard many persons, hee must oftentimes change his port, his 
gesture, his speech and countenance, for the good performance of his dutie towards all: which no man 
can well discharge, except he first know his duty towards his Soueraigne prince, as also how to submit 
himselfe vnto the other Magistrats his superiours, how to respect his equals, and how to commaund his 
inferiours, how to defend the weake, to withstand the great, and to doe iustice to all. And that is it, for 
which the auntients commonly said, Magistracie or authoritie to declare what was in a man, hauing as it 
were vpon the stage in the Theatre, and in the sight of all men, to performe the parts of many persons.
107
 
Although Bodin is writing about inquisitorial procedure, his writing suggests that the 
magistrate (who in Europe both questions witnesses and determines guilt or innocence) is 
analogous to the multi-faceted actor of a theatre. As we can see, there is nothing pejorative in 
Bodin‘s attitude towards the theatre; rather he assumes that both the courtroom and the 
theatre involve extensive representation, and this representation entails responsibility. For 
Bodin, magistrates are not simply men performing a function; rather they are representatives 
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 Prior to the establishment of a fixed theatre building that staged dramas, the term ‗theatrical‘ denoted a more 
philosophical idea of a ‗seeing place‘, and was common in the high middle ages as a title for atlases (Theatrum 
Mundi). Glen McGillivray argues that this use of ‗theatrical‘ signifies a different and pre-renaissance concept of 
the self, where humans understood themselves in relation to an all-seeing God who watched over them. See 
Glen McGillivray, ―Theatricality: A Critical Genealogy,‖ supra n. 14. 
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 Jean Bodin, The Six Bookes of a Common-Weale. VVritten by I. Bodin a Famous Lawyer, and a Man of 
Great Experience in Matters of State. Out of the French and Latine Copies, Done into English, by Richard 
Knolles, Richard Knolles, ed. (London: Printed by Adam Islip impensis G. Bishop, 1606), 309. 
54 
 
of something greater; the State and their Sovereign. He notes that when magistrates are 
corrupt, they demean not only themselves but dishonour the State and their Sovereign Prince 
to whom they owe their ultimate duty. The theatrical analogy for Bodin, then, is a reminder to 
magistrates of the responsibility of representation; all legal agents are on a stage and being 
judged by the world and God.108  
 
The other stream of writings written by non-lawyers about lawyers is also concerned with the 
accountability of legal agents; however, these tend to take a rather more dim view of the 
whole profession. In these writings, the courtroom is a theatre in a pejorative sense—a sham, 
and a show and the lawyers are to blame. Lawyers have been unpopular for a long time in 
England. As early as the 1300s when they were still only allowed to conduct civil cases, 
lawyers were seen as needlessly and dishonestly extending the proceedings to line their 
pockets.109 This attitude was not restricted to the English. The 14
th
 century commentator 
Marsilius of Padua stated: ―what falshed is there so great, whiche is not gayly coloured and 
paynted, by the subtylite (I wyll not say duplicite) of the lawyers selues‖.110 In fact, the 
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 As McGillivray notes, there is continuity between the understanding of theatrical as relating to a specific 
building staging plays, and the earlier definition of ‗theatre‘ as a seeing-place. See McGillivray, ―Theatricality: 
A Critical Genealogy,‖ supra n. 14. Bodin‘s writing combines both these definitions of ‗theatrical‘, as he refers 
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permanently understood through the lens of God as judge.  
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 The image of the lawyer who fleeces their client dates back presumably much earlier. However, written 
English sources are limited to the period following the introduction of the printing press by William Caxton in 
the 1470s and earlier texts that were printed later are rare. 
110
 Marsilius of Padua goes on to remark: ―who is nowe a dayes / whiche is a sueter in the lawe / but that he can 
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Frutefull Treatyse, Intituled the Myrrour of Good Maners Co[n]teynyng the .iiii. Vertues, called Cardynall, 
Compyled in Latyn by Domynike Mancyn: and Translate into Englysshe: at the Desyre of Syr Gyles Alyngton 
Knyght: by Alexander Bercley prest and Monke of Ely (London : Imprynted by Rychard Pynson, prynter vnto 
the kynges noble grace: with his gracyous pryuylege, the whiche boke I haue prynted, at the instance of Rychard 
yerle of Kent, 1518?). John Stephens also comments in 1615 that ―an honest lawyer is a precious diamond set in 
pure gold‖. John Stephens, Essayes and Characters, Ironicall, and Instructiue the Second Impression. With a 
New Satyre in Defence of Common Law and Lawyers: Mixt with Reproofe against Their Common Enemy. With 
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common medieval opinion was that lawyers were corrupt and avaricious and deliberately 
spun out proceedings for their own gain.  
 
The falsity of lawyers is frequently proclaimed by critics, such as Marsilius of Padua and, 
perhaps most spectacularly, the Puritan writer John Rogers who terms all lawyers ―ungodly‖ 
in his manifesto of 1654.111 In this work Rogers calls lawyers a ―state army of locusts‖, and 
condemns their coming as the coming of the Antichrist.112 What is significant about Rogers‘ 
attack against lawyers is that he lays another charge at their door: their ―art‖, and their ―craft 
and cruelty‖. This is exemplified in the excerpt: ―They (lawyers) insinuate into great places, 
kings courts etc and by simulation and fine glozing flattering shewes of humanity and 
humility, have learned the art of dissembling in the Inns of Courts‖.113 There is no question in 
Rogers‘ mind: the lawyers have brought their ―arts‖ into the great place of court and turned 
the trial process into a ―shew‖. It is their role as mediator that has driven the truth from the 
courtroom: ―These lawyers never more dissemble (than) when they resemble the faces of 
men; for they put the fairest faces on the foulest actions‖.114 The courtroom is now a place of 
performance for lawyers instead of a place to adduce vere dictum, or truth spoken. We can 
understand from this that critics of lawyers believed that lawyers did not simply take over 
storytelling but also changed the entire nature of it. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Many New Characters, & Diuers Other Things Added; & Euery Thing Ammended. By Iohn Stephens the 
Yonger, of Lincolnes Inne, Gent (London: E.Allde for Phillip Knight, and are to be solde at his shop in Chancery 
lane ouer against the Rowles, 1615), 193.  
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Rogers‘ work is emblematic of a shift in attitudes towards the theatre and thus, by extension, 
any field which is compared with theatre.115 It is no coincidence that the earliest critics of the 
lawyer as performer in the trial process are all Puritans writing under Cromwell‘s reign in the 
mid-17
th
 century.116 In the 16
th
 century commentators such as Bodin can draw on an analogy 
between legal agents and actors without this having negative associations, but once the 
Commonwealth under Cromwell is established in England, the theatre, in England, at least, 
becomes irrevocably tainted.117 Puritan attacks on the lawyer, such as Rogers‘, can largely be 
reduced to the issue of representation. In the new Protestant faith, the idea of God speaking 
through an intermediary became idolatrous, and the trappings of the Catholic faith signified 
this blasphemous corruption. An actor purporting to play a God or a King was blasphemous, 
and lawyers who spoke for other people (when they should speak for themselves) were 
tainted as well. That there was something distinctly anti-Catholic behind the anti-lawyer 
writings is demonstrated by the way that the representation and showmanship that Puritan 
critics termed ―theatrical‖ was condemned in the same language as the Catholic mass was 
condemned. Consider the following statement from Zacharisu Ursinus, a Dutch Protestant: 
The Pope hath done wickedly in taking the breaking of bread from amongst the rites of the Lords 
supper, as also in barring the people the vse of the cup. He hath also done wickedly in adding so many 
ceremonies, never commanded by the Apostles. Hee hath fowly transformed the Lords supper into a 
theatricall masse, that is, into a foolish imitation of Iudaical traditions, & stage-like gestures.
118
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 These documents refer to lawyers pleading in civil suits in the mid 17
th
 century, as this is before defence 
lawyers were operating in the criminal trial. However, it shows that people at this time believed that a lawyer 
functioning as an intermediary was associated with ideas of corruption, falsity, and idolatry.  
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usually focus on theatres and actors as sources of ‗infection‘, referring literally to the closed, humid 
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 Ursinus goes on: ―But most impious & idolatrous are those devises, to perswade that the masse is a 
propitiatorie sacrifice, wherein by the Masse-Priests Christ himselfe is offered vp to his father for the quicke and 
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Puritan critics such as Rogers set the template for the understanding of the term ‗theatrical‘ 
frequently levelled at the courtroom even today. This (primarily pejorative) theatricality is 
created in the separation between story and storyteller. Once counsel is present, they become 
a visible actor. As a counsel is not telling his (or, much later, her) own story, the demeanour 
of the by now passive defendant and the professional lawyer became unreadable in the 
centuries old understanding of how juridical truth was created and assessed. The defendant‘s 
body as a site of truthful information was replaced with a professional skilled in the 
complexity of the law.119 This means that the criminal trial, before legal representation, was 
not seen as immanently performative. For critics of legal representation, the trial was, rather, 
a place of truth-telling, corrupted by the advent of the lawyer. It was the lawyer who 
embodied ‗theatricality‘, like the travelling showman, bringing ‗untruth‘ and ‗perverting‘ the 
course of justice.  
 
The heavy mediation of our current adversarial criminal jury trial means that the use of the 
term ‗theatrical‘ to describe this process remains ubiquitous (as well as usually pejorative). 
As John Langbein comments: ―The striking peculiarity of the Anglo-American trial is that we 
remit to the lawyer-partisans the responsibility for gathering, selecting, presenting and 
probing the evidence […] The court renders a verdict of guilt or innocence by picking 
between or among the evidence that the contesting lawyers have presented to it‖.120 What 
Langbein calls ―peculiar‖ is what Puritan critics found unacceptable. The role of lawyer as 
representative, partisan and alleged truth obscurer is a significant point of continuity between 
21
st
 century attitudes and those that date all the way back to the non-criminal trials of the 
mid-1600s; the trial is ‗theatrical‘ because the lawyer takes the stage and turns it into a show.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
very necessary that the masse bee banished from the Christian church‖. Zacharius Ursinus, A Collection of 
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Downe by That Author in His Catechisme. Lately Put in Print in Latin By the Last Labour of D. David Parry: 
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The Adversarial Trial and the Performance of Tradition  
 
The dominance of the lawyer in today‘s adversarial criminal jury trial reflects the control of 
the entire juridical field over criminal process, secured by the 1840s onwards. Throughout 
history, following the withdrawal of the church from criminal proceedings in 1215, the 
juridical field has grown as a profession from informal and unregulated beginnings to a 
highly complex and relatively autonomous discipline complete with its own language and 
concept of reason.121 Whilst earlier incarnations of the trial derived their legitimacy indirectly, 
through the Church, God or the King, ‗The Law‘ itself has become the ‗god‘ of the 
adversarial trial, both reified and elevated into a position of ultimate authority.  
 
A complex series of factors led to this elevation of ‗The Law‘. Industrial development led to 
the increasing differentiation of labour in the late 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries. This meant that 
fields, such as the juridical field, became increasingly specialised and considerably more 
autonomous. By the 19
th
 century, this relative autonomy of the juridical field was maintained 
by a largely self-regulating, independent body of specialists (lawyers and, most importantly, 
judges who by this time were former lawyers). Although parliamentary statute overrides 
judge-made law, today in England and Australia (as well as the U.S.) the majority of criminal 
law is still not enshrined in formal legislation.  
 
The decline of feudalism and the growth of a new middle class also coincided with a new 
conception of the individual. This individual had certain ‗rights‘ as well as obligations, 
enabling what Foucault argued was the embodiment of the law in the individual.122  By the 
19
th
 century, there was a shift in the operation of power from the direct control that marks 
forms of absolutist government, to a voluntary self-regulation.123 ‗Power‘ was no longer a 
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 Rousseau argues that ―man‖ voluntarily alienates his ―natural‖ rights (which are governed by desire and 
might) to be part of a collective body known as the ―Sovereign‖. This abrogation of individual rights is 
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monolithic top-down action, but rather a complex web between people and the fields of 
knowledge and endeavour (and institutions of these fields) within which they interacted. 
Liberalism emerged as a dominant philosophy, one of its precepts being that people could 
only be considered a society if they were governed by their own (collective) consent with 
consideration to ―the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by 
society over the individual‖.124 The State could only have authority over an individual insofar 
as it needed to prevent people from doing harm to one another.125 This understanding of ‗The 
Law‘ was consequently an example of Liberal society because it functioned as a check on 
absolutism, and because it was grounded in ‗reason‘ rather than violent enforcement.126  
 
This philosophy of reason presupposes the voluntary exchange of individual rights for a 
greater protection based on the general will of the State. This greater protection also allows a 
greater equality (compared to the acceptance of ‗natural‘ inequality in a more formally 
stratified society).127 The shift in operation of power to voluntary self-regulation is reflected 
by the absence of explicit violence in the adversarial criminal jury trial. The defendant is no 
longer routinely chained to the floor.128 Coming to court becomes a responsibility whereby 
although technically summonsed, the individual seemingly enters the courtroom 
voluntarily.129 
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The elevation of reason (and ‗The Law‘ as representative of this reason) also opens the door 
to a scientific discourse that increasingly dominates trial practice throughout the 19
th
 century. 
There is a growing recognition of the role of science as a new means of finding ‗truth‘ as well 
as a tool of dispelling superstition. Agents within the juridical field increasingly subscribe to 
the concept of public reason as the arbiter of the trial, with the trial deriving its legitimacy 
from collective consent and informed scientific debate.130 This is illustrated in the adversarial 
trial whereby each partisan evidence gatherer presents a proposition. They then engage in 
reasoned debate and the jury determines the outcome. On a micro-level, too, legal language 
adopts scientific discourse. Now the trial talks about proof and evidence, constructing a 
science of trial practice and the law. These developments lead to a legal language largely 
opaque to the uninitiated.131 Lawyers are consequently no longer merely desirable as 
‗protectors‘ of the interests of the plaintiff and defendant; rather they are essential guides 
without whom ‗lay‘ trial participants cannot hope to navigate their way through ‗The Law‘.  
 
Adoption of scientific discourse allows legal practitioners to believe themselves to be 
impartial arbitrators and gatekeepers: scientists in pursuit of the truth.132 However, this belies 
the role that legal agents play in interpreting and shaping ‗The Law‘ which is not a 
monolithic, reified Liberal ideal, but rather a practice of the ever-changing juridical field. 
Whilst legal agents may well be the best people to interpret the law, it is also most certainly 
in their interests to promote this view of their expertise. Pierre Bourdieu calls this ―circular 
reinforcement‖, where ―[l]ay people are obliged to have recourse to the advice of legal 
professionals, who little by little will come to replace the complainants and defendants. The 
latter in their turn become nothing more than a group of individuals who have fallen under 
the jurisdiction of the courts‖.133 By the time the adversarial criminal jury trial was firmly 
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established, lay participants had indeed become merely individuals ―fallen under the 
jurisdiction of the courts‖. In our contemporary adversarial criminal jury trial, the jury is 
passive (until deliberation), the defendant is silent, and the witness testimony is 
reconceptualised into legal discourse.  
 
The extensive mediation of our contemporary criminal trial has become naturalised where 
anyone who is not represented by counsel is not believed to be ‗protected‘. However, this 
protection involves a remittance of power and control to legal agents. Despite the decline of 
obvious violence of the State over the individual, adversarial trials involve a form of 
socialised violence whereby the gap between a layperson‘s abilities and a legal specialist is 
increasingly emphasised to maintain a form of lay dependence on legal professionals. This 
force is not exerted physically, but rather through the layperson considering it in his or her 
own interest to hire counsel. Consequently, this manifests at adversarial trial in a performance 
of tradition that enacts repeatedly the sanctity of ‗The Law‘ over the individual while legal 
agents (representing ‗The Law‘) dominate passive lay trial participants who voluntarily enter 
into proceedings in the belief that legal agents are a necessary form of mediation and 
protection. 
 
Conclusion 
 
When a layperson enters the contemporary courtroom in Sydney, Australia, be they a 
defendant, witness, juror or trial observer, they are surrounded by the signification of past 
authority systems, despite the increasing professionalisation and secularisation of the legal 
trial. Today, despite the apparent secularity of the courts (in Australia at least), witnesses 
frequently swear on a Bible (although a non-religious oath is offered). The inscription Dieu et 
Mon Droit also remains prominently displayed in every courtroom in Australia (the U.S. 
Supreme Court has numerous depictions of Moses and the Ten Commandments). Barristers 
still wear costumes that are markers of 17
th
 and 18
th
 century English aristocratic fashion. 
Pierre Bourdieu terms these forms of signification homologies: a continual pattern of tying 
the present to the past whereby past markers of authority are retained to increase the antiquity 
and authority of the trial, emphasising its universality and timelessness.134These homologies 
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have aided the trial‘s ordination in the public imagination as not just a part of legal procedure, 
but central to what we understand as ‗The Law‘ itself: the ‗fair trial‘. Yet despite the trial‘s 
steady standing in social belief, the criminal trial does not have a straightforward pattern over 
history, nor has it always been based on a coherent and consistent body of rules. The trial is 
not a static institution but rather a practice of an ever-changing juridical field. 
 
What binds this history together is the performance of tradition; the consistent feature of all 
three forms of trial, from trial by ordeal to our contemporary adversarial criminal jury trial. 
The performance of tradition in our contemporary trial continues to reinforce the gap between 
laypersons and ‗The Law‘, positioning legal agents as the gatekeepers between the higher 
authority of ‗The Law‘ and the uninformed individual. In the following chapter, I will clarify 
how the performance of tradition operates. In so doing, I will expand on and contextualise a 
number of themes raised in this chapter: the autonomy of the law, socialised violence and 
presence. I do this by drawing extensively on sociological and performance theory, arguing 
that the performance of tradition relies on the exploitation of the symbolic value of live 
performance.   
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Theories of the Trial as Performance  
 
 
 
 
 
It seemed at times that we were all serving the interests of entertainment: American lawyers in London over for 
their Bar conference would jostle for seats in the public gallery as they might at a theatre, their roars of laughter 
silenced by ushers booming cries of ―Silence!‖ followed by the judge‘s regular threat to clear the public gallery. 
―This is a courtroom, not a theatre‖ he would remind them repeatedly. John Mortimer would leave the 
courtroom each afternoon for the Vaudeville Theatre (where A Voyage Round My Father was being rehearsed) 
with a sense that he was returning to real life. 
Geoffrey Robertson, The Justice Game 
135 
  
 
The courtroom, particularly a trial courtroom, seems to be a forum for people, who are so inclined, to behave 
inappropriately. Something about the theatre aspect of it. 
Anita Blumstein Brody et al., ―Women on the Bench,‖ 136 
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 Geoffrey Robertson, The Justice Game (London: Vintage, 1999), 27-28.  
136
 Anita Blumstein Brody et al., ―Women on the Bench,‖ (Symposium) Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 
12.2 (2003): 373. 
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Introduction  
 
Prominent American celebrity lawyer Melvin Belli once said: ―A lawyer‘s performance in the 
courtroom is responsible for about 25 percent of the outcome; the remaining 75 percent 
depends on the facts‖. Belli‘s quip, though sarcastic, sums up a significant proportion of the 
academic writings that analyse the role of performance in the criminal trial. These writings 
tend to concentrate on the dominance of the lawyer and consequently see the trial only as a 
means of conflict resolution. I argue throughout this chapter that the role of performance in 
the adversarial criminal jury trial involves more than the performing lawyer. As outlined in 
the previous chapter, the adversarial criminal jury trial is a performance of tradition that 
positions the trial itself in society as an unchanging bulwark of justice and authority.  
 
To clarify my own argument as to how this performance of tradition takes place, I analyse 
and synthesise the body of academic writings that examine the perceived relationship 
between the trial and performance. Examination of this material reveals a multiplicity of 
approaches: some writers see the trial as theatre, whilst others see only certain aspects of the 
trial as theatrical or performative. I begin by examining writings that concentrate on the 
cosmetic resemblance between the theatre and trials, in which the latter provides a site of 
‗drama‘. These writings illustrate the highly selective and partial construction of the theatrical 
analogy that tends to either dismiss theatre as corrupt or mere entertainment, or conversely 
use the theatrical metaphor to idealise the trial process.  
 
I then examine the work of legal academics that uses anthropological, linguistic and 
sociological approaches to argue for a more fundamental relationship between performance 
and the criminal trial. These writings suggest that the trial is a social process involving 
control, coercion and symbolism. However, these approaches may be criticised for the fact 
that they are often overly functionalist and also tend to draw on loose understandings of 
performance. In the final section of the chapter, I outline my own argument as to the 
performativity involved in the criminal trial. Drawing on the work of Philip Auslander, 
Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu, I discuss the trial as a site of collective unconscious 
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performativity. I argue that in the criminal trial process legal agents largely unconsciously 
exploit the symbolic value of live performance. The unconscious enactment on the part of 
both laypersons and legal agents sustains the performance of tradition. 
   
“Is” Performance/“As” Performance 
 
Elizabeth Burns writes: ―[D]egrees of theatricality are culturally determined. But theatricality 
itself is determined by a particular viewpoint, a mode of perception‖. She goes on:  
Behaviour can be described as ‗theatrical‘ only by those who know what drama is, even if their 
knowledge is limited to the theatre in their own country and period […] Behaviour is not therefore 
theatrical because it is of a certain kind but because the observer recognises certain patterns and 
sequences which are analogous to those with which he [sic] is familiar in the theatre.
137
   
What anyone chooses to classify as performative involves a particular form of recognition. 
As Richard Schechner expresses it, ―whether an event is theatre or not, performance or not, 
depends on the dominant thinking of the day‖.138 This chapter, then, is a means of tracing the 
―dominant thinking‖ as to what constitutes the theatricality or performativity of the criminal 
trial. As such, I have grouped the writings below into several categories constructed around 
similar patterns of thought.139 My intention in this chapter is not to determine a finite meaning 
for the theatricality or performativity of the trial. Rather, my intention is to analyse how each 
approach involves an implicit delimitation of what is meant by theatre or performance. These 
delimitations reveal the beliefs and values underpinning the writer‘s attitudes towards both 
the trial and the theatre, the shared patterns of recognition that Elizabeth Burns points 
towards. 
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 Burns, Theatricality, 12-13.  
138
 Schechner, Performance Studies, 31.  
139
 The relationship between the trial and performance is not a topic widely written about and this chapter 
accounts for much of the material that exists. Although I have divided these writings into categories, it should be 
acknowledged that they do not represent a coherent or consistent genealogy, but rather are highly disparate in 
terms of discipline, year, and location. The vast majority is U.S. scholarship, reflecting the disproportionately 
higher number of American publications as well as the arguably greater interest in cross-disciplinary legal 
scholarship in America as compared to Australia or the U.K.  
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One means of tracing these patterns is to follow Schechner‘s distinction between ―‗is‘ 
performance‖ and ―‗as‘ performance‖. For Schechner, something ―is‖ performance when 
―historical and social context, convention, usage, and tradition say it is‖. This involves a 
culturally specific recognisable demarcation of an event. However, any form of behaviour or 
action can be analysed ―as‖ performance. Performance in this broader sense involves 
―making belief—enacting the effects [the performers] want the receivers of their 
performances to accept ‗for real‘‖.140   
 
Broadly speaking, in this chapter the first two categories of scholarly literature I review, 
writers who draw on the physical resemblance between the trial and the theatre, and those 
who stress the drama of the trial, can be seen as working within the ‗―is‖ performance‖ 
category, whereas the subsequent anthropological and sociological writings fall more under 
the rubric of ―as‖ performance. The boundaries are not clearly marked however. As 
Schechner himself notes, this division is vanishing in what he designates (drawing on the 
work of sociologist Erving Goffman) as the increasing recognition of many activities as 
performance: ―[a]t present, there is hardly any human activity that is not a performance for 
someone somewhere. Generally, the tendency over the past century has been to dissolve the 
boundaries separating performing from not-performing, art from not-art‖.141   
 
Trials and Drama  
 
A large proportion of the academic writings examining the perceived relationship between 
the trial and performance concentrate on what I termed the ‗cosmetic‘ resemblance between 
the two processes. That is, for these writers, the term ‗theatricality‘ denotes shared 
conventions between the trial and theatre, such as costuming, props, ritual procession, 
symbolism, and space for audience. All of these shared conventions are forms of framing 
around the most important shared feature: that of the ‗actor‘. In these writings, the lawyer is 
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 Schechner, Performance Studies, 30-37. 
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 Ibid., 32. Erving Goffman‘s book The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life argues that we are constantly 
performing ourselves to other people, and that this is a conscious process whereby we are likely to adapt our 
behaviour to present ourselves as advantageously as possible. See Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in 
Everyday Life (New York: Anchor Books & Doubleday, 1959).  
67 
 
invariably compared to an actor in the theatre.142 Two trends stand out amongst these writings 
dealing with cosmetic resemblances and the lawyer-as-actor: firstly, there are the writings 
that draw on the anti-theatrical metaphor, as outlined in the previous chapter. Theatricality for 
these writers is constituted by the courtroom‘s association with the artificial and the ‗showy‘. 
As Peter Murphy puts it: ―most of us seem to have an undefined feeling that there must be 
something wrong with acting in court, that the courtroom and the theatre are, and must be, 
different worlds‖.143  
 
These writings draw on a relatively simplistic analogy that uses a particular definition of 
theatre; that of a traditional playhouse that stages dramatic fiction.144 This is not to state that 
the objects and symbols cited (such as props and costuming) may not serve a very real 
symbolic purpose to reinforce the authority of the law.145 However, theatre is dismissed as 
mere entertainment compared to the serious function of the trial.
146
 For these writers, all the 
points of comparison identified foreground the potential of the trial to ―degenerate into mere 
theatre‖.147  
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 See (amongst many): Editorial (Anon), Central Law Journal  3 (1876); Gail McGuire and Kristen Ramsey, 
―Litigation Publicity: Courtroom Drama or Headline News?,‖ Communication and the Law 22 (2000): 80. 
143
 Peter Murphy, ‗―There‘s No Business Like..?,‖ Some Thoughts on the Ethics of Acting in the Courtroom,‖   
South Texas Law Review 44.1 (2002): 111.  
144
 Although the pejorative attitude towards the theatre is still largely consistent with that of the Puritan authors 
outlined in the previous chapter, what is understood by ‗theatre‘ has shifted. Whereas with the Puritans, the 
issue of representation was the point of unease, for post-Restoration writers, the theatre has become a 
professionalised leisure activity and therefore seen as increasingly ‗stagy‘ and melodramatic. 
145
 As I argue throughout this thesis, we often dismiss traditional symbols, such as those in courtrooms as 
‗purely symbolic‘; that is, detached from any referent. I propose, alternatively, that these symbols continue to 
affect people unconsciously and/or help to maintain particular ideological ideas that have become naturalised 
over time. I will extend this discussion further when examining the formation of collective belief later in the 
chapter.    
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 Of course, there is not a dichotomy between the two. Historically the criminal trial has long been a source of 
entertainment for a community. Even today, there are still regular court-watchers to be found at the Old Bailey.  
147
 Seymour Thompson and the Hon. John F. Dillon, eds., ―An International Tribunal,‖ Central Law Journal 2 
1875): 635, my italics. The most interesting example of this potential cross-over is a trial in 1916 where, due to 
overwhelming public interest, the trial was moved from the courtroom to a theatre down the road that could 
more adequately accommodate the spectators. The defendant‘s conviction was overturned on appeal due to the 
overly prejudicial staging of his trial: ―At the adjournment of court on one occasion, the bailiff announced from 
the stage: ‗The regular show will be tomorrow; matinees in the afternoon and another performance at 8:30. 
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As with Geoffrey Robertson‘s quotation cited at the beginning of this chapter, there is an 
implicit understanding for these writers that the courtroom is not meant to be a theatre. 
Theatre is predicated on pleasure and leisure and actors are professional ‗fakers‘. The 
courtroom, on the other hand, is a serious place for making important decisions. 
Consequently, the comparison is unbecoming. Ultimately these writers emphasise that, 
despite the significant similarities between the two sites of cultural production, the courtroom 
is not a theatre (or should not be a theatre), because there are ‗real‘ consequences for 
participants in the trial.148 Allan Greenberg thus argues that confusion between the trial and a 
theatre is a ―fundamental misconception of the values involved‖.149 Or, as Adi Parush insists, 
―obviously a law court remains a law court and theatre is after all just theatre‖.150  
 
This trend in the literature stresses the inappropriateness of comparing a form of 
entertainment with a process that has such real effects on people‘s lives.151 Larry Geller and 
Peter Hemenway make the most explicit comment about the apparent limitations of the 
relationship: ―If the stakes weren‘t so high, courtroom theatrics could often be considered 
entertainment‖.152 There is continuity between these arguments and those outlined in the 
previous chapter. As Elizabeth Burns pointed out, when theatre is classified as artificial and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Court is now adjourned until 7:30‘‖. Quoted in Milner Ball, ―The Play‘s the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection 
on the Rubric of Courtroom-as-Theater,‖ Stanford Law Review 28 (1975): 84. 
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Although legal scholars are seeking to make a distinction between a process that puts one‘s livelihood/future 
in jeopardy and a site of entertainment, rather than conflating the two, this distinction between the real (in the 
courtroom) and the entertainment (in the theatre) indicates an assumption that the arrangement of signs in a 
theatre (e.g. the placement of the stage, curtains, or any other feature common to a proscenium-arch traditional 
theatre) has no ideological basis. It is arguably this misrecognition (of the benign role of tradition) 
that means they also overlook similar uses of symbols in the trial process. For a specific semiotic analysis of the 
courtroom space that draws on theatrical analogy, see Kenneth B. Nunn, ―The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and 
Symbol in the Adversarial Criminal Process—a Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal for 
Reform,‖ American Criminal Law Review 32.3 (1995). 
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 Allan Greenberg, ―Selecting a Courtroom Design,‖ Judicature 59.9 (1976): 12.  
150
 Adi Parush, ―The Courtroom as Theater and the Theater as Courtroom in Ancient Athens,‖ Israeli Law 
Review 35 (2001): 136. 
151
 Gail Ramsey and Kristen McGuire continue this argument, saying: ―the courtroom is not ultimately about 
issues and legal theories but about people and the lives that they live‖. Ramsey and McGuire, ―Litigation 
Publicity,‖ 80. 
152
 Larry Geller and Peter Hemenway, ―Argument and Courtroom Theatrics,‖ National Association of 
Administrative Law Judges 16.2 (1996): 179. 
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somehow deviant, this implicitly relies on an unstated ‗authentic‘ and uncomposed 
behaviour. In this instance, the courtroom is a site of ‗authentic‘ behaviour, whereas the 
theatre remains artificial. Consequently, any intrusion of theatrical process into the courtroom 
is positioned as potentially corruptive.   
 
Detailed analysis of how the trial comes to have features in common with ‗theatre‘ is not 
attempted in these articles; rather the relationship, predicated on physical resemblance, is 
taken as an unproblematic given.153 This unexplored comparison is commonplace, reflecting 
the pervasiveness of the metaphor. Sheila Murnaghan comments that ―the insight that the law 
can be analysed as a form of theatre has been instructively elaborated in recent decades, so 
that it has become easy to recognize the theatrical nature of legal procedure and especially of 
the trial‖.154 Yet Murnaghan‘s comments leave a number of details unexplained. Firstly, 
Murnaghan assumes that law is a form of theatre, the implication being that legal practice is a 
subset of a broader theatrical spectrum. Secondly, there is a reference to ―theatrical nature‖ 
without any clear identification of what she means by this. Murnaghan‘s article is reflective 
of many writings in the area that are often vague as to what they mean by ‗theatre‘ or 
‗performance‘.  
 
Murnaghan‘s article, however, reflects an increase in interest in investigating the relationship 
between the criminal jury trial and performance in the last thirty years. This increase in 
interest has resulted in the second major trend in the literature that focuses on ‗cosmetic‘ 
resemblances between the trial and the theatre. This trend is strikingly different to the anti-
theatrical approach as this body of work draws on theatrical analogy, that of ‗drama‘, to 
valorise legal processes. Murnaghan‘s article prefaces a journal issue devoted to this 
perceived relationship between ‗drama‘ and the trial. This alternative position, arising from 
the ‗Law as Literature‘ movement, rejects the pejorative attitude employed by other writers 
towards the theatre.155 Instead, in these writings scholars position theatre as a place that 
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 Pnina Lahav, writing in 2004, claims that ―compared to the voluminous bibliography on law and literature, 
there has been little effort at theorizing the meaning of theatre in the courtroom‖. Pnina Lahav, ―Theatre in the 
Courtroom,‖ Law And Literature 16.3 (2004): 451. 
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 Sheila Murnaghan, ―Staging Ancient Crimes: A Response to Aristodemou, Tieffenbrun, Purkiss and 
Pantazakos,‖ Cardoza Studies of Law and Literature 11.1 (1999): 77.  
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 The interdisciplinary ‗Law as Literature‘ studies of the early 1970s in many respects paved the way for 
studies of the theatricality of legal processes, as the ‗Law as Literature‘ movement produced the first academic 
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explores human conflict through drama. As such, they see a direct parallel between the 
courtroom and the theatre. 
 
One of the first articles specifically dealing with this analogy is Richard Harbinger‘s 1971 
article ―Trial by Drama‖. In this article, Harbinger argues that the trial is essentially a play 
within a play and therefore a ―dramatic thing‖ rather than a ―legal thing‖.156 There is the ―play 
without‖, which is what he terms the dramatic combat of the advocates, and the ―play within‖ 
or the ―crime drama‖ that is the narrative of the alleged crime. When referring to the ―play 
without‖, Harbinger is essentially referring to the confrontational structure of the adversarial 
system and when discussing the narrative(s) presented in court, the drama is the story. He 
therefore defines drama as generated by conflict. This double conflict requires resolution or, 
in his words, ―catharsis‖. The end-point of the trial has both conflicts resulting in one winner, 
and one loser—triumph or tragedy.  
 
This is a pseudo-Aristotelian construction that reflects popular understanding of Aristotelian 
dramatic theory.157 In this understanding, catharsis is where an audience is ‗hooked‘ on a 
story designed to evoke (and subsequently purge) their pity and terror. This interpretation of 
Aristotle suggests that if a play is devised or written following certain guidelines, it will 
achieve the desired end, implying that the actors‘ performances are little more than a vehicle 
for the moving story, and that the narrative has an inevitable outcome. By drawing on this 
theory, Harbinger foregrounds the centrality of storytelling, the power of the lawyer to create 
this narrative and the passivity of the jury/audience who do not have control over their 
                                                                                                                                                        
articles to consider the language and structure of the trial process—from this, a number of academics began to 
note the dramatic structure of the trial. However, because the earliest work in this field developed primarily 
from a relationship between Law and English Faculties, the concept of ‗theatre‘ grew out of ‗drama‘ as 
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 Richard Harbinger, ―Trial By Drama,‖ Judicature 55.3 (1971). 
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 I use the term ‗pseudo-Aristotelian‘ as the dominant understanding of Aristotle in Western dramaturgy is not 
necessarily reflective of Aristotle‘s own meaning. Whilst we have interpreted ‗catharsis‘ in a particular way, it is 
not clear what Aristotle himself meant by this term. Ultimately, this is because we are highly limited in our 
access to his own writings. For the relevant work that Harbinger is drawing on, see: Aristotle, Rhetoric and On 
Poetics (Pennsylvania: Franklin University Press, 1981). 
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emotions and are caught in the lawyer‘s spell.158 Harbinger also implies that it is a lawyer‘s 
(written) script that forms this narrative, downplaying any role the phenomenon of live 
performance in the courtroom might have.159   
 
Ronald Sokol follows this pseudo-Aristotelian line arguing that the ―dramatic structure‖ of the 
trial arises from conflict, as ―the essence of drama is conflict‖.160 Sokol argues that ‗conflict‘ is 
the central concept shared by both the trial and the written play, comparing the conflict 
between advocates at trial directly to the conflict in a work of fiction. The space of the 
courtroom is a site for these stories to be realised; however, it is the stories themselves, not 
their presentation, that are key to the ‗drama‘ of the trial. However, unlike Harbinger, Sokol 
emphasises that as there is more than one story being told, advocates must employ powers of 
persuasion to sway the jury. For Sokol the performance of this dramatic conflict is 
consequently highly important because that is how the outcome is determined (and catharsis 
subsequently achieved). Sokol‘s stance positions the audience/jury as considerably less passive 
than Harbinger. However, how this persuasion is achieved, and how the storytelling is enacted 
in space is not a particular point of interest. Both Sokol and Harbinger refer in passing to the 
concept of ‗presence‘ as well as to the ‗charisma‘ of the advocate but do not interrogate these 
concepts further. Both writers imply that each trial, driven by a ‗dramatic‘ conflict, will lead to 
an inevitable outcome.  
 
Sokol also separates his understanding of ‗drama‘ from the ‗theatrical‘ in his theory of the 
trial. Writing about political trials, Sokol notes that the political defendant can use the 
courtroom as a stage to disseminate his views to a captive audience. For Sokol, then, the 
stage is a potential soapbox. The more the defendant uses the courtroom for these political 
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 Harbinger‘s  interpretation  reflects  a  conflating  of  the  oral  practice  of  storytelling  with  dramatic 
 structure  that  occurs  frequently  in  popular  interpretation  of  Aristotelian  theory. Harbinger‘s  interpretation 
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 Ronald Sokol, ―The Political Trial: Courtroom as Stage, History as Critic,‖ New Literary Theory 2.3 (1971): 
500. 
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ends, the more ‗theatrical‘ it becomes. This suggests for Sokol that although the trial is 
―essentially dramatic‖, a ‗full-blown‘ theatricality only arises when trial participants ‗play up‘ 
or ‗act out‘, thereby theatricalising the proceedings.161 Sokol deliberately frames the 
‗dramatic‘ (good) in opposition to the ‗theatrical‘ (bad). Sokol‘s attitude towards the 
theatrical is consistent with earlier writers who see theatricality as deviant (and inappropriate 
for a court of law).    
 
Milner S. Ball, also writing about drama and the trial, does not accept the division between 
theatrical (bad) and dramatic (good).162 Whilst Ball also emphasises the ―dramatic structure‖ of 
the trial, unlike Harbinger and Sokol he draws upon 20
th
 century theatre practitioners Jerzy 
Grotowski and Peter Brook to define performance as ―[that which] takes place between 
spectator and actor‖.163 For Ball the trial is ―essentially theatre‖ and this is constituted by the 
encounter between spectators and performers/trial participants in a shared space.164 
Consequently, for Ball, the relationship between courtroom and theatre goes beyond dramatic 
structure. The shared characteristics between the two processes are so strong that he actively 
defines the trial as ―judicial theatre‖.165 What Ball (and, more recently, Larner, Hoffer, Tow, 
and Bernstein and Milstein) also does is to use theatrical analogy to idealise the trial process.166 
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Ball argues that the trial, like serious theatre, ―holds up a mirror to legitimate society‖ and 
emphasises the ―humanizing dimension of courts‖.167 His adoption of Grotowski‘s minimalist 
definition of performance enables him to locate the courtroom confrontation, the theatrical 
event, within the trope of a shared, intimate, human encounter.    
 
Ball asserts that ―judicial theatre performs and animates a fit form of decision-making for our 
version of democracy‖.168 For Ball, performative storytelling by legal agents in the trial is 
central to democratic process. Jurors who deliberate on the competing stories presented to 
them at trial are obliged to throw off ―the corrosive effects of our culture‘s devotion to the self 
and exclusive fascination with individual rights‖.169 As such, performative storytelling 
functions in an allegorical way, refocusing the purpose of the trial‘s participants on the greater 
good of society. John Gillespie shares with Ball the belief that both the trial and ‗drama‘ have 
a higher purpose. Gillespie writes an article comparing the trial not only with a play, but also 
more specifically with a mediaeval morality play. Gillespie argues that: 
The criminal trial may be considered as a play, allegorical in structure, which has for one of its objects 
the teaching of some lesson for the guidance of life, and in which the principal characters are personified 
abstractions or highly universalised types.
170
 
For Gillespie, it is not enough to claim that the trial is a theatre simply because people role-
play: a ―football match is [also] a dramatic event, but it would be absurd to consider it as 
theatre‖. What makes a trial a form of theatre is its structural similarity to the ‗serious‘ play, 
where there is a ―political, philosophical, or moral lesson‖.171 The passivity of the jury is 
therefore a positive thing, because the storytelling process undertaken by legal agents in the 
courtroom is a form of didactic enlightenment for the jury members.  
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The argument that Gillespie presents of the allegorical or didactic value of serious drama is 
dominant throughout scholarly writings dealing with the ‗drama‘ of the trial. In these writings, 
storytelling in the courtroom shares with theatre the ability to reveal the ‗Truth‘.172 Allan Tow 
describes ―dramatic technique‖ as ―humanism‖. He states: ―as such, acting and law are 
ultimately manifestations of civilised human behaviour‖.173 Milstein and Bernstein claim that 
―both trials and live theatre educate as they persuade‖. They claim ―the jurors have heard with 
their eyes and seen with their hearts‖.174  
 
As can be seen from the above, however, writers who valorise the adversarial criminal jury 
trial through comparing it to the theatre are very careful about how the relationship between 
the two is positioned. Rather than emphasising the trial being like theatre, these writers stress 
that the trial has similarities to certain kinds of theatre. The relationship between what might 
be termed ‗high drama‘ (classical tragedy, Shakespeare, Brook‘s Holy theatre) and the trial is 
used to position the trial as a classical theatre that persuades, educates, and imparts wisdom.175  
 
Although this analysis is more complex than those which previously used the drama/theatre 
analogy within the frame of an anti-theatrical prejudice, both kinds of analyses examined 
above overlook key aspects of the adversarial criminal jury trial process. For all of these 
writers the role of the lawyer, and his or her narrative of the case within the trial, is what 
primarily constitutes theatricality.176 This is partly a matter of positioning; most of the writers 
above are legal practitioners and, as such, have a vested interest in justifying their position. 
This manifests in either idealising the trial and the theatre or idealising the trial at the expense 
of the theatre. It also reflects the very real dominance lawyers have attained over the last two 
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centuries in the adversarial system. However, by concentrating on the lawyer, the trial is 
defined by the ‗narrative‘ of a particular case, or the behaviour of a legal agent. This means 
these writings tend to overlook other participants in the trial, and also see the trial‘s function 
as limited to those directly involved in the proceedings.  
 
Ritual and Speech-Act Theory 
 
For legal anthropologists, the purpose of a trial is not limited to dealing with those who are 
directly involved in an alleged crime. Rather, legal anthropologists posit the criminal trial‘s 
purpose as collective ritual: a public place to resolve private disputes witnessed by a 
community. Emiliano Buis states: ―Theatre and court are means to represent both collective 
and symbolic events in a public sphere. Both spectacles are, thus, social rituals‖.177 Very 
simply, a ritual can be defined as a performed social process that takes place within a 
demarcated space.178 This ritual space is a discursive and reflexive social space for a 
community. Legal anthropological approaches to analysing the trial bear out Schechner‘s 
comments on the difficulty of clearly distinguishing between his categories of ―‗is‘ 
performance‖ and ―‗as‘ performance‖. For these writers the trial is a performance, but the 
trial also functions as a performance of collective belief; both of these functions are bound up 
in the idea of the trial as a ritual.  
 
Anthropologist Victor Turner schematised a structure of ritual and its role in social life in The 
Anthropology of Performance.179 Turner was interested in identifying the relatively universal 
impetus behind ritual as well as the patterns he claimed were observable in the life of a 
society (subject to variation based on social and economic development). Turner argues that 
this pattern of a community over time is essentially ‗dramatic‘, calling it social drama. 
Turner divides social drama into the four broad stages a community undergoes in some form 
when there is disruption in their ongoing communal existence: breach, crisis, redress, and 
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either reintegration or irreversible schism if the redress fails.180 Turner states that: ―[t]he 
social drama is an eruption from the level surface of ongoing social life‖.181 The first stage, 
―breach‖, can cover events that include an overt disruption (such as a crime being 
committed), as well as take the form of potential developmental crises (for example puberty, 
where there is a potential, rather than explicit, breach). Regardless of what form this ―breach‖ 
takes, Turner argues that a community faces a ―crisis‖ because of the non-conformity (or 
potential non-conformity) to the social mores that the community ‗normally‘ lives by. It is 
how this threat is dealt with—the third stage of social drama, that of ―redress‖, that Turner 
argues is the impetus for all ritual. 
 
Ritual itself, for Turner (following the work of Arnold Van Gennep), is a tripartite process: 
separation, liminality and re-aggregation.182 According to Turner, for a ritual to take place, the 
participant has to be separated in some way from his/her normal life, usually by being taken 
to a specifically demarcated space. This functions as a kind of ‗removal‘ of the participant 
from temporality and normality. Once within this space the ritual takes place. For a ritual to 
be successful, a state of ‗liminality‘ has to be reached. Liminality means, literally, ‗in 
between‘ or on the threshold. Turner goes on to say: ―just as the subjunctive mood of a verb 
is used to express supposition, desire, hypothesis, or possibility, rather than stating actual 
facts, so do liminality and the phenomena of liminality dissolve all factual and commonsense 
systems into their components and ‗play‘ with them in ways never found in nature or in 
custom, at least at the level of direct perception‖.183 The liminal phase involves a heavy use of 
symbolism, costume, and is a place where a community ―tells stories about themselves‖.184 
Turner argues that without forms of redress, such as ritual, a community faces ongoing 
upheaval and potential revolution. Ritual functions not only as a means of public satisfaction 
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of private wrong (in the case of a crime being committed) or enfranchisement (for 
―prophylactic‖ or pre-emptive forms of redress) but also as a means of normativity and 
entrenching the dominant values of those in authority. Bringing the outsider successfully 
back under the umbrella of the community not only averts crisis but also bolsters the 
authority of the status quo.  
 
For Turner, ritual is one of a series of means of potential redress, which includes political 
processes, or forms of legal-judicial redress. Although ritual is often cited as a separate 
category in Turner‘s work from ―judicial-legal forms of redress‖, referral to Turner‘s work 
suggests he sees each form of redress as interlocking processes, all of which, to some extent, 
partake of one another. Turner explicitly argues that legal ritual has a distinct ‗family 
resemblance‘ to other forms of ritual. Drawing on the work of legal anthropologists Sally 
Falk Moore and Barbara Myerhoff, Turner argues that order remains an overriding concern in 
legal forms of redress. Ultimately legal ritual, according to Falk Moore and Myerhoff, ―gives 
form to that which it contains—for ritual is in part a form, and a form which gives meaning 
(by ‗framing‘) to its contents‖.185 In the case of crime, the aim of legal ritual, for Turner, is the 
reintegration into the community of the wrong doer and the concomitant restoration of 
balance that occurs in stage four of Turner‘s social drama (if successful; however if the 
redressive process is unsuccessful this results in the alternative fourth stage of social drama—
that of irreversible schism).  
 
Although Turner‘s term social drama charts the broad means by which a community 
collectively attempts to resolve disputes, Turner sees this process as an entirely necessary one 
by which a society may forge its identity and uphold its values. Consequently, although 
social drama is the means by which a community responds to a ―crisis‖, society repeatedly 
undergoes different forms of ‗social drama‘ over time, and through sustaining itself as a 
community is strengthened in its beliefs through successful redress. Turner‘s emphasis on a 
theory of a society repeatedly reasserting its identity reflects his increasing moves towards a 
theory of ―culture as process‖ as outlined by Sally Falk Moore. Falk Moore‘s book, Law as 
Process, argues that rather than seeing what she calls ―indeterminacy‖, and ―situational 
adjustment‖ as interruptions to ongoing social life, analysis of social life should see processes 
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of continuity, indeterminacy and situational adjustment as co-existing, and intergenerative. 
Falk Moore states: 
[…] strategies used in situational adjustment […] if repeated sufficiently often, by sufficient numbers of 
people, may become part of the processes of regularization. Analogously, if new rules are made for 
every situation, the rules cease to be part of the processes of regularization and become elements of 
situational adjustment. Thus each of these processes contains within itself the possibility of becoming its 
schematic opposite.
186
 
She goes on to say: 
whether these processes of regularization are sustained by tradition or legitimated by revolutionary edict 
and force, they act to provide daily regenerated frames, social construction of reality, within which the 
attempt is made to fix social life, to keep it from slipping into the sea of indeterminacy.
187
  
Whilst Turner was increasingly drawn to this idea of constant ‗situational adjustment‘, 
Lowell Lewis argues: ―Turner himself was unable to articulate fully a theory of culture as 
process, developing a model of dynamic change based on the alternation between structure 
(as daily life) and anti-structure (as ritual process)‖.188 However, Turner did increasingly 
emphasise the value of inversion, play, and the liminal/liminoid. The most important aspect 
of ritual for Turner, then, is its ―dialectical and reflexive‖ qualities. For Turner, successful 
ritual (and other forms of cultural performance that are the heirs of ritual in a contemporary 
society) involves creating a space of public reflexivity:189  
Ritual and drama involves selves, not self; yet the aggregate of selves in a given community or society 
are often thought of, metaphorically, as a self. Nevertheless, in practice, the plural reflexivity involved 
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allows freeplay to a greater variability of action: actors can be so subdivided as to allocate to some the 
roles of agents of transformation and to others those of persons undergoing transformation.
190
  
For Turner, to reach a stage of ‗limen‘ involves a radical repositioning of ―the world and 
society‖ and how we may understand ourselves as individuals and members of a community.  
 
Philip Meyer follows Turner‘s theory of ritual, arguing that courtrooms are ―liminal theatres‖ 
that provide ―transportation‖ for a community.191 For Meyer, the trial is a place for the 
members of a community to reflect on and reinforce their shared values. Meyer‘s use of the 
term ―transportation‖ suggests that the trial is a means of focusing a community on the higher 
good through sharing and discussing the ideals of that community. There is some cross over 
between pseudo-Aristotelian interpretations of catharsis and ritual transformation. Both are 
about a form of didacticism mobilised by legal agents for a community‘s own good. Milner 
Ball uses the term ‗ritual‘ in his work, although he does not elaborate explicitly on what he 
means by this. Milstein and Bernstein argue that ―jurors have been taken from everyday 
affairs and placed in [this] ritualistic setting‖. Then they also note, following from 
Aristotelian theory, that the trial is founded on ―hopes for a communal transformation‖.192  
 
However, Meyer‘s interpretation of Turner‘s ritual theory idealises the process as always for 
the ―higher good‖ of the community. This ignores Turner‘s insistence that ritual is a form of 
social control. Although the trial (that Meyer styles as the liminal phase) is a place of 
inversion, masking, and practices that border on subversion, it is important to note that these 
practices of inversion are always strictly proscribed. Ultimately, Turner points out that 
liminal performance is culturally conservative, since it ―may invert the established order, but 
never subverts it‖. Further, Turner reminds us, although the liminal phase is ―propelled by 
passions, compelled by volitions, overmastering at times any rational considerations […] 
reason plays a major role in the settlement of disputes which take the sociodramatic form‖.193  
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Turner states that ―there is a structural relationship between cognitive, affective and conative 
components‖, claiming that although all four stages of social drama involve each of these 
components, one always dominates at each phase. In the redressive stage, it is the ―cognitive‖ 
component, suggesting that although much of the liminal phase implies a loss of regulation, 
and process designed to be sensorially evocative, it is actually very structured. Knowledge, 
and how it is inscribed through normative performances of authority is central to the ritual 
that plays with form but ultimately functions to guard against serious disruption (often by the 
implication that ―true chaos‖ would be untenable, demonstrated through flirting with 
upheaval which the liminal phase is deliberately conceived to do).194 
 
As other legal anthropologists are keen to emphasise, ritual functions as a form of social 
control. Ransford Pyle explicitly argues that ―both the rules that legal authority makes and 
enforces and the legitimacy of the authority itself are arbitrary and in some sense 
unjustifiable‖. He goes on to remark that ―ritual imbues both with power (some might say 
‗magic‘) and this is an effective way to control public response‖.195 Rather than ritual by 
necessity being about the higher good, the performance of the ritual itself lends authority to, 
and helps naturalise, an outcome constructed as legitimate. The criminal trial therefore 
legitimises the authority of legal agents to arbitrate through the seductive and potentially 
insidious quality of ritual.196  
 
Mark Cammack also comments on the ideologically suspicious underpinnings of ritual. 
Cammack cites Turner, who argues that the ritual ―makes visible […] beliefs‖. Intangible 
communal ties and belief systems are rendered visible by the trial.197 Yet, as Cammack goes 
on to note, ―[r]itual depiction of abstract social, legal and political ideas make them seem 
both real and somehow given or inevitable‖.198 For Cammack, the enactment of the ritual is a 
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means of naturalising particular social norms.199 Geoffrey Miller also concurs with this, 
commenting that: ―ritual appears to be a matter for private conscience, spirituality, and 
placing the participant in contact with unseen or transcendental forces. Notwithstanding its 
unusual or esoteric content, however, ritual is very much of a part of the overall system of 
social control‖.200  
 
The role of ritual as a means of naturalisation is also the focus of Andrew Cappel‘s article 
entitled ―Bringing Cultural Practice into Law: Ritual and Social Norms Jurisprudence‖. 
However, Cappel demarcates his understanding of ritual from Turner‘s by defining the trial 
as ―secular‖ ritual, following Falk Moore.201 Cappel also draws on ethnography, particularly 
Clifford Geertz‘s work, to emphasise that Turner‘s universal tripartite structure fails to 
interrogate the particulars of the local ideological sensibility informing the process.202 Ritual, 
according to Cappel, is highly orchestrated and deliberate and relies on exploitation of the 
distinction between those that facilitate a ritual, and those that undergo it. This division is 
rendered natural through the manipulation of ‗presence‘. For these writers, the trial is a ritual 
that uses symbolism and performance to consecrate its judicial decisions in the wider 
community as sacred. Consequently, this performance exploits presence and for some legal 
anthropologists has insidious overtones. This is somewhat in contrast to Turner, who argues, 
via Goffman: 
We play roles, occupy statuses […] don and doff many masks, each a ―typification‖. But the 
performances characteristic of liminal phases and states often are more about the doffing of masks, the 
stripping of statuses, the renunciation of roles, the demolishing of structures, than their putting on and 
keeping on.
203
  
Although Turner is clear about the normative, conservative function of ritual, Turner implies 
in this extract that in ritual the truth is revealed through stripping away of ―artifice‖. As 
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Lowell Lewis argues, however, ―the liberatory, redemptive strain of Turner‘s theorising 
should probably be brought into some kind of greater balance‖. Lewis goes on to say that 
these rituals or ―special events‖ do not necessarily create ―‗transparent‘ reflection at all, but 
may instead create obfuscation, mystification, confusion, sensational excess, or rampant 
escapism‖.204 As the other legal anthropologists argue, ritual does not ‗reflect‘ or reveal 
authority or ‗Truth‘, but rather helps manufacture it. It is the performance of a trial that 
allows legal agents‘ judicial decisions to be accepted (and beliefs to be normalised, rather 
than ‗made visible‘).  
 
Legal anthropologists‘ attitude towards performance in the criminal trial is consequently in 
stark contrast to writers outlined earlier in the chapter who imply that live presence has an 
inherently authentic quality (Ball, for example, who argues that the trial ―performs and 
animates a fit form of decision-making for our version of democracy‖).205 Yet although legal 
anthropologists acknowledge the importance of ritual to ‗authority‘ and ‗norms‘, what most 
of these writers designate as ‗norms‘ are laws and how they are reinforced through judicial 
decisions, community problem-solving at times of ―crisis‖. As such, this theory, like 
Turner‘s, remains rooted in the structural whereby the trial is a forum for dealing with 
discrete moments of conflict resolution, disruptions to the ―ongoing life of a society‖. This 
conflict resolution does not include how the trial contributes to a broader form of socio-legal 
regulation.206 Sally Falk Moore and Barbara Myerhoff suggest the link between conflict 
resolution and a broader form of regulation:  
Every ceremony is par excellence a dramatic statement against indeterminacy in some field of human 
affairs. Through order, formality, and repetition it seeks to state that the cosmos and social world, or 
some particular small part of them are orderly and explicable and for the moment fixed. A ceremony can 
allude to such propositions and demonstrate them at the same time.
207
  
However, although Falk Moore and Meyerhoff‘s ideas of ritual involves a complex 
manufacturing of ‗power‘ through performance, this approach leads again to the concept of 
the trial as conflict resolution only (a means of ensuring acceptance of judicial decisions by 
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those in ‗authority‘). This reflects structuralist ritual theory‘s basis in pre-industrial 
societies.208 Yet this concept of ‗authority‘ becomes less and less helpful in highly complex 
industrialised societies where institutions of authority are diversified and specialised. The 
adversarial criminal jury trial does not take place in a discrete community but rather a 
differentiated and diverse population and those conducting the trial are not the leaders or 
elders of a community, but rather specialists from a particular field.  
  
Ritual theory also does not explain how the manipulation of ‗presence‘ takes place. Although 
Cammack, Cappel and Buis, in particular, are keen to critique the manipulation of ‗magic‘ in 
the trial, they do not explain how the trial can have that effect on participants,  without 
resorting to vague terms themselves, such as ‗transcendent‘. Because of the structural nature 
of ritual theory, there is little attention paid to the particular agency of the participants. This 
means legal anthropologists are not able to explain how this collective performance may 
operate in practice. Consequently, they are effectively claiming that the trial has a 
transcendental or ‗magic‘ effect, albeit an insidious one. ‗Presence‘ may be ideologically 
suspicious for these writers, but it is also still imbued with mysterious inherent qualities.  
 
How participants in the trial may contribute to ritual or create ‗presence‘ is outlined more 
explicitly by those writers who analyse the trial as a series of performed linguistic processes, 
or ‗speech-acts‘. For these writers, a trial participant‘s access to certain modes of speech 
defines their agency within the process. What is emphasised in linguistic approaches to the 
trial is the relationship between the law‘s power and its expression in performance. Following 
John Austin‘s work, these writers argue that the performance of legal agents is central to 
creating meaning within the trial.209 The work of legal academic and practitioner Bernard 
Hibbitts exemplifies this approach. Hibbitts writes extensively on enactment and the 
importance of bringing performance back into legal education, arguing that the law 
deliberately sidesteps its own entrenched need for performance.210  
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Hibbitts stresses the need to go beyond metaphor when examining the relationship between 
the trial and performance. He argues, following Austin, that legal pronouncements only have 
authority through performance: ―As John Austin has noted, certain of these texts, for 
example, statutes and wills, are already instantiations of performance insofar as they make 
things happen by virtue of their illocutionary force alone (‗we hereby ordain and 
establish...‘)‖.211 Consequently, performance is vital in the criminal trial, and this performance 
is primarily constituted by what might be termed ‗role-play‘ whereby a legal agent 
representing his or her office enacts real effects through his or her performance. 
 
Performance, argues Hibbitts, is an expression of concrete power. This performance must be 
framed in a ritualistic space, which expresses ―culturally determined meaning to prospective 
jurors‖.212 In effect, this makes this approach an offshoot of ritual theory, as those who write 
about speech-acts argue that it is the framing of the trial ritual that enables this ‗power‘ to 
exist. John Austin makes the relationship of speech-acts to ritual quite explicit in his 
published lectures, where he states that ―all acts are heir [to a form of speech act] which have 
the general character of ritual or ceremonial‖.213  
 
For Hibbitts, this ritual framing of a legal agent‘s performance is a positive aspect of the law. 
For example, Hibbitts points out that: 
Unlike a legal text, a legal performance takes place both in space and in time. Performance gives law a 
here that makes the rules of distant legislatures near and a now which makes past precedents present. 
The here and the now of performed law command attention and respect while rendering law accessible 
to human understanding. The performance of law also locates law by creating a space and time for it 
which places it outside and above routine human experience. In this context, legal performance—like 
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other types of performance—transforms the ordinary into the extraordinary, the self into other, and the 
transient into the timeless.
214
 
He goes on to argue that: 
Law‘s embodiment in performance is not merely physical and outer-directed, however; it is also 
intellectual and inner-directed. Embodied performance provides a critical means for us to internalize the 
law; to not only become aware of it but to think it through by acting it out. Ultimately, the embodiment 
of law in performance authenticates and legitimizes law; we are more likely to accept and endorse a law 
in which performance literally allows us to take a part.
215
 
Hibbitt‘s work is important, as he is one of the few writers in this area to introduce the 
concept of agency via ―embodiment‖. The performance of legal agents, according to Hibbitts, 
is not rooted in artifice but, conversely, rooted in the authenticity of the law. Hibbitts states 
that because the trial is a performed event, and therefore open, immediate and public, it is 
made accessible through performance in a way that the literate tradition of the law is not. The 
trial process is fundamentally democratic or egalitarian and ‗brings law alive‘. Hibbitts 
appears to idealise live performance as a transcendental means of accessing a shared truth, 
contending that live performance has authenticity because the act of performing is an 
embodied expression of the legitimacy of the law. For Hibbitts, the power of ‗presence‘ 
functions as a means to ensure the truth and fairness of the proceedings.  
 
Hibbitts implies that speech-acts (any words pronounced by judges) represent the authority of 
‗The Law‘ and are consequently beyond reproach. The role of power for Hibbitts is simply 
the authority of those in command, who have the ‗right‘ to arbitrate. As other writers remind 
us, however, ‗presence‘ is not inherently benign. Ransford Pyle argues that legal language is 
used in a practical, performed way within an ideologically embedded space. Pyle regards the 
law as ―somewhere between the sacred and the profane‖, commenting that the law 
deliberately (if perhaps unconsciously) uses ideas of the sacred to secure its own authority 
and consequently to achieve social control.216  
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Levinson and Balkin claim ―[i]t has become clear that many acts of interpretation are 
performative utterances which simultaneously constitute acts of power‖.217 For a speech-act to 
have efficacy the speaker relies on an underlying system of authority that legitimises his or 
her words and allows them to have concrete effects. They point out that ―the legal act of 
interpretation, which clothes power through an act of cognition is the normal paradigmatic act 
of interpretation while an imagined quiet ‗powerless‘ text on Keats is the exception‖.218 The 
―clothing‖ of power is the obscuring/naturalising of a judge‘s pronouncement that is a means 
of enactment of authority, rather than a reflection of it. Kenneth Nunn in particular is wary of 
the speech-act interpretation of performance in the criminal trial, as it fails to account for how 
this power is manufactured in the first place. This theory takes for granted the judge‘s natural 
right to have this authority.219  
 
In summary, the work of Bernard Hibbitts idealises the trial process, a process considered 
more problematic by other writers influenced by speech-act theory. Yet whatever their 
differing attitudes towards the implications of speech-acts, there are three issues raised by 
their approach. Firstly, the writings on speech-acts often fail to take into account the reality of 
a courtroom setting, where the discourse is not a constant high-minded and rigorous legal 
debate, but frequently involves  a great deal of less formal dialogue. These theorists overlook 
the vast majority of language employed when they concentrate only on what they deem to be 
significant ‗speech-acts‘.220 Secondly, they also overlook embodied behaviour by 
concentrating almost exclusively on language, despite the trial being a site of performance. 
Thirdly, by emphasising the role of the legal players in the trial process (those who have the 
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power to make these pronouncements), the experience of the lay bodies is lost from view. 
This is significant because for speech-acts to be effective, it is necessary for a legal agent to 
exercise this authoritative speech-act on/over a lay body. 
 
Writers drawing on speech-act theory overlook the other side of this linguistic transaction of 
power: the subject body who is equally necessary for a speech act to be effective. Over the 
centuries, as barriers to counsel appearing in the criminal trial have been slowly lifted there 
has been a gradual silencing of the defendant. Whereas once defendants were obliged to tell 
their own story, question witnesses and discuss matters with the jury, now they can go 
through the entire trial process without uttering any word beyond their initial plea of guilty or 
not guilty. Yet, as legal sociologists argue, the defendants, too, are performing, a role-play of 
submission, silence, subjection and constraint.  
 
Sociology and the Trial 
 
Sociological approaches to the trial redress this neglect of the defendant by examining the trial 
as an exercise of power. Much of this work seeks to come to terms with the role of the body in 
the criminal trial and how it is exploited through representation. Robert Cover‘s 1986 article 
―Violence and the Word‖ was highly influential in this regard. Cover emphasises the one-sided 
dimension of writings on legal interpretation as performed practice: 
The violence of the act of sentencing is most obvious when observed from the defendant‘s perspective. 
Therefore any account which seeks to downplay the violence or elevate the interpretive character or 
meaning of the event within a community of shared values will tend to ignore the prisoner or defendant 
and focus upon the judge and the judicial interpretive act.
221
 
When the defendant‘s position is examined, the role of performance is very different: ―the 
function of ideology is much more significant in justifying an order to those who principally 
benefit from it and who must defend it than it is in hiding the nature of the order from those 
who are its victims‖. For Cover, the irreducibly important point is that ―the defendant‘s world 
is threatened‖.222 Cornelia Vismann follows Cover‘s distinction, arguing that the courtroom is 
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an ―encounter between power and knowledge‖ that exploits the separation between the lay 
and the law. Vismann states that: 
The event of a trial—the courtroom scene—according to Foucault, is best represented as an encounter 
between power and knowledge. On the side of a witness, there is a certain knowledge but no power; on 
the other side there is the insatiable desire to know as well as the power to retrieve this knowledge that 
the witness bears.
223
 
The lack of power and the real threat to the defendant help to explain the hesitation to see 
analogies between the trial and performance. At the core are ‗real‘ human consequences 
flowing from the (albeit ‗dramatic‘) proceedings of a trial. Vismann questions ―whether the 
probative theatre metaphor of a trial blinds the insight to the mediating strategies of a 
courtroom setting which is of course about nothing else but the question of representation‖.224 
Vismann suggests that conceptualizing the trial as performance or role-play under-
emphasises the real violence and exploitation of the body involved in the trial proceedings.  
 
It is, after all, the defendant‘s body that is the crux of the criminal trial. The presence of the 
defendant‘s body in the courtroom is fundamental to criminal proceedings. As Peter 
Halewood states, ―both the modern and pre-modern conceptions of legal legitimacy and legal 
interpretation define themselves against the backdrop of the body, the corporal subject of 
punishment, discipline and confinement‖.225 Halewood argues that the display and consequent 
signification of a defendant‘s body is central to the ‗power‘ of the trial process.   
 
Edward Morgan also focuses on the body rather than speech or language. Morgan sees 
parallels between the criminal trial and the theatre of Jean Genet, arguing that Genet‘s theatre 
is one of domination and submission, represented and signed without words: ―theatre, 
according to Genet, is a profound web of active symbols capable of speaking to the audience 
a language in which nothing is said but everything portended‖.226 The complexity of 
performance—the multiplicity of non-verbal signs mobilized—is a parallel to the complexity 
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of the trial which uses a multiplicity of means to signify certain ideologies. For Morgan and 
Halewood, discourses of domination and submission are embedded in the structure of the 
criminal trial, and are written on the body. If analysis of a trial only pays attention to 
language, writers will miss the vast majority of ways that ‗power‘ is represented or enacted. 
 
Morgan argues that this submission (particularly of the defendant, though it includes other lay 
bodies as well) is played out by the trial participants in an overarching performance of 
domination and submission. For legal sociologists, bodies performing acts of 
domination/submission in a public sphere constitute the theatre of the trial. Performance itself 
naturalises this power imbalance because the defendant plays their role seemingly 
voluntarily. Morgan, by raising the issue of ‗voluntary‘ vs. ‗involuntary‘ performance helps 
to answer Visman‘s earlier question as to whether ‗role-play‘ theory trivializes the experience 
of the defendant. Vismann‘s argument is only sustainable if performance is always conceived 
of as voluntary or as a form of self-representation. What legal sociologists argue is that the 
seemingly voluntary nature of a defendant‘s performance is the crux as to how the ‗power‘ of 
the trial manifests itself.  The defendant‘s body being exploited to signify and represent is a 
form of performativity of self; but it is not one created or actively controlled by the 
defendant.227  
 
As Peter Halewood observes, a trial requires ―[a] defendant‘s acquiescence to his ‗official‘ 
role as defendant, and his apparent recognition of the legitimacy of the theater of his own 
trial, at least in the form of his physical presence in the courtroom‖.228 A defendant‘s 
seemingly willing entry into the courtroom legitimises the trial process. And yet this 
performed willingness is in fact an illusion. As Robert Cover observes: 
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It is, of course, grotesque to assume that the civil facade is ―voluntary‖ except in the sense that it 
represents the defendant‘s autonomous recognition of the overwhelming array of violence ranged 
against him, and of the hopelessness of resistance or outcry.
229
 
For the legal sociologists examined here, the trial process forces the defendant to perform 
acceptance of the legitimacy of the process. By making it appear voluntary, the actual 
violence of compulsion (and the underlying real threat) is cloaked.  
 
However, because these writers are keen to expose the underlying violence of the trial they 
do not acknowledge what this domination/submission model is intended to achieve—instead 
tending to perceive the trial over-simplistically as a repressive state institution. Further to 
this, they overstate the consciousness of those involved in the process, suggesting that the 
defendant is fully aware of the legitimacy he or she lends the process by entering the 
courtroom, and that legal agents are also fully aware of their exploitation of authority. Yet 
acquiescence to the legal requirement of attendance is not the same thing as being aware of 
the legitimacy any participant lends the trial simply by setting foot in the courtroom.  
 
Bernard Hibbitts implies that it is the space of the courtroom that triggers an acceptance of 
the process (which he identifies as positive). According to Hibbitts, those who are placed 
within the process are therefore not only representing roles symbolically; they are embodying 
their position to the extent that certain performance imperatives become seemingly natural. In 
the majority of cases this will suggest to trial participants the idea that it is to their advantage 
to behave within certain bounds (this is similar to, yet almost an inversion of, Goffman‘s 
earlier argument) to achieve the best possible outcome. A defendant is therefore unlikely to 
question his or her position of subjection in the court, as any form of disruption will hurt his 
or her case. As I outlined in the beginning of this chapter, symbols and objects certainly help 
uphold the authority of the law: this framing is a powerful means of suggestion.230 
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However, contrary to Hibbitts, I argue that this suggestion is insufficient to account for this 
internalisation and naturalisation of role, which is not an immediate response to a courtroom 
environment (although the courtroom itself is partially responsible); rather it is a process that 
starts long before entry in the courtroom. As I will outline in the second half of this chapter, 
the role of the unconscious and embodiment are crucial to understanding how discourses of 
power are both internalised and naturalised by all participants in the process, and 
consequently go relatively unquestioned in the criminal trial. 
 
Each of the above approaches acknowledges the ‗power‘ of performance to create certain 
effects in the criminal trial. For those scholarly writers who concentrate on the physical 
resemblance between the court and the theatre, the ‗theatrical‘ has the potential to corrupt the 
important processes of trial through its inherent artificiality. The writers who see the trial as 
essentially ‗dramatic‘ conversely argue that the theatre of the trial is a means of inspiring and 
bringing together the audience/jurors. Lawyers and actors (through dramatic narratives) affect 
jurors and show us certain ‗Truths‘ about ourselves. Performance in a trial is consequently 
transcendent and affirms each participant‘s role as collectively part of something bigger.  
 
In writings by legal anthropologists everyone participates in the collective ritual, although 
some are more in charge and others less so. In this conception, it is the judges and legal 
agents who are the prime performers and the other trial participants (including jury and 
audience) are more like initiands. This performance must take place in a specifically 
demarcated space to function effectively. The combination of authority and symbolism that 
frames this performance allows the experience of it to be imbued with ‗magic‘ for the 
participants, where the actions of those facilitating the ritual seem imbued with ‗natural‘ 
authority or ‗presence‘. These writers argue that those undergoing the trial experience it as a 
collective transformation, even though this ‗transformation‘ functions as a form of social 
control.   
 
In writings that draw on speech-act theory, the concentration is squarely on isolated incidents 
of performance, rather than an overarching performative rubric. The trial is not a 
performance, but judges are performers as their speech has concrete effects. When a judge 
says ‗I sentence you‘, he or she relies on a genuine chain of authority that enables these 
words to not merely be symbolic markers of authority, but acts of power in and of 
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themselves. Although these incidents of performance require a symbolic framework, a judge 
is still posited as having real power and ‗natural‘ authority that the courtroom activates.  
 
In sociological approaches to the trial, however, performance revolves around the defendant‘s 
performativity of self, or how a defendant‘s body is represented. For these writers a 
defendant‘s performance is a form of subjection. Rather than looking at the judge as a 
performer of speech acts, these writers examine the power dichotomy between legal agents 
and the defendant. The judge requires the defendant‘s enforced presence to inscribe their 
efficacy and authority. This is because there is no symbolic value in the silence and constraint 
of an accused unless the lay public (both jury and gallery) sees it. Every defendant‘s public 
submission to the process signals his or her acceptance of the law‘s power. In these writings, 
the entire trial is an overarching performance of authority that exploits the body of the 
defendant to concretise this dominance. This is done through the seemingly voluntary 
submission of the defendant.   
 
Despite their disparate approaches, each of these interpretations as to the performativity or 
theatricality of the trial revolves around a concept of the symbolic value of live performance. 
All acknowledge that performance is integral to enact/create or represent authenticity. Yet 
none of these approaches theorises in detail what this ‗presence‘ might be, and why and how 
live performance has this extraordinary (magic) power. Consequently, most writers tend to 
rely on essentialist ideas as to the inherent qualities of ‗presence‘. It is this mysterious quality 
of ‗presence‘ that I seek to problematise in the rest of this chapter where I outline my 
argument as to the performativity of trial participants and how they create a performance of 
tradition.   
 
The Symbolic Value of Live Performance  
 
To explore essentialist claims about the ‗power‘ of performance, I will draw on the work of 
performance theorist Philip Auslander. Auslander interrogates the symbolic value of live 
performance in his book, Liveness. He investigates what he considers to be the prevailing 
preference for the ‗live‘ over the mediatised in different areas of cultural production. 
Auslander devotes a chapter of Liveness to the criminal jury trial, arguing that the trial has 
proved particularly resistant to the introduction of mediatisation (such as closed-circuit 
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television testimony or video testimony). He claims that criminal trial procedure is ―rooted in 
an unexamined belief that live confrontation can somehow give rise to the truth in ways that 
recorded representations cannot‖.231 
 
Auslander questions the dichotomy between the live and the mediatised, claiming that this is 
an artificial (and unsustainable) construct usually adopted by performance practitioners and 
theorists to valorise the ‗purity‘ of the live through the concept of ‗presence‘, and thereby to 
shore up theatre‘s value and viability in the face of film, television and new media. This 
notion of presence is expanded on in both Liveness and an article, ―Towards a Concept of the 
Political in Postmodern Theatre‖. Auslander points out that ‗presence‘ is a problematic 
construct that can serve to naturalise certain dominant ideologies and reinforce the status 
quo.232   
 
Auslander seeks to demythologise essentialist definitions of live performance, which credit it 
as having greater authenticity than mediatised forms of cultural production, pointing out that 
live presence has no quantifiable ‗real‘ value; rather this value is only recognised in 
opposition to mediatised forms. Yet his claims surrounding presence contradict this. For 
presence to be insidious live performance, despite its authenticity being ‗only‘ symbolic, has 
to have real effects. This is, arguably, what Auslander does not account for sufficiently. By 
concentrating on whether there is a ‗real‘ distinction between the live and the mediatised, he 
does not adequately address the role belief plays in maintaining this distinction. The 
difference between what is ‗real‘ and what is believed to be ‗real‘ is arguably not that 
important.  
 
Collective belief in the symbolic value of live performance is authentic in the sense that it 
becomes self-fulfilling. Consequently, when Auslander asserts that the trial‘s emphasis on the 
live is ―unexamined‖, he fails to account for two things. Firstly, live confrontation in the 
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criminal jury trial has a symbolic (and real) value because we invest in the belief that it does. 
This belief is tied to the other possibility of the live that Auslander does not address: the 
guarantee of openness. By ensuring legal processes are kept live a certain degree of 
accountability is also ensured (fulfilling habeas corpus for example). Although Auslander 
notes that judicial procedure implicitly relies on the potentiality of the moment, the idea that 
‗anything might happen‘, he continues to overlook the possibility that this belief itself will 
produce real flow-on effects.  
 
Secondly, it is in legal agents‘ interests to maintain the ontological distinction of the live. The 
use of live bodies in space performing the will of the court is a powerful symbolic 
representation of the law‘s authority in the wider community. The very act of compelling a 
witness to come to court in person attests to this. If we can see defendants, we can also see 
that they are subjecting themselves to the will of the state. Therefore, their presence signifies 
their bodily submission to their role in the hierarchy of the state. This act of submission is 
repeated ad infinitum with each new defendant.  
 
Although up to this point, I have been discussing the role of the body rather than the social, I 
follow Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu and do not conceive of them as discrete entities, 
but rather inseparably intertwined. As Bourdieu comments, ―the body is in the social world 
but the social world is in the body‖. 233 Whilst sociological approaches to the trial are certainly 
correct in their assertion that that the trial exploits human bodies, the trial process is not a 
simple equation of dominance and submission; rather it is a means of naturalising a broader 
from of social regulation. Michel Foucault notes:  
We must show that punitive measures are not simply ―negative‖ mechanisms that make it possible to 
repress, to prevent, to exclude, to eliminate; but that they are linked to a whole series of positive and 
useful effects which it is their task to support.
234
 
 For Foucault, harnessing the ―political technology‖ of the body is the end-goal of the 
normative function of judicial proceedings. This manipulation uses bodies to self-legitimate, 
as it were, and this usage is positioned as fitting punishment. The process is inescapably 
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violent; bodies are compelled, constrained, and forced to ―perform ceremonies, to emit 
signs‖. 235   
 
According to Foucault  ―it  is  always  the  body  that  is  at  issue—the  body  and  its  forces, 
 their  utility  and  their  docility,  their  distribution  and  their  submission‖.236 A courtroom is 
consequently a place for the power of the state to continually inscribe, subject and assert 
authority over (and on) the body. Foucault states that ―power is exercised, rather than 
possessed‖.237 Here lies the importance of performance. It is the constant repetition of a 
defendant‘s submission that allows ‗The Law‘ (or rather, legal agents) to claim its authority 
over the body. This authority is not stable, but ever reliant on constant enaction. Contrary to 
the sociological approach outlined above, the trial does not reflect the authority of the law 
over the body; it enacts it and helps to perpetuate it through performance.238 This performance 
has real ‗power‘ even if it is not because performance itself is inherently ‗powerful‘. 
 
The ongoing willing submission of a defendant‘s body (and other people‘s bodies) is 
imperative to the trial process as a means of constructing/maintaining its power as an 
institution that can arbitrate over individuals. Collective belief in the symbolic value of live 
performance allows this submission to seem natural, whereby actual violence is cloaked in 
the ceremonial and because we embody this obedience, we do not recognise the significance 
of this act of submission, nor the very real danger it places a defendant in. This performativity 
of self reflects the power shifts outlined in the previous chapter. For Foucault, individuals 
embody socio-legal structures and then reproduce them (or are aware of transgressing them) 
through their actions.  
 
How this manifests in the criminal trial involves collapsing the dichotomy of agency and 
structure. What is termed the structure of the trial by the above writers is for Foucault a 
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manifestation of discourse—discourse being Foucault‘s term to describe a set of knowledges 
produced by people under specific conditions. Analysis of a criminal trial does not reveal a 
stripped back frame but rather a practice performed by many people that reproduces the 
ideological beliefs of the legal field and a broader form of power. The trial is consequently 
not a stable structure at all, but rather a shifting ideological frame that involves the collective 
beliefs of human agents.   
 
To understand the criminal trial‘s use of the body and performance involves understanding 
exactly how and what it is legitimising about the legal field. For Foucault this is largely its 
right to arbitrate and dominate. However, this focus on domination returns us to Foucault‘s 
primary focus, which is ―to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, 
human beings are made subjects‖.239 For Foucault the trial is a reflection of the means by which 
humans are constrained through their own docility and complicity. Yet Foucault‘s own 
methodology does not fully explain how human agents help create and sustain these beliefs. 
While he is clear that performance‘s role is in the repetition of enactment that manufactures 
‗power‘, the acquisition of belief systems is something he largely leaves unexplored.  
 
This is where the work of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu is pertinent. Bourdieu uses the term 
habitus to describe this acquisition and embodiment of belief systems. Habitus is a concept to 
help explain how we acquire, and naturalise life-knowledge obtained through education and 
socialisation. This knowledge takes the form of unconscious dispositions towards things and 
plays a large role in what we value.240 Bourdieu argues that our primary habitus is formed 
largely by family or the relationship between a child and their parents. For Bourdieu, the 
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earliest lesson a child learns is the need for recognition from others.241 This search for 
recognition drives our movement in the world. Our perpetual desire is to acquire 
‗recognition‘ or capital in an area we value. The kind of recognition we want depends on 
what we choose to value. What we choose to value will depend on our background, but we 
will value participation in certain areas or fields and therefore gravitate towards them.  
 
A field for Bourdieu is a site of struggle in which people (social agents, in Bourdieu‘s terms) 
compete with one another for capital of shared value that is not necessarily monetary yet not 
entirely unrelated to money (as all fields sit within, and are autonomous—by degree—to the 
field of economy). The process of accruing capital is strategic, and because our primary 
desire is for recognition we must invest in the field we move towards, and we must ‗play the 
game‘. Bourdieu argues that agents internalise the logics of fields unconsciously through 
education and socialisation. Applying these concepts of Bourdieu, Paul Moore writes on such 
a process of socialisation: 
If we have learnt to share a particular value, we will compete for it and seek recognition of our success, 
as this increases our sense of purpose and belonging, and we will follow rules governing accumulation 
as these are experienced as the ‗natural‘ way of doing and reinforced by the group‘s unconscious 
collusion […] In Bourdieu‘s terms, we will attempt to maximise our ―capital‖ within particular ―fields‖ 
of human endeavour, as determined by those dispositions we have embodied.
242
  
Because this process works on a largely pre-cognitive level, the actual field-specific logics 
become ‗naturalised‘ and agents rarely reflect upon them as a way of being in the world. So 
those coming into the field are unlikely to question the field logic itself.243 
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According to Bourdieu, the juridical field is a ―site of competition‖ where the aim is to obtain 
a ―monopoly‖ in determining the law, and legal agents do this by interpreting legal theory 
and practice in a manner that reflects a relative autonomy and is also influenced by internal 
hierarchies. Because they are acted out on a largely pre-cognitive level, the actual field-
specific logics become naturalised and unquestioned. Struggle occurs for both Foucault and 
Bourdieu not ―on behalf of the truth‖ but ―about the status of truth and the economic and 
political role it plays‖. 244 Within any field, then, the aim of this struggle is to create a 
hegemony of interpretation that is argued to be ‗true‘ (and felt to be true by the agents 
working within this area of endeavour). This thinking is in keeping with Foucault, who 
specifies that ‗truth‘ is not something to be ―discovered and accepted‖; rather truth is ―[t]he 
ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects 
of power attached to the true […].245 Legal ‗truth‘ is a field-specific construction, however 
legal agents are likely to believe that their understanding of ‗truth‘ and ‗reason‘ is (or should 
be) relatively universal.  
 
An example of this conversion from field-specific construction to ‗truth‘ is legal framing. 
Bourdieu argues that this is one of the primary means of enforcing the notion of legal 
autonomy (and therefore enabling the law to perform in terms of its own laws) and one that is 
particularly visible at trial. Legal framing is where any action, system of thought, or person 
from another field (science, anthropology, plumbing, kite-making et cetera) is reconfigured 
within legal terminology. Status established within another field does not necessarily have 
currency within the courtroom—thus all other field-specific knowledges fall under the rubric 
of ‗all are equal in the eyes of the law‘.246 This rubric illustrates the legal field‘s vested 
interest (if not a particularly conscious interest) in diminishing all hierarchies that are not 
legal.  
 
‗The Law‘, as demonstrated by the behaviour of legal agents and the trial process, is 
interested in what is judicially true or false and this is defined largely internally according to 
the internal hegemonies in the juridical field. Robert Van Krieken, writing an article 
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analysing both the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Niklas Luhmann comments, regarding 
Luhmann‘s work: 
There are no extra-legal ―truths‖ exempted from the juridical gaze and cross-examination, no facts 
which have any autonomous status, all knowledge is mere testimony in favour of one party or another. 
All science is merely ―opinion‖, the reliability of any area of knowledge is always open to the courts‘ 
critical scrutiny.
247
 
For Bourdieu, Luhmann overstates the case somewhat. The category of ‗expert witness‘ relies 
on legal recognition of extra-legal status. The absence of any extra-legal status in the 
courtroom suggests that everyone in the courtroom is seen as absolutely equal—this is overly 
idealistic.248 This said, the law purports to level all hierarchies established within other fields 
as though it were alone in being immune to hierarchical influences and the exercise of power. 
This process allows ‗The Law‘ to subsume all other systems of knowledge, therefore 
maintaining its normative function, and upholding its seeming autonomy. This leads to what I 
consider the defining feature of legal practice—legal agents‘ claim to be able to shine a light 
into and illuminate any other field (and arbitrate) despite not having any field-specific 
knowledge in those other areas.249  
 
Despite the juridical field being a site of struggle between legal agents competing for capital, 
Bourdieu says that legal agents mostly unconsciously cooperate in the 
assumption/construction of legal autonomy. So although, according to Bourdieu, there is 
―perceived tension‖ between the pure legal theorist (who deals in the theory and philosophy 
of legal practice) and the judge (who deals in practicalities), they are linked by a ―chain of 
legitimation‖ whereby a judge‘s decisions are taken and reconfigured, formalised, and 
systematised by theorists and/or lawmakers. This ultimately presents a cohesive body of rules 
and where at the same time the judge can believe justice is not arbitrary but reasonable, 
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 Robert Van Krieken, ―Legal Reasoning as a Field of Knowledge Production: Luhmann, Bourdieu, and Law‘s 
Autonomy,‖ (paper presented at the Law, Power & Injustice: Confronting the Legacies of Sociolegal Research, 
Law & Society Association Conference, Chicago, 2004), unpublished. Retrieved 15 June 2008 from Sydney 
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 Although equality before the law is one of the foundations of Liberalism, the fact that a trial participant‘s 
socio-economic status may determine the quality of legal representation they can obtain calls this ideal into 
question.  
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 This reaches its zenith in the trial, where judges often preside over complex medical or scientific disputes, or 
are expected to understand complex methodology in the space of several days, weeks or months. 
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sourced from a collective agreement as to what is appropriate in any given circumstance. For 
Bourdieu this is because there is an unavoidably arbitrary streak at the heart of juridical 
decisions that cannot be revealed to the layperson or to the participants themselves.
250
 
Bourdieu comments that: ―Judicial decisions can be distinguished from naked exercises of 
power only to the extent that they can be presented as the necessary result of a principled 
interpretation of unanimously accepted texts‖.251  
 
Bourdieu is not questioning the ability of trial judges to reach reasonable decisions. Reason 
itself involves degrees of reflexivity and self-awareness that are only produced under specific 
historical conditions. The ability of a judge, and the particular status of reason, will vary over 
time and social space. However, the law is a highly unreflexive field. In order for the law to 
appear governed by reason and therefore objective, how decisions are reached must be 
presented as stemming from a coherent self-contained body of rules that are impartial. 
 
Of course, Bourdieu is clearly talking at this point about inquisitorial processes (civil law). In 
this system of trial, most law is contained in written legislation, rather than precedent 
(although this is not absolutely the case). This means that under inquisitorial trial process, the 
judge is theoretically meant to only interpret and apply the law, rendering usually very short 
decisions. Bourdieu‘s critique is that inquisitorial processes have to stress a continuity 
between different cases falling under the same laws, despite the fact that no two cases will be 
exactly alike. Yet this argument is also pertinent to common law, because common law in its 
reliance on precedent confers a certain authority on judges to interpret what is relevant and 
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adversarial system (Bourdieu is writing primarily about the inquisitorial system) due to the presence of a jury 
whose decision-making processes are veiled from the public and legal agents.  
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what is not. Although theoretically a judge (particularly in a lower court) must follow the 
precedent of a higher court, what they choose to find relevant will always to some degree be 
arbitrary. Even interpretation of statute involves a varying degree of interpretation.252  
 
Despite varying room for interpretation depending on the legal jurisdiction, judges need to 
demonstrate the fairness and impartiality of their decisions. In the criminal jury trial this is 
essential as the judge‘s role is to preside and remain neutral.253 Consequently, a judge‘s 
determinations on points of law (involving admissibility of evidence and 
summation/directions to the jury) must be seen to be relatively impartial.254 Consequently, 
judges tread a fine line when it comes to interpretation of common law. However, this 
process must be rendered consistent in public. This ‗making consistent‘, or ‗universalising‘ 
and ‗transcendentalising‘, is something Bourdieu argues generally happens in all fields of 
cultural production, although rarely having such an expansive impact on an entire society 
(and this point I would argue to be equally valid in adversarial practice as it is in 
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 For example, currently in Australia, New South Wales, South Australia and Victoria are referred to as 
‗common law‘ jurisdictions in terms of criminal practice. This is because although each state has a criminal 
code, the bulk of their criminal law remains in common law. Conversely, Queensland, Tasmania, Western 
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 ―The judge is to take no part in that contest [the adversarial trial], having his own role to perform in ensuring 
the propriety and fairness of the trial and in instructing the jury in the relevant law‖. Ratten v The Queen (1974) 
131 CLR 510 at 517 (Barwick, CJ). For more information on the role of the judge in the criminal trial, see 
Murray Gleeson, ―The Role of a Judge in  a Criminal Trial,‖ (paper presented at the LawAsia Conference, Hong 
Kong, 6 June 2007), unpublished. Retrieved 11 June 2008 from: www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/cj/cj_6jun07.pdf 
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 This is crucial to the concept of ‗separation of powers‘ whereby the judiciary cannot simply be seen as an 
extension of the government. Rather the concept of the ‗independent judiciary‘ is fundamental to preserving 
public belief in the fairness of the trial. Ironically, of course, this means that judicial decisions that are opposed 
to government policy will lead to claims of ‗judicial activism‘. However, following slavishly the dictates of all 
legislation may cause the judiciary to compromise their independence. These tensions between the different 
perceived responsibilities of a judge (including whether an unelected judge can ―make‖ law) result in frequent 
controversies in common law jurisdictions and are beyond the scope of this thesis. For further discussion see: 
Enid Mona Campbell and H.P. Lee, supra n. 250. 
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inquisitorial).255 For Bourdieu, then, the criminal trial is a practice of the juridical field that 
seeks to manufacture and perpetuate its autonomy and its right to arbitrate. The means by 
which this is made possible is through what he terms symbolic violence. 
 
Symbolic violence is the exploitation of and dominance by those in a relatively powerful 
position over those who have less capital. For this violence to be effective there has to be a 
shared understanding of the value of this capital. In the case of the criminal trial, the 
unconscious exploitation by legal agents of the gap between the lay and the law is a form of 
symbolic violence: 
In reality, the institution of a ―judicial space‖ implies the establishment of a borderline between actors. It 
divides those qualified to participate in the game and those who, though they may find themselves in the 
middle of it, are in fact excluded by their inability to accomplish the conversion of mental space—and 
particularly of linguistic stance—which is presumed by entry into this social space.256 
This is central to the process of the criminal trial, as observed by all the writers outlined in 
this chapter. The significant disadvantaging of the defendant‘s body within the trial is marked 
by his or her inability (which will obviously vary by degree from defendant to defendant) to 
comprehend the opacity of legal processes. Legal agents unconsciously enact and re-enact 
their own dominance over all other fields (as gatekeeper between lay and ‗The Law‘) when 
they guide laypersons. Consequently, a layperson‘s dependence on counsel signifies his or 
her already naturalized submission.257 
 
Bourdieu continues: 
The difference between the vulgar vision of the person who is about to come under the jurisdiction of 
the court, that is to say, the client, and the professional vision of the expert witness, the judge, the 
lawyer, and other juridical actors, is far from accidental. Rather it is essential to a power relation upon 
which two systems of presuppositions, two systems of expressive intention—two world-views—are 
grounded.
258
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 This is not, of course, always the case. In instances where a criminal defendant is a highly skilled 
professional, they may have less sense of inferiority before legal agents.  
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 Bourdieu, ―Towards a Sociology,‖ 828. 
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Whilst other writers examined in this chapter have argued that this gap is exploited, Bourdieu 
explains how this ‗magic‘ occurs—via the operations of habitus and collective belief. It is not 
enough that legal agents within the trial process exploit bodies visibly. Experiencing the 
criminal trial as transcendental relies on a naturalized disposition to see agents within the 
juridical field as impartial gatekeepers between the individual and ‗The Law‘:  
This complicity is not granted by a conscious, deliberate act; it is itself the effect of a power, which is 
durably inscribed in the bodies of the dominated, in the form of schemes of perception and disposition 
(to respect, admire, love, etc.), in other words, beliefs which make one sensitive to certain public 
manifestations, such as public representations of power.
259
  
A collective, mostly unconscious, performance of embodied belief enables this magic: 
―habitus is the vis insita, the potential energy, the dormant force, from which symbolic 
violence, and especially that exercised through performatives, derives its mysterious 
efficacy‖.260 
 
Every legal agent and layperson within the trial has a specific role and function. But for 
Bourdieu this is partly unconscious. In other words legal agents and lay bodies unknowingly 
perpetuate the performance of tradition simply by doing what they have been taught to do. 
This tells us that legal theory will not necessarily reflect legal practice, but may 
unconsciously idealise practice to the layperson and legal agent, concealing the way the trial 
functions as a state site of ―legitimised symbolic violence‖.261  
 
The exploitation of the symbolic power of live performance cloaks the complex and 
contingent functions of the criminal trial, transforming the trial into a process that is 
apparently cohesive, universal and unquestioned, not only by the layperson, but also by most 
of the legal agents who work within it:  
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 ―What is at stake in this struggle is monopoly of the power to impose a universally recognized principle of 
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Symbolic force, that of a performative utterance, and especially of an order, is a form of power which is 
exercised on bodies, directly, and as if by magic, without any physical constraint; but the magic works 
only on the basis of previously constituted dispositions, which it ―triggers‖ like springs. The criminal 
trial ―triggers‖ submission before it from all participants.262 
The repetition of this collective belief, its repeated enactment: 
[…] is the canonical form of (all this) social magic. It can function effectively only to the extent that the 
symbolic power of legitimation, or more accurately of naturalization (since what is natural need not even 
ask the question of its own legitimacy), reproduces and heightens the immanent historical power which 
the authority and the authorization of naming reinforces or liberates.
263
 
 
Conclusion: Symbolic Violence and the Performance of Tradition  
 
Performance lies at the heart of the criminal trial‘s ability to perpetrate and perpetuate the 
significant gap between lay and law and to cloak it in tradition. The performance of tradition 
is, therefore, far from ‗mere‘ theatrics; rather it is a process that, through its exploitation of 
live performance, functions to sustain the mythology of a (fair) trial. Yet, as Bourdieu points 
out, despite the (largely unconsciously perpetrated) symbolic violence and inequity of the 
trial that assist legal agents in maintaining their position within a (semi-)autonomous juridical 
field, this collective performativity is also vital to maintain belief in the trial. The trial as a 
live performance must be continually enacted; played out over and over and over again. This 
repetition manufactures, almost as a by-product, the power of ‗The Law‘.  
 
Having outlined the role of the unconscious in my argument as to the performativity in the 
trial, in the following chapter I examine in detail how legal agents acquire and habituate these 
unconscious behaviours. This involves examining legal education to show how advocates 
acquire and habituate belief in the adversarial model of truth-telling. I will show that despite 
changing models of legal education for advocates, with a growth in performance and acting-
oriented advocacy training, any form of advocacy education continues to perpetuate practices 
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that sustain the symbolic violence employed within the trial, a process necessary to the 
performance of tradition. 
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4 
 
 
Advocacy Training 
 
 
 
 
 
As we have not hesitated to speak of Mr. Beach‘s deficiencies as an advocate, so we shall allude to what seems 
to us Mr. Porter‘s main defect. He always strikes us, on reflection, as an actor. He is just as effective in a bad 
case as in a good one. The cause lends him no aid; he makes the cause. At the moment we yield, just as the jury 
does. If he has the last word, the day is his. But we suspect that if he is to be answered by a strong man, his 
wondrous spell might fade. 
 Editorial, Albany Law Journal, 1875 264 
 
 
The great advocate is like the great actor; he fills the stage for his span of life, succeeds, gains our applause, 
makes his last bow, and the curtain falls. Nothing is so elusive as the art of acting, unless indeed it be the sister 
art of advocacy. 
Judge Edward Abbot Parry
265 
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Introduction  
 
Whereas once we, as members of the public, largely spoke for ourselves as witnesses, now 
legal counsel speaks for us.266 We rely on advocates to perform effectively in court. But what 
is effective performance for an advocate? In the previous chapter, I argued that legal agents 
unconsciously exert significant control over witnesses. In this chapter, I examine how 
advocates acquire courtroom skills. I begin by critically reappraising the popular rubric of 
‗storytelling‘, arguing that this term, while explicitly constructing the advocate as narrator, 
also naturalises the high level of control legal agents have over lay bodies. This control will 
go unquestioned by the vast majority of practising advocates.  
 
I then analyse two different kinds of advocacy training: the traditional model of pupillage and 
the more recent model derived from the private advocacy training industry, which frequently 
draws direct parallels with actor training and the theatre. Long-standing legal bias against 
theatricality means that purporting to teach an advocate to ‗act‘ is controversial; hence, while 
some advocates argue that there is an affinity between acting and advocacy, others continue 
to associate performing with lying. I argue that criticism of acting-focused advocacy training 
material is at least partially misplaced, based on a failure to recognize pupillage as an earlier 
method of performance training. Drawing on acting theory, I argue that advocates have 
always been trained in performance. This is often misrecognised as natural behaviour, but is 
in fact what I call legal naturalism—a performance style that has become habitual.267  
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 This is excepting defendants in criminal trials who, as outlined in the second chapter of this thesis, could only 
provide unsworn statements to the court and could not testify under oath on their own behalf until 1891 in New 
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I show in this chapter that the ambivalent attitude towards performance training is consistent 
with the belief that advocates are ‗not-performing‘ in the courtroom: that is, that his/her 
behaviour is simply an acquisition of legal skills to get to the ‗Truth‘. This misrecognition of 
the nature of advocacy practice by both advocates and the public maintains lay dependency 
on legal practitioners and sustains the performance of tradition. As I conclude, these 
methodological debates about models of education overlook the fact that any form of 
advocacy training involves an unconscious naturalisation of coercion and force that is 
essential to the adversarial model of evidence testing.  
 
Legal Naturalism  
 
It is April 2005 at a moot at Sydney University Law School.
268
 The prosecution begins: 
May it please the court….er…I….sorry, I withdraw that. 
Looking around the classroom there is no Clarence Darrow in sight. There is not even a Law 
and Order McCoy, a Johnny Cochran, or a Geoffrey Robertson. Instead, there is a terrified 
22-year-old wearing what looks like his father‘s too big blazer, trousers that ride up far above 
his sock-line, and who is carrying a large red umbrella and a slightly cheap looking mock-
leather briefcase. His choice of clothing, clearly meant to make him look professional, instead 
renders him looking more like a 14-year-old extra from Modern Times. Perhaps, of course, it 
is the location as well. I am in Lecture Room 6, two storeys underground. We are in a small 
dark classroom, and the entire building smells like damp washing. It is hard to take anyone 
seriously under these conditions. This frightened 22 year old man in his father‘s blazer wants 
to be a barrister, like many other law graduates who every year sit for their Bar exams and try 
to make their way into the profession. Yet this student is so far removed from the advocates 
of popular imagination it seems an impossible leap. So how can a law student with a golfing 
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century. Mooting is based on appellate court proceedings, as opposed to mock trials, which simulate lower court 
proceedings. This means mooting involves debating points of law before a ‗judge‘, rather than examining 
witnesses as is the case in mock trials.  
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umbrella in a basement improve? What does this young law student need to do to become an 
effective advocate?  
 
Advocacy training—methods and advice for advocates on how to improve their skills—has 
existed in one way or another for (literally) ages. As far back as the 1500s, there were printed 
English manuals of advice for legal practice.269 These manuals themselves often drew on 
ancient Greek and Roman advice for pleaders that dates back thousands of years, and there is 
a steady stream of books on decorum and procedure through the centuries.270 This material 
has boomed since the 1970s.271 The more recent material has also become increasingly 
multidisciplinary, with a multitude of material whose focus is on performance and 
persuasion.272 This includes a growing body of work directly focused on perceived affinities 
between acting and advocacy.  
 
This boom in materials means our 22-year-old law student has options that he did not have 
previously. Now, to improve his advocacy skills, he could for example take a course run by 
TalkingBrief, an Australian company started by two professional actors that provides 
‗performance‘ skills for the courtroom. Their website tells us that: ―TalkingBrief workshops 
for advocates gives you the ‗tools‘ of the acting profession, ensuring a compelling case, a 
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 Examples of early English advocacy advice include Abraham Fraunce and Ramus Petrus, The Lavviers 
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Justine Lewis, ―Performance in Legal Advocacy‖ (Ph.D. diss., University of California Los Angeles, 1995).   
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 As I will outline later in the chapter, this expansion is attributable to a significant increase in law degrees and 
law students, a shift in the syllabus to focus on electives rather than vocational training, and an academic 
interdisciplinary expansion (such as the Law as Literature movement mentioned in the previous chapter). Much 
of the material is American and has filtered through to Australian practice.  
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 Advocacy training material in the last 30 years has drawn on psychology, linguistics, and literature as well as 
acting theory. In addition to this multidisciplinary take on advocacy training, there has also been growth in 
generalised ‗communication skills‘ that are presented as applicable to multiple careers, most frequently lawyers 
and salespersons.  
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spell-binding performance and a jury gripped by your powers of persuasion‖.273 TalkingBrief 
runs workshops designed to ―enhance presence‖ and give the participant ―weapons of mass 
persuasion‖. Despite the populist rhetoric, they, like a number of other private professional 
advocacy companies teaching acting techniques, advertise their workshops on the NSW Bar 
association website. Legal professionals are required to update their skills in order to retain 
their license. This is done through the accumulation of Continuing Professional Development 
(CPD) points of which there is an annual quota. Attendance at a TalkingBrief workshop is a 
means of acquiring CPD points suggesting, if not an explicit endorsement of the content, at 
least a willingness on the part of the Bar to outsource some aspects of legal education to non-
legal professionals.   
 
A TalkingBrief workshop is, however, a pricey option. At $AUS 400 for 4 hours, it may be a 
bit out of our law student‘s range. Nevertheless, it is cheaper than purchasing a U.S. four-part 
DVD over the internet called What Can Lawyers Learn from Actors, listed at $US495. This 
DVD series is a filmed workshop run by two American actors who sell their merchandise 
through the website for the U.S. National Institute of Trial Advocacy (N.I.T.A.). A visit to 
N.I.T.A.‘s website would also allow our student to purchase a book. For $US65 (plus 
shipping), he could get a copy of Theatre Tips and Strategies for Jury Trials by David Ball, a 
book whose publicity states that:   
You may not be Al Pacino, but you can be just as convincing to your jury with these subtle techniques 
that the best attorneys in the world employ. This practical step-by-step guide will transform you into a 
seasoned performer, with guidance for voir dire, openings and closings, testimony, and focus groups. 
You‘ll also become a director—preparing your cast of witnesses to testify clearly, credibly, and 
memorably. Become a master of improvisation to navigate your way through the surprises that creep up 
in jury trials (instead of being blindsided by them). Did law school teach you how to act in a courtroom? 
This book will.
274
 
 
The specific focus on acting in this kind of advocacy training material is not without its 
critics in the legal world, due to the longstanding association between acting and artificiality. 
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Milner Ball draws attention to this underlying pejorative attitude towards acting in ―The 
Play‘s the Thing‖:  
The identification of juridical proceedings as theatre requiring live presentation would seem 
unexceptional but for the fact that the label has been rejected, as though theatrics were an expendable, 
intrusive embarrassment to the scientific and businesslike austerities of the courts.
275
  
As detailed in the first chapter of this thesis, along with witnesses ‗misbehaving‘, it is 
frequently the advocate who is believed by commentators to have the potential to interfere 
with the austerity of the courtroom through his or her ‗theatrical‘ behaviour. This means that 
negative connotations are also attached to the notion that advocates can and should learn to 
act.  
 
Accusing advocates of performing is an insult that can be traded in the courtroom (―you have 
obviously ‗rehearsed‘ your witness well‖, or ―I will not attempt to match my learned 
colleague‘s ‗theatrical‘ style‖). The accusation implies that advocates are attempting to 
manipulate the jury and/or are lying. For many legal agents, whilst advocating effectively for 
a client is essential, ‗acting‘ is not effective advocacy as it involves emotional manipulation 
and histrionics rather than an appeal to rational thought. Acting is more like ‗acting up‘—
emotional and inappropriate.276 This means that some of the advocacy training advice listed 
above, far from assisting our law student, could prematurely stunt his career.277 So what is 
appropriate and effective performance for an advocate in a contemporary Australian court? 
 
In 1992 in Lyons v R, the judge found that counsel should ―avoid hyperbole and not seek to 
sway the jury by trickery, prejudice or emotion‖. 278  However, the judge also stressed that 
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counsel ―is not required to reduce his rhetoric to dull and lifeless factual propositions‖.279 
Legally, then, an advocate is permitted to breathe life into the evidence he/she presents, but 
must be careful to avoid a breach of ethics, including any overt emotional manipulation of a 
jury. The remarks in Lyons v R were specifically about Crown counsel (advocates for the 
prosecution), not defence counsel. Unfortunately, criminal law reports are highly unlikely to 
give specific advice about defence counsel behaviour (as defendants rarely mount appeals 
against their own defence).   
 
However, the implication is that advocates are always limited in how they may behave, and 
that the prosecution is even more limited, having less right than the defence to advocate 
stridently (because the Crown acts for the public and the state, not for a private client).  
A prosecuting counsel stands in a position quite different from that of an advocate who represents the 
person accused or represents a plaintiff or defendant in a civil litigation. For this latter advocate has a 
private duty—that of doing everything that he [sic] honourably can to protect the interests of his client. 
He is entitled to ‗fight for a verdict‘. But the Crown counsel is a representative of the State, ‗a minister 
of justice‘, his function is to assist the jury in arriving at the truth.280   
A case in point of the limitations on strident advocacy on the part of the prosecution is that of 
McCullough v R in 1982, appealed in the Supreme Court of Tasmania. In this case, a 
defendant was convicted of murder, but had the conviction quashed by the Supreme Court 
because of inappropriate conduct by Crown counsel. The prosecuting advocate in this case 
compared the defendant with the Yorkshire Ripper, Peter Sutcliffe, and stated:  
We have a man in this Court who acts like—as I said before—like somebody who would swat a fly or 
flick out a match; that‘s how he regarded the life of another man. I suggest that it‘s not unreasonable to 
claim that he had about as much need to protect himself from Owen Adcock, from death or grievous 
bodily harm at the hands of Owen Adcock, that Peter Sutcliffe had in England to protect himself from 
his twenty female victims.
 281
  
The appeal judges found that: 
[t]here was a real risk that the jury were improperly influenced by those remarks. We consider that the 
trial process was compromised in that the possibility cannot be excluded that in convicting the applicant 
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the jury were actuated, partly at least, by indignation, disgust and fear aroused by the intemperate 
language employed by counsel for the Crown. That is enough to demonstrate that a miscarriage of 
justice […] occurred and that the verdict cannot be allowed to stand.282  
From this case we can discern two important points. Firstly, what is essential to uphold this 
ground for appeal (the allegedly inappropriate conduct by counsel) is whether the jury may 
have been improperly influenced by the behaviour of the advocate. As observed by Justice 
Giles JA in Gonzales v R in 2007, ―An important matter in considering unfairness is whether 
the Crown Prosecutor's conduct distracted the jury from rational consideration of the Crown 
case and the defence‖.283 
 
Secondly, the reliance by Appeals Courts on the effect on the jury (‗improper influence‘) tells 
us that there are no uniform boundaries as to what constitutes inappropriate advocacy. Rather 
both the prosecuting and defence advocates are bound by invisible lines in the sand. Les 
McCrimmon and Ian Maxwell argue that ―there are lines over which an advocate should not 
cross‖ and that the use of trickery, prejudice or emotion constitutes over-zealous advocacy. 
They also acknowledge, however, that this is a difficult position to determine, stating: ―in 
practice […] it is often difficult to establish the boundary between zealous advocacy and 
unethical conduct‖.284 As one New Zealand case established, the ―feel and atmosphere of one 
trial may make it reasonable and even necessary for tactics to be employed that would seem 
out of place and disproportionate to the circumstances of another‖.285  
 
My argument throughout this chapter is that this boundary of appropriate advocacy is 
difficult to firmly establish in large measure because it is not historically static. Conventions 
and expectations of an advocate change not only in differing situations but also over time. As 
such, what is recognised as appropriate behaviour (that does not constitute trickery, prejudice 
or emotion) is not ‗natural‘ behaviour, but rather a particular style that advocates must learn 
through induction into the social universe of the law. This nebulous area of appropriate 
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behaviour is what I call legal naturalism: a performance style that indicates competence, skill 
and honesty to other legal practitioners and to a jury, and whose parameters alter over time.286  
 
Legal naturalism functions on a largely unconscious level whereby advocates habituate what 
they have learned (as well as absorb relatively unconsciously how to behave) to the point 
where their behaviour feels, to an experienced advocate, like it is natural and looks, from an 
outside perspective, like it is simply a professional persona. Although many legal agents 
consciously associate acting with artificiality, and construct a dichotomy between acting and 
his or her own practice of „not performing‘ (being ‗natural‘), this is a form of misrecognition, 
resulting from advocates‘ failure to recognise their own embodied courtroom behaviour as a 
performance style. Legal naturalism is, in the courtroom context, simply a case of ‗good 
acting‘ rather than ‗over-acting‘.   
 
This is one of the reasons why I have employed the term legal naturalism, which explicitly 
references naturalistic acting. For an actor, playing another character naturalistically involves 
adapting one‘s way of being in the world, one‘s habitus, to ―sign another‖. Paul Moore writes 
on such a process: 
Although not by name, the habitus as an idea is one that many actors may be familiar with. A good deal 
of training, which typically spans three of four years and continues into professional life, involves 
rigorous exercises aimed at neutralising physical expressions of this conceptual apparatus. ‗Symptoms‘ 
of habitus, such as accent, colloquialisms and bodily expression, all of which help to locate our past in 
the present, are suppressed, allowing the actor to temporarily sign another. The more completely actors 
master the ability to do this on a precognitive level, the more successful and comfortable their attempts 
at performance are likely to be.
287
  
Naturalistic acting involves an actor not only attempting to become conscious of, and modify 
one‘s own ‗symptoms‘ of habitus, but is also an attempt to understand and navigate a 
different way of being in the world and concomitant sign system. Naturalistic actors do not 
only mimic external characteristics; rather they attempt to present themselves as fully 
embodied characters. The effort behind this accurate representation is ideally invisible in an 
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effective performance, where an audience does not notice the disjunction between an actor 
and the character he/she is playing. The enormous effort and high level of preparation for an 
actor involved in naturalistic performance is transformed by an audience‘s experience, where 
he or she simply seems ‗natural‘.288 
 
Legal naturalism as I am defining it is similar to naturalistic acting. Both actors and advocates 
must neutralise symptoms of their habitus—reducing obvious markers of their past that may 
jar with audience reception. However, whereas actors only have one audience, advocates 
must play to two very different audiences inside a courtroom: their colleagues and a jury. To 
a jury, an advocate must seem like a human being, able to communicate with them without 
patronising them or being pompous. The outcome of a case depends to some extent on an 
advocate winning a jury‘s trust. However, advocates must also meet the expectations of their 
colleagues. All lawyers and judges present in a trial are officers of the court. That is, they are 
all bound by certain rules and duties to the court, which outrank/outweigh their individual 
responsibilities to their clients. This means that advocates cannot overstep these boundaries 
for the sake of their client (for example by trying too hard to win sympathy, or ‗play‘ to the 
jury).  
 
To their peers (and superiors), advocates must seem competent, professional and 
disinterested. This is not only, as observed above, because behaviour that may sway a jury 
may also potentially constitute grounds for appeal. It is also because, just as a witness‘s 
credibility is under scrutiny in a courtroom, so too is an advocate, who is continually being 
assessed by his/her peers as well as by the jury. Legal naturalism is necessary not only to be 
persuasive in a case, but more largely to ensure an advocate‘s competence to compete for 
capital in the juridical field.  
 
Storytelling and Persuasion 
 
The need to reach the audience, coupled with the negative connotations frequently attached to 
acting, means that a common rubric has developed to describe advocacy practice: 
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storytelling. Advocates often learn to see themselves as storytellers.
289
 The goal of this 
storytelling is ‗persuasion‘. Queen‘s Counsel Chester Porter, who wrote a book called The 
Gentle Art of Persuasion, says ―Stories are very often a highly effective means of making a 
point in a speech‖, though he qualifies this by pointing out that ―it is best for the story to be 
brief‖.290 New South Wales Crown Prosecutor Mark Tedeschi says that advocacy involves a 
―fireside story‖.291 Queen‘s Counsel George Hampel points out that storytelling is a means of 
reminding the advocate that he or she wants to ―avoid sounding as though [he or she has] 
recently escaped from a mooting contest in an intellectual property dispute‖.292  
 
In the adversarial criminal jury trial, to be able to communicate with (or persuade) the jury 
effectively requires a downplaying of the professional, specialised language of the law into 
language that is communicable to laypersons. The term ‗storytelling‘ is used by legal 
practitioners to explain the necessity of negotiating (although not collapsing) the gap between 
lay and law, whereby advocates can retain their professionalism and distinction without being 
overly opaque to a jury. Chester Porter makes this explicit, saying that ―the secret of 
successful storytelling is the ability to judge what will be interesting to the audience, and then 
to tell it in an interesting way‖.293  
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Storytelling places a premium on being brief, clear, and using ‗sensorial‘ language. As 
George Hampel points out: ―‗He hit my client several times, occasioning him severe injury‘ 
does not suggest nearly as much to the Tribunal as ‗he punched my client hard to the face, 
and broke his nose‘ […] such imagery can quickly catch a court‘s attention and direct it to the 
concerns which the advocate wishes to develop‖.294 Because the criminal trial process remains 
primarily oral (and judges have discretion—albeit rarely used—to prevent jurors from taking 
notes), storytelling is also about presenting an argument in a way that is simple and 
memorable.295  
 
The term storytelling is also distinctly classical.296 Advocates have a long history of drawing 
on classical writings as a means of illustrating the skills of persuasion needed for today‘s 
trial.297 English manuals on advocacy training (dating back to well before the 1300s) 
frequently draw on legal advice for pleaders in ancient Greece and Rome, particularly 
Aristotle‘s writings on rhetoric. More recently, Justine Lewis‘s dissertation writes about the 
rhetorical skills necessary for advocacy.298 This classicising of contemporary legal 
proceedings is partly about the creation of tradition. By concentrating on the advocate‘s 
(literal) antiquity, the contemporary advocate can trace a line from their profession back to 
the pleaders of ancient Rome and Greece by seeing themselves as ‗storytellers‘ who practice 
the ‗art of persuasion‘.  
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This, however, belies the fact that these two separate legal universes are in fact alien to one 
another.299 The law, and the criminal jury trial itself, in Australia or any other adversarial 
jurisdiction, is radically different from these classical origins. Although the emphasis on oral 
processes remains, what is meant by ‗oral‘ has shifted. The culture of residual orality in 
Ancient Greece and Rome was strong enough that the law was not so bound to literacy, as it 
is in our contemporary legal system. As Walter Ong points out in Orality and Literacy: 
Technologizing the Word, oral cultures have a completely different conception of the 
world.300 Writing is not simply a means of recording oral processes; rather it has utterly 
changed the way humans think.  
 
While common law traditions have their origin in (relatively) preliterate societies, the 
mechanisms and structures of the trial are predicated on literacy. Legal documents do not 
have a narrative structure; rather they are navigable only with reference to other written 
material such as cases, supplementary texts and statutes. In a trial process, this remains true. 
The construction of a defence or prosecution relies on reference to written evidence, 
precedent and procedure. Storytelling (primarily based on Aristotelian theory) functions on 
the premise of a beginning, middle and end. Although in the contemporary criminal jury trial 
advocates still rely on the spoken word, storytelling in a contemporary trial is not a simple 
chronological oral account, but rather a translation of a mass of material into something 
resembling a narrative structure that is presented primarily orally. This is immediately 
apparent on entering a courtroom where vast amounts of documents sit in suitcases and on 
trolleys in the aisles of the courtroom as there are no facilities for storing documents.  
 
Examining the meaning of ‗orality‘ exposes a conceptual gap between the theory and practice 
of the criminal trial. The traditional courtroom operates on a legal belief in the law‘s orality; 
yet the trolleys full of books undermine this belief. Trial procedure is not classical; in fact, its 
progress mirrors the post-enlightenment scientific model that is also embedded in the 
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language. There is no beginning, middle, and end to a legal case that a partisan evidence 
gatherer does not artificially delimit in a courtroom. Each (prosecution or defence counsel) 
presents a hypothesis that is then tested through the opposing counsel; a decision is then 
rendered by a jury as to which hypothesis is more compelling.  
 
As we remit evidence gathering to partisans, it is unlikely that either hypothesis is the 
‗Truth‘, although the prosecution in particular is bound to strive for this goal. It is not in 
either side‘s interests to admit any interpretation of evidence that may hinder a jury‘s 
acquittal/conviction.301 The goal of advocacy is consequently to compel the acceptance of one 
story over the other, truth becoming (as previously noted from Foucault) ―the ensemble of 
rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power 
attached to the true‖.302 
 
Despite the prevalence of advice from legal practitioners about speaking simply and clearly, 
an advocate is never simply relating what happened. Rather, advocates translate and shape a 
past event into a legally acceptable narrative. ‗Storytelling‘ is therefore a form of legal 
framing where an event must be reconfigured in legal discourse to have meaning in a 
criminal trial. As George Hampel points out, storytelling involves drawing attention to 
particular ‗concerns‘ an advocate wishes to develop.303 I stressed in the previous chapter that 
the role of the preconscious was integral in sustaining the symbolic violence of the courtroom 
process. As I will outline, ‗storytelling‘ and ‗persuasion‘ are also relatively euphemistic terms 
that cloak significant coercion.  
 
Just as using pseudo-Aristotelian theory allows writers to posit the courtroom as a classical 
theatre, so does the term storytelling allow advocates to believe that they are simply aiding 
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their client to present their story as best as possible.304 The paradigm of storytelling has 
become such a common expression that it is easy to overlook the elision of other parties that 
this term suggests. Advocates do not just construct a narrative out of an alleged crime; they 
use other bodies—witnesses—to elicit this narrative.  
 
Anne-Marie Büllow-Møller remarks: ―no adequate account of courtroom communication can 
be given without starting from the premise that the real communication is not between the 
primary speakers, i.e. counsel and witness, but rather between counsel and his audience—the  
judge and jury‖.305 Büllow-Møller draws our attention to the dominance of the advocate and 
the relative passivity of the witness, a significant historical development in the trial as 
outlined in the second chapter of this thesis. Forensic linguist John Gibbons also focuses on 
this power transaction. Gibbons describes the advocate‘s story as the ―master narrative‖ and 
the witness accounts as ―satellite narratives‖. Gibbons argues that witnesses‘ accounts fold in 
to the ―master narrative‖ and that advocates achieve this through fragmenting the witness‘ 
story and eliciting it through control.306 Gibbons calls the alleged crime the ―second reality‖, 
subsumed within the primary reality of the trial process itself, and argues that advocates‘ 
―master narrative‖ involves transforming the events into legal language and additionally 
using a broader legal frame of chronology, all of which is constructed through the witness.307  
 
This allows a past event the jury did not witness to become digestible and compelling. The 
clearer and more cogent the witness is through the advocate‘s translation, the more credible 
he/she is to a jury. Consequently, the onus on the advocate is to present a narrative through a 
witness as concisely and chronologically as possible. This alteration is in a witness‘s own 
interest, if he/she wishes to be believed by the jury. However, it diminishes (to varying 
degrees) a witness‘ ability to give his/her account of what happened.308   
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For example, although the examination-in-chief theoretically allows a witness to tell his/her 
story, this method is highly controlled, if less explicitly so than cross-examination. The 
advocate determines what questions will be asked and will have been specifically trained to 
ask questions that will shape a witness‘ narrative into legal discourse. The kind of questions 
being asked are usually ―Can you tell us what you did first?‖ followed by ―then what 
happened?‖ ‗Then‘ is a frequent sentence opener as an advocate translates the complexity of 
a witness‘ memory into a chronological (and therefore legally credible) understanding of 
events. This means that examination-in-chief is highly controlled as advocates must carefully 
shape a witness‘s statement through their choice of questions without putting words into the 
witness‘ mouth (‗leading‘ the witness). As John Gibbons points out, leading questions (or 
leading statements) despite technically being disallowed in examination-in-chief, are actually 
frequent and to some degree unavoidable.309 As he notes, ―When counsels attempt to adhere 
rigidly to this [no leading statements] rule, there can be agonizing exchanges where the 
witness misses the point of the questioning, because if the lawyer made the question more 
precise or pointed, this would involve leading the witness‖.310 
 
Cross-examination is more readily recognisable as control by both laypersons and legal 
practitioners. A frequent piece of advice given to an advocate cross-examining a witness is 
never to ask the witness a question that the advocate does not know the answer to. Witnesses 
undergoing cross-examination can (usually) only answer with one-word or very short 
answers (most commonly ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘). Gibbons terms these ‗polar questions‘. This means, 
in practice, that ‗questions‘ in cross-examination are not necessarily recognisable as such. 
Rather they are leading statements. John Gibbons points out that along with the limiting 
nature of insisting on ―polar‖ questions, a means of augmenting this control is to ―embed‖ 
several pieces of information into a question. For example, Gibbons uses the example: ―Can 
you tell me what colour that nightdress was?‖ As Gibbons goes on to note, the question has 
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additional information embedded in it because it already assumes the existence of said 
nightdress. This means that because a witness can only make a one-word reply (such as ‗red‘) 
the said witness will be singularly unable to object to the other information embedded in the 
question without becoming confused, contradicting him/herself or being admonished by legal 
agents for not simply answering the question.311  
 
For example, the 1995 NSW Department of Women report into sexual assault trials, Heroines 
of Fortitude, documents where a defence counsel asks the witness:  ―And it was then that you 
pushed your pants and your underpants down?‖ to which the witness can only cry ―No‖. The 
―no‖ remains ambiguous because of the multiple propositions embedded in the question.312 
This means that the constructed primary narrative of the advocate will only partially resemble 
what happened. A ―satellite narrative‖ in the first place describes a witness translating a 
complex experience into a verbal account. An advocate then reconfigures this account into 
legal discourse, meaning that their narrative is a twice-translated step from what happened 
during an event/alleged crime. As Gibbons comments:  
The packaging of complex and multifaceted reality into a linear narrative carries obvious dangers of 
distorting the secondary reality. However, the need to make the secondary reality ―graspable‖ for a 
varied audience usually outweighs these concerns.
313
  
The rubric of storytelling—making ‗what happened‘ ―graspable‖—cloaks the advocate‘s 
dominance over the proceedings at the expense of the witness.314 Even the most ideal 
behaviour of an advocate—when he or she is simply applying the skills that he or she has 
learned—involves significant control of a witness, which can diminish the witness‘s capacity 
to give an account of his or her experience. This can be upsetting and traumatic without even 
considering the further possibility of hostility and provocation by a defence advocate (as 
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provoking a witness to anger can diminish his/her credibility, particularly if he/she 
contradicts him/herself or makes an admission). Most advocates are not conscious bullies, but 
it is certainly the case that cross-examination in particular can become forceful at times.  
 
Gibbons, looking at the controlling nature of witness questioning, comments that ―these types 
of disadvantage, which have deep social roots, cannot be remedied only by linguistic 
means‖.315 Following Gibbons, I argue that although these disadvantages manifest themselves 
in the language, they are emblematic of the systemic gap between lay and law that sustains 
the adversarial trial process in its current form. As I outlined in the previous chapter, 
symbolic violence is only possible through the unconscious support of both ‗perpetrator‘ and 
‗victim‘: the assumption by both parties that ultimately advocates are acting in everyone‘s 
best interests. In this situation, symbolic violence is perpetuated because both legal agents 
and laypersons believe that the adversarial model of criminal trial is a reasonable means to 
determine the ‗truth‘ of a case, and consequently examination-in-chief and cross-examination 
are accepted (and relatively unquestioned) means of evidence-testing.316   
 
Consequently, although I believe the metaphor of storytelling is faulty, the fact that advocates 
continue to draw this parallel means that this perceived relationship is important in itself for 
revealing how advocates understand their own practice. By seeing him/herself as a storyteller, 
every practising advocate has internalised and embodied certain ideas about the trial, truth-
telling, and the role of ‗The Law‘. Advocates do not question their dominance or the 
relationship between what happened and the ‗story‘ that they construct in the courtroom (the 
story that reflects the field-specific model of adversarial juridical ‗Truth‘). Instead, advocates 
believe ‗The Law‘ is relatively neutral, and that the lay public relies on professional 
assistance. These assumptions sustain the performance of tradition. 
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Having determined what appropriate performance is for a contemporary Australian advocate, 
I will now examine two different kinds of advocacy training. In the first section, I will 
examine private advocacy material that explicitly purports to teach advocates how to act. 
Secondly, I will examine pupillage, the traditional apprenticeships for advocates. Through 
this analysis I establish that an advocate‘s performativity is considered natural if it fits into 
the contemporary parameters of legal naturalism and artificial if it subscribes too closely to 
explicit acting. As I will argue, however, this dichotomy can better be understood as ‗good 
acting‘ vs. ‗bad acting‘. ‗Bad acting‘ is recognisable because it diverges from legal 
naturalism; this means that those advocates employing explicitly acting-oriented advocacy 
advice may seem too much like they are acting. ‗Good acting‘, on the other hand, is missed 
completely as a performance style by the vast majority of legal agents because it seems 
natural. As I will ultimately show, however, despite this divide any form of advocacy training 
continues to reassert and perpetuate the dominance of an advocate over the witness.  
 
„Bad Acting‟: Private Advocacy Training 
 
Acting focused advocacy training is often a collection of strategies and tips, rather than an 
overarching methodology. It is also primarily based in the U.S.317 A visit to the National 
Institute of Trial Advocacy website reveals such book titles for sale as 100 Vignettes for 
Improving Trial Advocacy Skills, 31 Ways to Winning Advocacy, and How to Try a Jury 
Case: Trial Tactics.318 Keith Evans, who has written both U.K. marketed and U.S. marketed 
advocacy books, states in the introduction to his U.K. advocacy guide that advocacy training 
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is about technique. He goes on to say: ―‗technique‘ is a Greek word that means a bag of tools. 
We shall start to look at some of those tools‖. 319  
 
The kind of tips and strategies these guidebooks give revolve around pitch, tone, dress, and 
gesture; what might be termed style and decorum. For example, Evans stresses the 
importance of striving ―to keep the interest of your audience‖.320 Evans suggests that altering 
one‘s voice does this, warning that otherwise ―its pitch may be dreary and its tone 
monotonous‖.321 John Barkai, who writes an article on the importance of ―nonverbal 
communication‖, prescribes the best methods of standing, sitting and leaning for the advocate 
seeking to build a relationship with the client at trial or during an interview: 
The forward lean posture is also very good for making observations. The close distance provides a better 
opportunity for the lawyer to observe minute changes in the client. The forward lean also narrows the 
field of view and therefore reduces other distractions.
322
 
James McElhaney suggests in Trial Notebook that an advocate should ―every 10 to 15 
minutes do something to get the witness standing up and moving around. Have the witness 
point to something on an exhibit or a diagram. Ask the witness to demonstrate how 
something happened‖.323 As we can see, these materials do not teach an advocate how to be 
an actor. Instead, there is an emphasis on individual aspects of acting in the theatre—such as 
voice, gesture, and movement—that can be borrowed to achieve the same effect in a 
courtroom. The monologism of this approach assumes that these signs—such as the ‗forward 
lean‘—are static (and therefore always appropriate and consistently achieving the same 
effect). Advocates are told in these materials that certain signs will have certain effects, with 
no mention being made of the meaning-making processes of the jury who are perceived to b e 
highly passive.   
 
‗Tips and tricks‘ advocacy training material can therefore be interpreted as a guide to 
courtroom semiotics, and this approach foregrounds the importance of style. Using this 
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advice potentially allows an advocate to assume the mannerisms of, and present him or 
herself as, a far more experienced advocate than he or she may actually be. This approach 
verges on the manipulative. These guides teach advocates how to imitate markers of legal 
naturalism, such as ―open arms‖ and a ―steady voice‖, yet rather than these signs being the 
manifestation of an embodied performance, the advocate is assembling a series of tools to 
trick a jury into believing what he or she says. This approach also encourages artificial 
behaviour as these signs may seem like awkward ―add-ons‖. As James Maxwell says:  
The approaches suggested by trial practice teachers and writers seem to treat gestures as ―add-ons.‖ At 
the least, therefore, these tips engender clichéd behaviour and at the worst they encourage the lawyer to 
disassociate her behavior entirely from her intuitive sense of what is appropriate in the here-and-now.
324
 
These materials make performance highly visible, because advocates are not being taught to 
respond to a dialogic situation. Instead, they are effectively arming themselves with devices 
to achieve certain effects. This borders on the trickery advocates are warned against in Lyon v 
R.325  
 
A potential problem with this material, however, is that authors such as Keith Evans or David 
Ball tend to assume that the processes in the courtroom and the theatre are the same. In this 
material, as noted in the previous chapter, we see such lines as ―the courtroom is a theatre; 
thus the trial is the play‖, suggesting a simple equivalence between the two practices. In 
advocacy training material, this relatively simplistic comparison is extended where not only 
is the trial a play, but the lawyer is consequently an actor:  ―a courtroom is a theatre. The 
prepared trial lawyer will know everyone‘s lines in the play‖.326 This loose analogy means 
that the monologic signs may be less likely to come across as natural, and more likely to 
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seem inappropriate in a courtroom where the signs of performance are potentially quite 
different from the theatre.  
 
Yet, like the term storytelling, the faultiness of the analogy is illuminating in revealing how 
advocacy-training writers and/or practitioners understand the role of the advocate. The 
analogy foregrounds the advocate as the key player of the trial, and tips and strategies 
material sells itself on this idea. The advocate/magician is the central figure who single-
handedly turns the courtroom into a stage. David Ball‘s Theatre Tips and Strategies for Jury 
Trials states: ―In the theatre of the courtroom, you are one of the stars‖ and Laurence 
Vogelman describes the lawyer as ―author, choreographer, actor and dancer‖.327 Keith Evans 
claims: 
You wouldn‘t want to be a trial lawyer if there wasn‘t something of an actor inside of you. You‘d have 
gone for another job or another area of law practice. By aiming for the courtroom, you have chosen to 
go on the professional stage, just as surely as if you‘d tried to make it in Hollywood or on Broadway.328 
Evans suggests that any aspiring advocate is also somewhat of an exhibitionist. James 
McElhaney says: 
I have spent most of my professional life studying, analyzing, teaching, writing about (and doing) trial 
advocacy. That has meant studying the styles, techniques and ideas of the best trial lawyers in the 
country—undisputed winners. Everyone of those winners made a decision. She or he decided not to be a 
run-of-the-mill lawyer, but a winner. That decision led these people to develop (consciously or 
subconsciously) the qualities necessary to be winners. I am going to tell you what those qualities are.
329
 
The authors of tips and strategies guidebooks market themselves by saying that an advocate 
can win a case based on their advice. Of course, it is obviously in the interests of those 
writing to do so. However, this approach still suggests that an advocate‘s performance can 
persuade a jury one way or the other. Consequently, the implication is that what an advocate 
is doing is more important in affecting an outcome than the facts of a case. This flies in the 
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face of underlying core legal beliefs about methods of evidence testing in the criminal trial. 
As Chester Porter expresses these beliefs: ―there is no substitute for quality and this applies to 
arguments, however well expressed. The argument that will ultimately prevail will be a valid 
one. Of course, this is only ultimately, but the object of a persuader should always be 
truth‖.330 
 
Arthur Austin, a professor of jurisprudence, notes the dominance of the analogy of the 
advocate as actor and critiques its use. For Austin, this approach trivializes the processes of 
court by comparing it to a form of entertainment, where the lawyer is a ‗star‘. He also argues 
that lawyers over-emphasise their own importance in the process: 
The theater scenario of litigation […] is the basic premise of the advocate‘s ideology. According to the 
tradition of adversarial systems, egocentric litigants [i.e. American advocates] function as central 
characters who direct and star in the law-suit drama.
331
 
Although the basis of Austin‘s criticism is the egocentricity of the advocate, I argue, 
however, that this ‗egotism‘ is in part a manifestation of how important the advocate has 
become. 
 
As I outlined in the beginning of this thesis, advocates have come to dominate the trial 
landscape as the juridical field has become increasingly autonomous and professionalised. 
The public now places continual trust in legal professionals, remitting to them care of what is 
frequently a traumatic time in their life. Both the public and the legal profession have 
naturalised this role beyond questioning. However, both parties have done so under the 
conscious belief that advocates are mediators—public servants of a kind—who work in 
service of ‗The Law‘. This may sound rather naïve. Indeed, the lawyer‘s role in popular 
imagination, usually the butt of black jokes revolving around deceit and swindling, is a good 
indication that the public do not necessarily have unbridled faith in an advocate‘s honesty. 
However, although advocates may vary in their abilities and ethics, the public and the legal 
profession need to believe that the adversarial criminal trial is still a reliable and relatively 
fair means by which to determine what happened in an alleged crime.  
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An advocate‘s performance should not be seen to be the sole means by which the outcome is 
determined by a jury (as made explicit by the quashing of the conviction in McCullough v R).  
However as the jury only ever sees evidence mediated by the prosecution or the defence, 
there is no doubt that an advocate‘s powers of persuasion in the courtroom are very 
important. As David Berg says (somewhat hyperbolically) in The Trial Lawyer: What it 
Takes to Win: ―the degree to which jurors are persuaded is in direct proportion to your 
performance: You must be a good storyteller. In Marshall McLuhan‘s famous phrase about 
television, ‗the medium is the message‘. In a jury trial, the medium is you‖.332 
 
I am not suggesting that the most charismatic performer will always determine the outcome 
of an adversarial criminal jury trial. I am arguing, however, that where overwhelming 
physical evidence is lacking, the role of advocacy is crucial. Advocates control the 
presentation of evidence and testimony, yet are theoretically meant to be simply mediators 
that work for their client and the court. For legal agents within the juridical field to maintain 
credibility in the wider community, they must be able to navigate these two slightly 
contradictory tasks in such a way that their dominance in the trial goes unchallenged by 
laypersons and where advocates themselves can maintain their belief that they work in the 
service of their client and ‗The Law‘. This balancing act is illustrated by the downplaying of 
the advocate‘s dominance in the courtroom as simply a vehicle for truth (where the ethical 
responsibilities of an advocate are represented by that blurry boundary between ―zealous 
advocacy‖ and ―unethical conduct‖).  
 
The advocacy training materials above also show awareness of this potential problem by 
emphasising that their advice on how to win assumes that the advocate presenting their 
client‘s case believes what he or she is saying is true. Most state specifically that a jury will 
know if an advocate is lying: ―Speak without conviction and you will lose the jury‖.333 All 
Bar Association rules explicitly state that an advocate cannot knowingly mislead a court.334 
Yet considering that the relationship between an advocate‘s interpretation of an event and 
what happened is not simply straightforward (and cannot be, given the constraints of the trial 
and the distance from the alleged crime itself), the suggestion by these authors that advocacy 
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training methods are only helpful when used in pursuit of the ‗truth‘ remains a little idealistic 
and unconvincing.  
 
The return to the jury as arbiter, however, is illuminating. Ultimately, all assessment of 
advocacy ability and expectation comes back to the jury. The idea that a jury can determine 
an outcome after witnessing evidence testing by partisan advocates involves subscribing at 
least to some degree to the widespread faith in a jury‘s ability to detect the ‗truth‘. Whilst this 
belief, which has existed for hundreds of years, may consciously be adhered to by both legal 
and lay trial participants, it is also in the interest of legal agents to confer the authority of 
judgment to the jury, since in this way the jury process remains shrouded in secrecy.335 To 
some degree, the secrecy of jury deliberation in Australia and the U.K. sidesteps the thorny 
question of just how much power an advocate‘s performance in court has in determining the 
outcome of a case (except in cases where a defendant appeals on the basis of inappropriate 
conduct by the prosecuting advocate, or Crown Counsel).336 
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How much influence an advocate has over winning or losing a case is the focus of another 
form of advocacy training, one exemplified by the convenors of the workshop What Can 
Lawyers Learn from Actors. Unlike the ‗tips and tricks‘ advocacy material, this workshop 
presents itself as a full-blown methodology. Made by Act of Communication, a company run 
by two American actors, this workshop reflects a different approach to advocacy training, in 
which performance is valorised as a means of revealing, rather than obscuring, the truth. The 
workshop convenors state their opposition to trickery by arguing that acting is not about 
artifice; rather ‗real‘ acting requires an advocate to strip away clichéd gestures. In the 
previous chapter, I canvassed trial writings that emphasised the ‗Aristotelian‘ process of the 
trial: the centrality of storytelling, the power of the lawyer to create this narrative, and the 
passivity of the audience who do not have control over their emotions and are caught in the 
lawyers‘ spell.337 This kind of storytelling is the methodological core of What Can Lawyers 
Learn from Actors.  
 
The structure the workshop is framed around is pseudo-Aristotelian with the convenors 
placing emphasis on the importance of the beginning, middle and end of a story. The jury is 
meant to be highly passive in these workshops and the conveners specifically argue that an 
advocate must ―corral‖ its attention. Participants are told at the beginning that the workshop 
is about ―triumphs‖ and ―challenges‖. The advocate‘s challenge is to convince a juror to 
―allow himself or herself to be taken and moved spontaneously‖. The publicity for the 
workshop reads: 
From the theatre, the lawyer can learn how to strip away artifice and get rid of the lawyer persona and be 
himself/herself […] [I]n the theatre, the goal is to have a clear, active story that moves people 
emotionally, intellectually and to action—the identical goal of the courtroom attorney.338 
The specific focus of this workshop is to move people emotionally and the convenors 
repeatedly stress the importance of reaching the jury. What Can Lawyers Learn from Actors 
markets itself as bridging the communication gap between legal professionals and the lay 
public, arguing that the lawyer‘s task of communicating with a jury is different from that of 
communicating with a judge. However, rather than ‗storytelling‘ being used to distance an 
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advocate from acting (as outlined in the beginning of this chapter), in this workshop the 
convenors argue that acting is not only appropriate, but also essential, to effective 
storytelling. For the convenors, the common denominator between a courtroom and a theatre 
is their emphasis on empathy and genuine emotion. As another proponent of these 
commonalities, James Maxwell, notes: ―Actors and lawyers are protagonists who face 
uncertain, ambiguous, often profound and moving circumstances‖.339 
 
For the convenors of the workshop, the trial should be approached as an intimate encounter 
between fellow human beings, rather than a competition between professional teams 
witnessed by a jury. Acting is a pathway to reaching a jury because real acting is a means of 
stripping away to reveal the ‗real‘ person. In the first workshop exercise, participants begin 
with an opening statement and mid-way switch to telling a personal story; later they  return to 
their opening statement. Afterwards, the workshop audience shares its reflections on the 
perceived differences in demeanour. Most respondents claim that they are more interested by 
the personal story because the advocate telling it is more engaged and relaxed than when 
he/she is formally delivering his/her opening statement. The workshop conveners use this 
example to tell participants that an effective advocate‘s goal is to bring this engaging human 
being into his/her professional persona.  
 
The overarching lesson to advocates in this workshop is how to tell someone else‘s story like 
it is their own. For the convenors, the separation between story and storyteller due to the 
mediation of the advocate means that genuine emotion is lost. Acting is essential because the 
advocate must introduce the emotion of the experience of their client. What Can Lawyers 
Learn from Actors could perhaps be called Stanislavski-lite. Its emphasis on empathy and 
stripping away is a crash course in naturalism.340 The workshop attempts to teach advocates 
how to access genuine emotion and thoughts from their own associations that will 
spontaneously produce ‗genuine‘ signifiers. For the conveners, this involves imparting the 
―principles of the theatre‖—which they call ―storytelling, language, human behaviour, eye 
contact and body language‖. These are not signs detached from referents, but are ideally the 
product of embodiment. The Stanislavskian slant to the workshop is also stressed when 
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advocates are encouraged to form ―objectives‖. The ―objective‖ of the advocate is to move 
the jury to action. This ability to move is not simply a form of emotional manipulation (using 
―sensorial‖ language) but must also be based on a form of emotional understanding, whereby 
the advocate must create and project a form of empathy. 
  
This form of advocacy actor training reflects mainstream Western dramaturgical and acting 
tradition. In the courtroom, the lawyer must take the audience/jury on an emotional journey. 
The story must be emotionally compelling and persuasive because, unlike in the theatre 
where measuring one‘s ability to move an audience is not fully possible, in a trial the 
advocate tries to move an audience to opt for a specific result for their client. Consequently, 
what is crucial in an advocate‘s performance (according to these writers) is the creation of 
empathy, which must not be a simulation (bat eyelashes twice, pause, bow head, use low 
voice), but must come from a place of ‗truth‘. The loss of ‗genuine emotion‘ engendered by 
the professionalisation of storytelling is picked up by other advocacy training writers. Dana 
Cole writes an article where she advises advocate and client to engage in ―psychodramatic‖ 
therapy together—whereby the advocate can understand and empathise with his or her client 
to the extent that this will be transmitted when he or she is standing in court.341 The ideal 
advocate is one who is genuinely moved and not disinterested.   
 
The difficulty with What Can Lawyers Learn From Actors is the speed with which it purports 
to teach this acting methodology. Les McCrimmon and Ian Maxwell note that: ―theoretically 
sound instruction on the performative aspects of the advocate‘s craft has been conspicuously 
absent from most advocacy courses‖.342 The fact that courses such as What Can Lawyers 
Learn from Actors purport to teach advocacy-acting skills in four days risks exposing such 
courses to the same kind of criticisms levelled at the ‗tips and tricks‘ material examined 
earlier in this chapter. The convenors of What Can Lawyers Learn from Actors recognize the 
speed at which they conduct their workshop and mitigate this by stressing that their teaching 
method is about introducing the notion of rehearsal so that an advocate can continue to work 
at these skills. Consequently, although the workshop ‗fast-tracks‘ the acquisition of acting 
techniques, the convenors do not seek to present the DVD set as sufficient. Rather the 
workshop is modelled as an introduction to acting skills that can be learned over time with 
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rehearsal and experience. Acting is ‗human‘ but it is not so natural that it does not require 
practice.  
 
The workshop‘s focus on moving the jury is another potential source of alienation for legal 
agents as the direct appeal to emotion and empathy may be considered inappropriate 
(emotion being one of the markers of inappropriate advocacy). The workshop convenors 
argues that the way for advocates to improve, is to win the audience—the jurors. An advocate 
employing this advice ineffectively may seem awkward, but if he/she is effective, he/she may 
seem overly populist. His/her style will consequently be overt and recognisable as acting. 
However, What Can Lawyers Learn from Actors turns this anti-acting logic on its head. 
Instead of introducing acting to a ‗serious‘ profession, the convenors of the workshop argue 
that lawyers are (and have been) always performing, but that they are not very good at it. The 
convenors state upfront that their goal is to remove the ―lawyer persona‖ unconsciously 
adopted by practitioners. For the convenors, this professional persona is a mode of 
performance; and according to them, an ineffectual and alienating one for a jury. As co-
convenor Katherine James says (when asked about whether lawyers are actors): ―we know 
they‘re acting. They‘re acting like bad lawyers‖.  
 
„Good Acting‟: Pupillage  
 
Legal naturalism, then, is not natural; rather it is a form of performance habituated by legal 
practitioners. But if legal naturalism is an habituated performance style, how is it acquired? 
Bourdieu argues that agents‘ naturalisation of the internal logics of particular fields happens 
through processes of education and socialisation.343 Traditionally, the primary means of 
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advocacy training was pupillage, which was effectively a form of apprenticeship.344 This 
mode of training derived from English practice and continues today as pupillage in the U.K. 
and in various derivative forms (usually called ‗readership‘) in Australia.345 Traditionally 
during pupillage the novice advocates attach themselves to a senior advocate‘s chambers and 
spend roughly one year (sometimes more) under the senior advocate‘s guidance. The junior‘s 
first six months is usually spent observing their senior, and in the second six months, the 
junior will also begin representing the senior advocate in court, doing minor court 
appearances. Prior to the commencement of pupillage, the junior advocate embarking on this 
course of training will have minimal experience in a courtroom. Most will have watched a 
trial in a courtroom, and perhaps some may have done mooting, or bar practice involving 
mock-trials. However, it is quite possible that a junior advocate will have done none of this. 
Consequently, junior advocates may have no embodied knowledge of how to behave in a 
courtroom during a trial.  
 
Pupillage is therefore more than learning how to handle briefs or stand in court (although 
these are of key importance). It is an introduction to the social universe in which legal agents 
operate. To make a living, advocates require referrals of briefs from solicitors and clerks 
within chambers.346 Consequently, the importance of networking and establishing good 
working relationships with colleagues and superiors is essential to job survival. Pupillage is 
the ground-level entry to this world, where the novice advocate can demonstrate his/her 
competence and/or reliability with the specific goal of creating a good reputation and 
consequently obtaining work.  
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Junior advocates, consequently, usually work long hours for relatively little pay, and do as 
much as they can to favourably impress those they are working with.347 This also involves 
presenting themselves as professionals: after their apprenticeship, junior advocates will 
usually be spending heavily, and in some cases paying for expenses like floor fees and 
business cards, although the work coming in may be very unsteady. Because the world of the 
graduate advocate is so financially uncertain, getting on, in the legal world, is as much about 
social education as it is about a legal education. The complexity of the implicit rules must be 
internalised as graduates aspire to stake out an area in which to work. The competitiveness 
amongst junior advocates is very high, with large numbers of graduates aspiring to access and 
position themselves within a relatively limited pool of resources.348 The strong need to ‗get 
on‘ is an important factor in explaining how rules as to appropriate performance are learned 
during pupillage.  
 
Pupillage formalises a hierarchy where the senior advocate‘s abilities are the paragon for the 
junior. The acquisition of knowledge by an advocate through pupillage is consequently a 
form of modelling that is similar to repertory theatre, whereby a novice actor is attached to a 
company and improves his/her skills through imitation, rather than consciously absorbed 
verbal instruction. This form of education is in the doing, rather than in explicit training. An 
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advocate‘s imitation over time becomes part of his or her habitus. Law graduates do not leave 
law school and turn into gifted advocates after passing the Bar exam—they rehearse.  
 
On a conscious level, during pupillage junior advocates learn how to conduct examination-in-
chief, cross-examination and give opening and closing statements (as well as other procedural 
requirements such as writing affidavits). Through imitation of their senior advocate, junior 
advocates learn how to phrase questions and structure arguments. Yet hand-in-hand with this 
comes an appreciation for a whole series of implicit social behaviours that regulate the power 
dynamics of the process, as outlined in the section on storytelling. Because pupillage is 
entrenched in a junior watching and imitating their senior, a student will be absorbing not 
only the structure of questions being asked, but also the overarching style of an advocate.  
 
Besides the naturalisation of controlling legal language, what is also transmitted in this form 
of ‗modelling‘ is regulating behavioural constraints embodied in honorifics, accent, dress, 
gesture, etc. Usually, if these constraints are consciously acknowledged, they are attributed to 
the construction of a professional persona. For example, we can examine the question of 
dress. Wigs and gowns are still worn by advocates in Australia and the United Kingdom. It 
has frequently been argued by both members of the public and of the legal profession that the 
dress of barristers and judges is simply an outdated tradition. In fact, since 1992 there has 
been a series of debates and enquiries in the U.K. revolving around whether to make wigs 
obsolete and all have concluded that the majority of legal practitioners and members of the 
public want them retained. Interestingly, as a 2004 report found, ―members of the public (non 
court users and court users) who responded to the consultation were just as conservative in 
their preferences, if not more so, than the court officials and others who responded‖.349  
 
Lord Donaldson‘s famous quote sums it up: ―There is no urgent need to go discarding 
something which has been out of date for at least a century‖. More than simply a humorous 
quip, this remark points to the fact that wigs are argued to still serve various useful functions. 
The major argument given for retention of wigs and gowns is that once the wig is on, an 
advocate (or a judge) exists only as a legal agent with a responsibility to their client and the 
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court. Wigs are a form of protection and aid the concealment of identity. Although wigs 
clearly do not obscure judicial officers‘ faces, wigs do separate an advocate‘s function in 
court from his or her private life and personality. 
 
Paul Moore writes that the neutralisation of habitus involved in naturalistic acting is essential 
as it is habitus that locates our past in our present. In the case of advocates, when they 
become officers of the court, and mediators, their personal and subjective beliefs are not 
meant to be visible.350 In Australia the continued use of wigs and gowns (as well as other 
behavioural constraints, such as the adoption of a ‗neutral‘ accent; i.e. educated Australian) 
serve as a form of levelling and protection. Although varying degrees of status are indicated 
in a legal costume, these costumes also represent the idea that legal practitioners are officers 
of the court and sustain this belief in the need to neutralise the personal and subjective in the 
courtroom. By these small alterations of self-presentation an advocate becomes someone who 
represents the Court and ‗The Law‘.  
 
Yet beyond separating the personal from the legal the other, equally essential, aspect of wig-
wearing is that it is a means of manufacturing mysticism; wigs are rather impressive and 
useful for creating that necessary distinction between court functionaries and laypersons.351 
Accent modification also apparently aids the elimination of a specific subjective past, but 
again it is disputable that the consequent representation is ‗neutral‘. Advocates may see 
themselves as simply modifying more jarring aspects of themselves, yet the ‗neutral‘ accent 
                                                 
350
 ―A barrister must not make submissions or express views to a court on any material evidence or material 
issue in the case in terms which convey or appear to convey the barrister‘s personal opinion on the merits of that 
evidence or issue‖. The New South Wales‟ Barristers Rules no. 25, supra n. 301.  
351
 This is a point where American and U.K. trial practices diverge significantly. In the U.S., only the judge 
wears official robes and most American legal agents find the continued use of costume in the U.K. (and 
Australia) absurd. The abandonment of wigs is famously attributed to Thomas Jefferson, who pleaded with 
Americans to ―discard the monstrous wig which makes the English judges look like rats peeping through 
bunches of oakum‖. Jefferson quoted in Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History: Volume 1 
1789-1921 (Beard Books, 1999), 48. Judges no longer wear wigs in Federal Courts in Australia, with the Family 
Court, the High Court and the Federal Court all abandoning the practice. However barristers continue to wear 
wigs in the Federal and High Court.  
139 
 
and particular dress does not cease to signify. Rather it perpetuates the expectation that 
advocates should come from a relatively high status background.352  
 
The ‗style‘ being learned through pupillage is much more than learning simple signs of 
decorum and is at the heart of legal naturalism. Modification of habitus to behave 
appropriately, or seem natural, in fact involves learning to signify a very particular idea of 
what an advocate is, or should be. These ideas are historically contingent and have direct 
homologies to a certain class and school background. As David Weisbrot observes: ―The 
Australian legal profession does not reflect the socioeconomic class, ethnicity or gender 
composition of the society at large‖.353 The honorifics and ‗style‘ that constitute legal 
naturalism function as forms of exclusion whereby advocates who do not observe this 
decorum identify themselves as not fitting into the social universe of the law. Legal 
naturalism is is also a manifestation of the implicit logics of the juridical field. Investigation 
of this style that goes unrecognised as a style illustrates how this behaviour perpetuates the 
gap between junior and senior advocate, as well as between legal agent and layperson. This 
gap is vital to sustain the hierarchies that structure position-taking in the juridical field, as 
well as to perpetuate the performance of tradition.  
 
Although the above is the ideal functioning of the apprenticeship system, the experience of 
pupillage is, and has always been, as diverse as those who undertook it. Some senior 
advocates provided a great number of opportunities for their juniors whereas some juniors 
had a relatively unhelpful experience: ―While the theory behind articles, as with other 
apprenticeship training, was that intending lawyers would best learn skills, practices and 
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procedures on the job, the reality often involved poor supervision, menial tasks, and limited 
exposure to a range of different types of work‖. This means that the degree to which 
pupillage assisted in the acquisition of specific skills would have varied considerably.354 
 
Regardless of this, acquisition of legal naturalism is a gradual ‗becoming‘ of practice and 
familiarity, akin to the way one learns a trade.355 This performativity of self echoes Erving 
Goffman‘s idea of presenting the best aspect of oneself to others so as to position oneself for 
advantage. However, Goffman‘s concentration on the conscious aspect and preparation for 
this overstates how aware an advocate is of what he or she is doing.356 Ultimately, advocates 
who undergo pupillage no longer see the skills learnt over a period of years as specific. 
Instead, advocates will see themselves as having navigated their way normally in the legal 
universe. This means that although the importance of apprenticeship is recognized, what is 
learned is less easy to quantify, as it may come to be seen as networking, and ‗common 
sense‘ rather than acquiring highly specialised skills.  
 
Those who undergo pupillage consequently see their practice as either an ‗art‘ in the classical 
sense (oratory and rhetoric) or as ‗natural‘. John Mortimer‘s lawyer character in A Voyage 
Round My Father claims that being a great advocate relies primarily on ―common sense‖ 
rather than brilliance.357 Mortimer‘s student, Geoffrey Robertson (a Sydney University Law 
School graduate), says ―advocacy courses […] now affect to teach a trade which comes 
instinctively or not at all‖.358 Justice Edward Parry states (rather loftily) that: ―the high 
privilege of lighting the torch at the lamp of eloquence is a gift of the gods, for orators are 
born, and not made‖.359 As Bourdieu notes, part of the mastery of any ‗art‘ form is an 
obscuring of the conditions through which this mastery was made possible:  
[i]gnoring the social and cultural conditions underlying such an experience, and at the same time treating 
as a birthright the virtuosity acquired through long familiarization or through the exercises of a 
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methodical training […] for the acquisition of art competence in the sense of mastery of all the means 
for the specific appropriation of works of art is a self-seeking silence because it is what makes it possible 
to legitimatize a social privilege by pretending that it is a gift of nature.
360
 
Unsurprisingly, then, those that subscribe to the notion of the art, talent, or instinct of 
advocacy are usually older and more senior (often male) judges and legal professionals.361 
Because these legal agents have secured relatively high-status places in the juridical field, it 
has traditionally been in their interest to promote the mystical abilities of the barrister (if not 
done consciously), thereby ensuring their own dominant position in the field. This dominance 
relies on young students entering the field perceiving an almost impossible divide between 
themselves and senior advocates, as we saw with our 22 year old student at the outset of this 
chapter.362  
 
The Decline of Pupillage 
 
Habituation of legal naturalism is a prime factor in creating ambivalence towards the concept 
of acting-focused advocacy training. To be as natural as possible involves forgetting the 
processes by which specific behaviour is learned. Yet formal pupillage was arguably in a 
period of decline until relatively recently. This is partially attributable to the fusion of the 
profession of solicitor and barrister. As a 1994 NSWLRC report into Barrister‘s Practicing 
Certificates notes: 
New South Wales and Queensland are the only Australian States that have a formally divided legal 
profession with no common admission as a barrister and solicitor.
1
 Whilst the other states and territories 
allow a successful applicant admission as both a barrister and solicitor, over the years a practical 
division has emerged, as after admission an applicant often chooses to practise only as a barrister or 
solicitor. Separate Bars have consequently come into existence, and individual State and Territory Bar 
Associations with their own rules of conduct, pupillage requirements, and disciplinary procedures have 
become established. Whilst such rules are not legally enforceable, peer pressure has, to an extent 
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ensured that such rules are generally complied with, if a barrister wishes to continue to practise 
successfully within that jurisdiction. 
363
 
This means that whilst most states have some form of readership, these requirements are far 
more nominal than traditional pupillage when barristers and solicitors received distinct 
training.364 At the time of writing, in the Northern Territory, readership lasts between 1 and 2 
years. NSW readership is a minimum of 12 months and requires a signature from a 
supervising barrister at the end of this period. In Queensland, a junior advocate undergoes 12 
months of pupillage with two pupilmasters, one junior and one senior. In Victoria, it is 9 
calendar months under the guidance of an advocate with at least 10 years‘ experience 
(although they cannot be a QC or SC). In the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), a junior 
advocate must complete 10 days of criminal trial appearances and 10 days of civil trial 
appearances amongst other requirements, however the length of time readership takes is not 
specified within the guidelines.365 Other Australian states have no formal requirements before 
or after admission to the Bar.366 This potentially creates a problem for new legal graduates 
who enter a field where the specific skills needed to get on in the legal world are considered 
unteachable by those who have forgotten that they acquired them.  
 
The decline in traditional methods of pupillage is also due to major shifts in legal education 
since the heyday of advocacy apprenticeship. In 1968 there were only six university law 
degrees offered in Australia. The ratio of legal practitioners to the public was 1:1600 people 
in 1968, yet by 1977 this ratio had shrunk to 1:1000. Today there are 30 university law 
degrees offered in Australia, and around 40,000 legal professionals, constituting a ratio of 
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roughly 1:500 of the population, including approximately 5000 barristers.367 This rapid 
increase in graduate numbers has led to a diversification of skills where many people 
undertaking a law degree do not go on to the Bar or become a solicitor.368 Although a smaller 
proportion of law students go on to the Bar, the large increase in law students overall means 
that the number of aspiring barristers has risen significantly. This increase has reached the 
point where traditional pupillage, which relies on a steady proportion between young 
graduate and older practitioners, is no longer sustainable. Even in the U.K., where pupillage 
is still formalised, it is highly competitive, with limited positions available for a vastly 
expanded number of graduates.369  
 
An Australian Law Reform Commission report from 1999, Managing Justice: A Review of 
the Federal Civil Justice System, notes that law graduates in the 1970s: 
Almost invariably would have been members of a law society or a bar association, and would have felt 
that their professional interests were being catered for, and represented externally, by these associations 
[…] Most `students-at-law' already worked in the profession as articled clerks, interacted regularly with 
practitioners (across the solicitor-barrister divide), and received mentoring from senior (‗master‘) 
practitioners. Students organised their studies around their work responsibilities, with classes held 
mainly in the evening and taught mainly by practitioners, and with only a small core of full-time 
academics in the one law school located in each capital city. Law graduates mostly went into the 
profession, and practised as solicitors or barristers.
370
 
This close-knit association between students and the field also involved a ―close relationship 
between the Bench and the Bar‖ with judicial appointments usually being from the Bar.371 
This means that means of promotion and inclusion within the juridical field consisted of a 
largely self-contained network of people. The concomitant outcome is that previous 
hierarchies sustained by a very specific route from law school to the Bar (and then perhaps to 
Senior Counsel—formerly Queen‘s Counsel—and the Bench) are changing. In this new 
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world, those law graduates who do go on to the Bar will not necessarily have intensive 
training with an older advocate (and will probably have practised as a solicitor for several 
years). Consequently, the decorum necessary to maintain a particular historical manifestation 
of what is ‗good acting‘ (and consequently perpetuate certain underlying ideas about what an 
advocate should be) may not be passed on. 
 
Graduates are today also less likely to have received specific vocational training than in the 
past. Although almost all junior advocates will now have a law degree, universities were 
traditionally not the place to learn advocacy skills.372 In the 1970s, when the universities in 
Australia began to take the prime role in educating lawyers (before this, as mentioned earlier, 
most advocates did not attend university, rather simply worked for a number of years as 
articled clerks) they focused strongly on procedural subjects that were applicable to trial 
practice (for example, Evidence). Yet since the 1970s, the undergraduate legal curriculum has 
altered from being practically and vocationally oriented to being a more general degree, with 
a reduction in core units and a proliferation of electives.373 The report Managing Justice 
described the curriculum thus: 
In Australia, the much lower level of resources available to law schools has meant that only a handful of 
law schools run clinical programs—and only the University of Newcastle allows students to undertake a 
fully integrated clinical degree program rather than simply an elective unit. Both for reasons of resources 
as well as recognition of the importance of non-adversarial forms of dispute resolution, the emerging 
trend in Australia has been toward the teaching of generic `professional skills'—that is, skills which will 
be needed in any subsequent legal practice, but would be equally valuable in a range of other 
occupations and professions.
374
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This means that although legal education is the province of the universities, law graduates are 
not being trained in procedural or practical trial skills at university.375 This gap in vocational 
training is arguably an important reason for the boom in the unregulated, private advocacy 
training industry.376  
 
To counter this decline in traditional forms of pupillage and the generalising of the LLB 
(Bachelor of Law degree), there has been a recent growth in Australian-based private 
advocacy training. This has developed in tandem with the development of new vocational 
requirements attached to admission to the Bar. NSW, for example, now requires Bar 
graduates to do the Bar Practice Course which runs for around a month (and costs around 
$AUS3000). The stated aims of the course are to ―teach advanced advocacy, mediation, and 
other barrister skills, and an awareness of special considerations and requirements of different 
jurisdictions; provide practical insights into life and practice at the New South Wales Bar; 
and promote a strong spirit of professional support among new members‖.377 This course 
includes some practical courtroom training, as well as specific lectures in advocacy. Many 
other Australian states now require junior advocates to complete an Advocacy Course which 
may run from one week to several. Universities have also introduced elective undergraduate 
advocacy subjects, such as Advocacy, interviewing and Negotiation offered in 3
rd
 year at 
Sydney University Law School.  
The Australian Advocacy Institute  (AAI) is a good example of this recent shift in education 
and attitudes towards advocacy. Founded in 1991, it specifically sets out to counter the belief 
that advocacy is ‗natural‘:  
Until the 1970‘s there was a common belief that advocacy could not be taught. It was thought that good 
advocates were born not made. Reading about advocacy and exposure to senior advocates were thought 
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sufficient for new advocates to learn their skills by observation and osmosis and to develop them by 
experience. Many did learn, and some who had talent became excellent advocates. However, it often 
came at a cost to clients. Some did not learn from experience but simply perpetuated bad advocacy 
practices. Experience does not necessarily equate with competence, far less excellence.
 378
 
The statement goes on to say that: ―The achievement of this balance [between efficiency and 
good representation] requires preparation, discipline, skill, and a professional approach by 
advocates capable of analysing the issues and succinctly presenting cases for their clients‖.379  
This form of advocacy training, however, employs distinctly different terminology to the 
explicitly acting-oriented materials outlined earlier. This side-stepping of specific acting 
terminology is evident in Australian-produced written advocacy material. George Hampel‘s 
advocacy guide devotes the last six of its 70 pages to conduct in the courtroom. This section 
on presentation has its sole emphasis on the dignity of the proceedings: ―It is important that 
the behaviour of counsel is not only appropriate to the importance and solemnity of the 
proceedings, but is also sensitive to those involved as litigants‖.380 Specific advice consists of 
instructions such as ―it is bad manners and detracts from the presence in Court of a good 
advocate to put feet on chairs, to place hands in pockets, or to slouch on the bar table or 
lectern‖.381 Max Perry‘s extension of Hampel‘s advocacy advice spends 15 pages on 
presentation. Perry suggests modulating monotone delivery. He emphasises that ―the 
courtroom is a solemn and serious place‖.382 Thomas Mauet‘s Fundamentals of Trial 
Techniques has a similar line: ―Regardless of where you make your opening statement, guard 
against mannerisms that detract from your delivery. Keep your hands out of pants or coat 
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pockets, avoid playing with coins [...] Use upper body gestures, those involving your hands, 
arms, shoulders, head, and face, since these usually strengthen your speech‖.383  
 
There is no reference to acting in these materials—rather it is about ‗practical‘ skills and 
‗hands-on‘ experience. This kind of language illustrates the relative status of different 
terminologies, where acting has low-status in the juridical field because of its negative 
associations. On the TalkingBrief website, there is a testimonial from George Hampel, which 
states that:  
I have always had a strong view that communication and presentation skills are a vital part of the work 
of an advocate. The Australian Advocacy Institute (AAI), in its teaching places great emphasis on this 
and we do our best to teach some aspects of communication. Our knowledge however is limited and I 
have no doubt that people in the acting profession have much to contribute to the development of 
communication skills.
384
  
Using terms such as ‗communication skills‘ and ‗practical‘, rather than ‗acting‘ allows legal 
practitioners to emphasise the utility of their methods: that there is a tangible practical 
purpose that is not related to ‗entertainment‘. This terminology has considerably more 
currency in the legal world, particularly as the entire methodology of much institutionally 
based contemporary advocacy training (such as that offered at NITA and AAI) revolves 
around problem-solving in particular cases. This terminology also allows legal practitioners 
to contain advocacy training within his/her own self-defined standards (legal communication 
rather than naturalistic performance). This avoids having to drawing on another field for 
illumination of the juridical. Marcus Priest, a journalist who attended a 2006 Australian Bar 
Association Advocacy course, commented: 
The alternative [to Bar Associations conducting their own advocacy training courses] is to allow such 
teaching to be left to professional teachers, as has happened in America. ―There are a lot of people in a 
lot of jurisdictions who really believe that education of the bar ought to be in the hands of expert 
teachers who sell their services, because usually they are unemployed lawyers. Beware teachers and 
beware experts,‖ rails [Queen‘s Council, Edwin] Glasgow [one of the chief advocacy training staff at the 
course]. But that commitment to training their own can also be seen as a reflection of the elitism that 
permeates the bar‘s traditions. And it is those traditions that senior practitioners are trying to maintain in 
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a society that openly questions the need for the historic relics and practices of law‘s bygone days. As a 
result, advocacy coaching is not just about teaching the technical skills, but about building an esprit de 
corps and emphasising the importance of ethical conduct. It would be the equivalent – in another culture 
– of elders passing down tribal secrets.385   
However, beyond the terminology, most Australian advocacy training material continues to 
promote the belief that an advocate should be as effective as possible without deviating from 
a relatively straightforward presentation. This idea of behaving normally, or ‗not-performing‘ 
does not interrogate how ideas of a ‗good lawyer‘ are constructed through habitual 
performance and how, as Priest observes, this perpetuates certain hierarchies in the juridical 
field (as well as the gap between the lay and law). Continuing to see advocacy in the 
courtroom as only a matter of observing decorum and/or ‗style‘ demonstrates just how 
assimilated and habitual these rules are.  
 
For our 22 year-old law student, this leads to conflicting information. Although ‗acting‘ as 
such is classified as relatively artificial, the ‗arts‘ of communication, storytelling and 
persuasion are common. The institutions around him, such as Sydney University Law School, 
or the NSW Bar Association and the Australian Advocacy Institute, have all integrated some 
aspects of performance or communication skills into their methods of advocacy training.386 So 
where does this leave our young law student? He is likely to try and acquire the skills 
wherever he can, be that private advocacy training, or institutionalised teaching. 
Alternatively, he will be like many new graduates and simply bumble his way through 
courtroom procedure until, over time, he will learn what he needs to know through watching 
and experience.  
 
Yet no matter where this student goes, and no matter what particular methods he attempts to 
learn, habituate, or naturalise, he will also naturalise unquestioningly the dominance of the 
advocate and other legal agents over laypersons. This habitual inculcation for advocates 
ensures the continuance of models of power and domination necessary for the trial process to 
maintain its current form. Simply reading the Bar Association‘s Guidelines on the duties of 
the advocate reveals these complex levels of responsibility and status. They state:  
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 Marcus Priest, ―Raising the Bar,‖ Australian Financial Review, supra n. 355.  
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 The Bar Association (as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter) regularly outsources Continuing 
Professional Development (CPD) programs to seminars such as The Power of Persuasion Series. See the NSW 
Bar Association‘s on CPD, retrieved 11 May 2008 from: http://www.nswbar.asn.au/docs/ 
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A barrister must, when exercising the forensic judgments called for throughout the case, take care to 
ensure that decisions by the barrister or on the barrister‘s advice to invoke the coercive powers of a court 
or to make allegations or suggestions under privilege against any person:  
- Are reasonably justified by the material already available to the barrister 
- Are appropriate for the robust advancement of the client‘s case on its merits 
- Are not made principally in order to harass or embarrass the person; 
- Are not made principally in order to gain some collateral advantage for the client or the barrister of 
the instructing solicitor out of court.
387
  
Even a cursory examination of the above rules, which are the only ones specifically 
pertaining to oral presentation in court, reveals a number of intriguing language 
constructions. Firstly, the rules draw attention to the ―coercive power of the court‖ as being a 
factor that is to be utilized by the advocate. The ―coercive power of the court‖ refers to both 
the advocate‘s particular powers of interrogation, as well as the framing of the trial, whereby 
any advocate‘s examination of a witness takes place within a somewhat constrained and 
intimidating atmosphere. 
 
This is supported by the acknowledgement of the potential of an advocate to ―embarrass‖ or 
―harass‖ a witness on the stand. The rules state clearly that it is an advocate‘s responsibility 
to pursue a client‘s case ―robustly‖, utilising the ―coercive powers of the court‖, albeit in 
good faith (an advocate ―must give a truthful opinion‖) and without unnecessary harassment 
witnesses. The use of the word ―principal‖ also suggests that if evidence or questioning 
indirectly causes harassment, this is within the bounds of an advocate‘s duties.388 These 
guidelines suggest that advocates are negotiating an ever-shifting and highly nebulous area of 
appropriate behaviour—which I have termed legal naturalism. Advocates must naturalise a 
complex set of skills so as to be able to present themselves as zealous pleaders, but not 
unethical ones. Robust cross-examination is an advocate‘s duty to their client. However, this 
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 New South Wales Barristers‟ Rules, supra n. 301. 
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 The prosecutor is similarly bound: ―a prosecutor must not, by language or other conduct, seek to inflame or 
bias the court against the accused‖. This is a slightly acrobatic positioning whereby the prosecutor can only try a 
person he or she genuinely believes could be guilty (there being a reasonable amount of evidence, however this 
‗belief‘ may be constructed) but within the courtroom must try to win his or her case as if the defendant were 
guilty. However, a prosecutor is also expected to terminate prosecution should evidence come to light that might 
exonerate the defendant. See: ―Prosecutors Duties,‖ New South Wales Barristers‟ Rules, Section 62-72, supra n. 
301. 
150 
 
duty is always secondary to his or her (unconsciously acted out) responsibility to the juridical 
field and the trial process. Advocates act for their client, but above and beyond this, they 
work for the court. 
 
Conclusion: Legal Naturalism and Winning the Audience 
 
The Australian juridical field is in a state of flux between different modes of legal education. 
Dominant forms of understanding advocacy are becoming increasingly outmoded for a 
variety of reasons, primarily to do with the large increase in numbers of graduates. The 
diversification of legal education potentially challenges old means of promotion. Newcomers 
who do not undergo formal pupillage and do not share the same background will not 
necessarily share the same values as those who are their superiors. They are therefore more 
likely to challenge the underlying rules of the field by not seeking to be included in the same 
way. This is manifesting in alterations to legal naturalism where ideas of the advocate 
appropriate in the 1960s may seem outdated today. With the increasing diversity of 
graduates, the social ideal of the advocate is shifting along with how this ideal is constructed 
and perpetuated through advocacy performance.389 
 
Along with this, there has been an explosion in the broader community in ‗communication‘ 
theory; popular understandings about persuasion, strategising, and argument (in the line of 
Dale Carnegie‘s How to Win Friends and Influence People)390. This has led to a fuzzier line 
than ever before for advocates who must maintain the distinction between between lay and 
law (and the need for advocates to present themselves as a needed professional specialist) and 
also accommodate a naturalistic, more ‗human‘ contact between advocate and jury. Not only 
is it becoming increasingly necessary for the legal field to provide additional vocational skills 
for advocates, but advocates must now also respond and adapt to popular ideas of advocacy. 
This is particularly the case in criminal trials because of the need to persuade a jury. This 
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 It is important not to overstate this. Statistics from the New South Wales Bar Association do not include 
details on socio-economic backgrounds. However, the proportion of male to female is still extremely lopsided. 
As of June 2007, there are 2061 practising barristers: of these, 344 are female. NSW Bar Statistics retrieved 15 
June 2008 from: http://www.nswbar.asn.au/docs/about/barstats/full_stats.php 
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 Dale Carnegie, How to Win Friends and Influence People (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981).  
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means that advocacy training must also be more open to cross-disciplinary skills such as 
‗communication‘ and ‗performance‘. 
 
I have identified changing education as responsible for a shift in legal naturalism. Yet another 
important influence on advocacy behaviour is ‗mediatisation‘. The expectations of the jury 
have altered significantly since the 1960s, as television has become the dominant medium of 
information. The proliferation of courtroom-based television dramas, as well as televised 
proceedings means the vast majority of jurors‘ experiences of courtrooms will be through 
television. Consequently, their expectations of advocates will be based on actors. This means 
that not only have agents within the juridical field always been somewhat dependent on the 
expectations of the jury (and therefore less autonomous than agents within the field present 
themselves), but also that this relative autonomy of the field is eroding in the face of a 
mediatised world. Public expectations of what makes a good advocate are now constructed 
and determined at least in part by television producers.  
 
Today, according to What Can Lawyers Learn from Actors, advocates need to behave like 
human beings. Jurors expect advocates to not be overly different from themselves—rather 
jurors expect them to be realistic—and this concept of realism is based on signifiers of 
naturalism. Any deviation from naturalism is likely to jar with an audience who will find their 
behaviour ‗fake‘ or ‗artificial‘. Because of its self-evident nature, it is worth observing that 
this acting style has only been dominant for about a century. Although it has now become the 
standard (assisted by film and television), any attempts at naturalism on stage prior to the late 
19
th
 or early 20
th
 century would most likely have been met with derision or confusion. Today 
the most effective means of appealing to a jury have diverged significantly from older ideas, 
illustrating the historically contingent boundaries of appropriate and effective behaviour for 
an advocate noted at the beginning of this chapter.  
 
Older, legally sub-cultural markers of status, such as accent, certain ways of dress and speech 
are now becoming less influential over a jury who may in fact determine them to be 
pompous.391 Mediatisation has diminished the autonomy of agents in the legal field to set 
their own standards of behaviour. I use the term legal naturalism, then, not to simply draw a 
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 Although interestingly, as I observed earlier in this chapter, surveys show that members of the public usually 
want legal practitioners to retain wigs and gowns despite the regular criticism of their pomposity in the press.  
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parallel between acting and advocacy but also to argue that naturalism as a style has 
transcended the stage and has become the accepted model of performance that signals 
integrity and honesty. This ascendancy is largely due to the growth of film and TV in the 20
th
 
century.  
 
The ability to capture and reproduce performance—the creation of an economy of cultural 
reproduction as it were—has affected all fields. In the following two chapters, I examine the 
effect of mediatisation on the adversarial criminal jury trial. Chapter 5 examines debates 
around broadcasting the trial. Some legal agents argue that broadcasting risks ‗theatricalising‘ 
the trial—causing participants to ‗act up‘. However, I argue that resistance to broadcasting 
also stems from a reluctance to remit control of the trial to external producers. Broadcasting 
invites greater scrutiny into a process that if not always fair, needs to be believed in as fair 
and that relies on the disappearance of live performance.  
153 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
Acting Up: Trials, Broadcasting and Television 
 
 
 
 
 
[…] justice shines brightest in the sunshine. In today‘s busy world only a few people can actually attend court 
proceedings. With so many people relying on television as their primary resource of information televised 
coverage of trials exposes greater numbers of our citizens to our justice system. A camera in the courtroom 
enhances public understanding of the judicial world by engendering a deeper understanding of legal principles 
and processes. 
Clara Tuma, ―Open Courts‖392 
 
[…] In the age of the Television Trial, the threat is not that the medium will somehow fail to adjust to the 
sensitive intricacies of the courtroom, but that the American courtroom itself will become a manifestation of the 
medium. 
Paul Thaler, The Watchful Eye
393
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 Clara Tuma, ―Open Courts: How Cameras in the Court Help Keeps the System Honest,‖ Cleveland State 
Law Review 49 (2001): 420. 
393
 Paul Thaler, The Watchful Eye: American Justice in the Age of the Television Trial (Praeger: Connecticut, 
1994), 203.  
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Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I examined the extensive mediation of the trial through the 
dominance of the advocate. In this chapter, I turn my attention to the mediatisation of the 
courtroom through examining the television broadcasting of trials.394 The broadcasting of 
trials provokes strong controversy. This is because mediatisation is more than just another 
layer of mediation; rather, mediatisation raises broader questions as to the purpose of the trial. 
Some legal agents argue that televising trials is a means of opening up the court system to the 
public. Others argue that all trial broadcasts remain television programs heavily aimed at 
securing audiences and that it is therefore in the interest of television producers to 
sensationalise proceedings. This sensationalising allegedly turns the courtroom from a serious 
place into a site of entertainment.  
 
The strong position-taking common in debates around broadcasting frequently involves 
dichotomies such as ‗real‘ or ‗fake‘, ‗serious‘ or ‗entertaining‘. In this chapter, I seek to 
problematise these dichotomies and reconfigure this debate by examining both television and 
the criminal trial as modes of cultural production produced by agents working within 
particular fields. This means that lawyers and journalists are working within their own 
relatively discrete set of conditions and constraints, as well as with different assumptions and 
beliefs. These must be taken into account when examining the relationship between television 
and the criminal trial. For example, many legal agents argue that television potentially 
corrupts the courtroom, encouraging witnesses to ‗perform‘. However, this perceived threat 
presupposes that the courtroom process is a site of ‗not-performing‘ and truth-telling. On the 
other side of the debate, many journalists claim that the resistance of legal agents to 
broadcasting courtrooms contravenes the public‘s right to the open trial. Yet this posits 
television and the journalists who produce it as a transparent conduit for the public, rather 
than agents subject to particular economic and time constraints, such as editing and audience 
ratings. I argue that only through understanding both television broadcasts of trials and the 
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 By broadcasting, I mean the transmission of any part of a trial on public television, whether live or delayed. 
This also includes the usage of snippets of courtroom footage on the news. 
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criminal trial as practices particular to different fields can we reconfigure a debate that is 
often stereotyped as ‗the free press v the fair trial‘. As I will show throughout this chapter, the 
press is not free, and the trial is not fair.  
 
Although legal agents who critique broadcasting emphasise its corruption and ‗theatricality‘, 
I argue that a major factor at play is the value of the live trial, which risks being interfered 
with by broadcasting. Legal agents unconsciously rely on the value of the live trial to protect 
their right to internally regulate how trial proceedings are conducted. Finally, I conclude that 
a rigid distinction constructed in debates around broadcasting between ‗live‘ law courts and 
‗mediatised‘ television overlooks the fact that processes of mediatisation have already altered 
aspects of legal practice even without the physical presence of cameras. The impact of 
television as the primary medium of information has arguably already reduced the ability of 
agents within the juridical field to define their own standards of behaviour and truth-telling. 
This development is characteristic of the general growth in the influence of television since 
the middle of the 20
th
 century. 
  
The Free Press vs. the Fair Trial  
 
In 2000, the Scottish High Court convened a special court in the Netherlands to try the 
‗Lockerbie bombers‘, two Libyan men who were accused of being responsible for the death 
of 270 people when they allegedly detonated a bomb on board Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988.395 
There was intense international interest in the proceedings of the court case as the victims 
were of multiple nationalities (the victims were mostly American, however the plane 
exploded over Scotland) and because it was considered at that time to be the single most 
lethal act of terrorism in terms of civilian deaths.396 Because of the international nature of the 
crime, the Scottish court proceedings held in the Netherlands were transmitted through a 
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 This international incident led to more than a decade of sanctions against Libya, and protracted diplomatic 
wrangling in an attempt to find a trial process that Libyan leader General Qaddafi would agree to. Eventually, in 
1999 upon the urging of Nelson Mandela and Crown Prince Abdullah, General Qaddafi agreed to a Scottish 
court presided over by Scottish judges but which would be held in the Netherlands. 
396
 This was surpassed by the attacks in New York on September 11, 2001. 
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closed signal to the families of the American victims who were unable to attend the trial in 
person.397 
In March 2000, the BBC applied to the Scottish High Court for permission to broadcast the 
trial proceedings. They proposed to intercept the closed signal and transmit it to a television 
audience. The BBC argued that as the trial would take place in the Netherlands, it would not 
be accessible to Scottish people who wished to attend in person.398 The explicit argument 
made was that of the open trial: that the interested public had a right of access to the 
courtroom. Consequently, they argued, television broadcasting was the most appropriate 
means of ensuring the public nature of the proceedings.   
But what exactly is the function of the open trial? The BBC‘s argument in this appeal reveals 
a larger 20
th
 century shift in its meaning. Historically the open trial has been the right of a 
defendant (and tied very closely to the ‗confrontation‘ principle that forms Amendment 6 of 
the U.S. Constitution) to be confronted with the witnesses against him/ her and to have the 
trial proceedings known to the public (rather than happening in secret, such as might occur in 
processes of private torture, or indefinite detention).399 Over the 20
th
 century, however, 
journalists of both the print and television media have pursued a different interpretation 
whereby the open trial is a right of the public, rather than that of the defendant.  
In the U.S., this was upheld in 1980 by the Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers v 
Virginia.400 In this case, the Supreme Court reversed a Virginia judge‘s decision to grant a 
                                                 
397 ―The trial is of international significance. Its conduct and outcome are of unique significance for a criminal 
trial in Scotland having regard to the number of victims, the fact that they are of different nationalities, and its 
implications for a number of governments including those of the United Kingdom, the United States, Libya and 
the Netherlands‖. BBC Petitioners (No.2) 2000 JC 419, 427. 
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 ―The conduct of the trial is a matter of legitimate public interest in Scotland having regard to the fact that the 
destruction of the aircraft caused the deaths of persons in Scotland‖. Ibid., 427.  
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 The ‗confrontation‘ principle  is derived from a clause in the Magna Carta. The clause outlines the right of 
the defendant to be confronted with the witnesses against them in open court. See: U.S. Constitution, amend. 6. 
‗Confrontation‘ will be examined in more detail in the following chapter.  
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 Richmond Newspapers Inc. v Virginia [Hereafter ‗Richmond Newspapers‘], 448 US 555 (1980). In this case, 
a defendant claimed his trial had been jeopardised by the media circus attending it. His appeal was accepted in 
Virginia but overturned in the U.S. Supreme Court. The judges found, as is outlined in the subsequent chapter, 
that the ‗confrontation‘ principle refers to the right of the defendant, and does not guarantee the media‘s right to 
attend a courtroom. However, the judges argued that the 1
st
 and 14
th
 Amendments of the U.S. Constitution 
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defendant‘s request to clear the court. The Supreme Court found that the right of the press 
and public to be there was more important to the fair trial than the defendant‘s wishes.401 
Although the defendant‘s wishes had to be taken into account, a trial could only be closed if 
there were specific reasons suggesting that a public or media presence would prejudice the 
defendant‘s chances of a fair trial. In their decision, the judges discussed the value of the 
open trial, stating that:  
Finally, with some limitations, a trial aims at true and accurate factfinding. Of course, proper factfinding 
is to the benefit of criminal defendants and of the parties in civil proceedings. But other, comparably 
urgent, interests are also often at stake. A miscarriage of justice that imprisons an innocent accused also 
leaves a guilty party at large, a continuing threat to society.
402
 
The judges state explicitly that the open trial is about the community, in terms of their safety 
and education, and because trials serve a prophylactic purpose, allowing communities to 
resolve disputes through legal means.403 The judges also argue that the appearance of justice 
being done is vital to the public‘s belief in the legal system, and they argue that the trial itself 
represents a miniature sphere of the role of law, as the judge makes decisions that affect the 
public.404 Consequently, the retention of public trust is paramount to the criminal trial and is 
                                                                                                                                                        
(which detail freedom of speech and freedom of the press) do guarantee the right of the public and the press to 
attend, and consequently override Amendment 6 to some extent. In other words, the judges decided that unless 
there was specific reason to believe that the presence of the press and media would interfere with the 
defendant‘s right to a fair trial, it did not matter what the defendant wanted.  
401
 The case of Richmond Newspapers concerned the presence of reporters in the gallery and was not 
specifically about televising courts. However, it is this case‘s decision that has facilitated arguments for court 
broadcasting because it was the first case to determine that the ‗open trial‘ was a right of the public and not only 
of the defendant. Although this in an American case, it has ramifications for Australian practice as Australia 
draws on overseas experiences in debates surrounding broadcasting because of what Stepniak terms Australia‘s 
―limited experience‖ with broadcasting. See Stepniak, Audio-Visual Coverage of Courts, 236.  
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 Richmond Newspapers, 448 US 555, 596 (1980). 
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 ―When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows. 
Thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for 
community concern, hostility, and emotion‖. Ibid., 571. 
404
 ―The trial is a means of meeting ‗the notion, deeply rooted in the common law, that ‗justice must satisfy the 
appearance of justice.‘‖ Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 616 (1960), quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 
US 11, 14 (1954). ―But the trial is more than a demonstrably just method of adjudicating disputes and protecting 
rights. It plays a pivotal role in the entire judicial process, and, by extension, in our form of government. Under 
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facilitated by a relative transparency of proceedings to distance legal agents from any 
accusation of arbitrariness or secrecy in the law courts‘ processes that might result from trials 
being held behind closed doors.405  
The judges also give clear commentary on what they perceive to be the role of the media in 
the criminal trial. Having acknowledged the importance of the open trial to the public‘s 
confidence in the legal system, they then go on to observe that the public attendance at trials 
has waned as a pastime, replaced by, among other things, television: 
In earlier times, both in England and America, attendance at court was a common mode of ‗passing the 
time‘. […] With the press, cinema, and electronic media now supplying the representations or reality of 
the real life drama once available only in the courtroom, attendance at court is no longer a widespread 
pastime.
406 
 
The judges argue that because the public are primarily informed as to court proceedings by 
the print and (particularly) electronic media, these consequently function as ―surrogates for 
the public‖. This pivotal role in maintaining a degree of transparency in proceedings justifies 
the media‘s special right of access to the courtroom.407  
The basic argument that the media acts as a surrogate for the public has been used 
subsequently as a justification to broadcast trials on television as a functional substitute for 
attendance of the public in court. This was one of the arguments advanced by the BBC in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
our system, judges are not mere umpires, but, in their own sphere, lawmakers—a coordinate branch of 
government‖. Richmond Newspapers, 448 US 555, 595 (1980). 
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 ―Public access to trials acts as an important check, akin in purpose to the other checks and balances that 
infuse our system of government‖. Richmond Newspapers, 448 US 555, 596 (1980). The judge goes on to quote 
Blackstone: ―open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much more conducive 
to the clearing up of truth, than the private and secret examination [...] where a witness may frequently depose 
that in private, which he will be ashamed to testify in a public and solemn tribunal‖. William Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England (Philadelphia: Charles & Peterson, 1860) Vol. III, 372.  
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 Richmond Newspapers, 448 US 555, 572 (1980).    
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 Media representatives are often provided with special seating and priority of entry so that they may report 
what people in attendance have seen and heard. This ―[contributes] to public understanding of the rule of law 
and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system.‖ Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 
427 U.S 539, 587 (1976). However, they do not have any special status: ―no greater or higher right can be 
established by representatives of the press than is recognized as existing in members of the general pubic, who 
have the right of access to the court subject to regulation and control‖. Re Andrew Dunn and The Morning 
Bulletin Ltd. [1932] Sr R Qd 1, 17.  
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Lockerbie application. Although the BBC claimed ―special circumstances‖ as it was an 
international trial (and consequently they argued that people wished to attend in person but 
logistically could not), the BBC still argued that television broadcasting could to some degree 
replace being in the courtroom.408  
To argue that television (and the journalists who produce it) provides a functional substitute 
for physical presence in the courtroom requires reconfiguring the television audience‘s role in 
a particular way: instead of the popular assumption that television involves a one-way 
transmission to a passive audience, television instead becomes a medium for an active 
audience, facilitating community participation where those watching a broadcast of a trial are 
involved in the administration of justice. This is the argument advanced by many journalists, 
such as Court TV reporter, Clara Tuma: 
[…] justice shines brightest in the sunshine. In today‘s busy world only a few people can actually attend 
court proceedings. With so many people relying on television as their primary resource of information 
televised coverage of trials exposes greater numbers of our citizens to our justice system. A camera in 
the courtroom enhances public understanding of the judicial world by engendering a deeper 
understanding of legal principles and processes.
409 
 
Tuma‘s statement is interesting in two ways. Firstly, she says that those watching broadcasts 
are doing so in the name of public justice, distancing Court TV from being a source of 
entertainment rather than education.410 Secondly, Tuma implies that television is not only a 
functional substitute for being in the courtroom; it is also a more practical means of fulfilling 
the requirements of the open trial. She consequently takes a step further than the BBC, who 
argue only that ―special circumstances‖ prevented people from attending the court in person. 
For Tuma, the court requires television. Because no one attends trials anymore, the courts 
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 There is some precedent to the BBC‘s argument in the broadcasting of proceedings at Nuremberg. 
Nuremberg broadcasts had arguably little to do with ensuring the defendants‘ rights to a fair trial, and much 
more to do with a belief that the Nuremberg trials were showing justice to be done to the worldwide community. 
To some extent these two motives are inseparable. However to simply fulfil the defendants‘ rights to an open 
trial would merely have required the presence of members of the public in the gallery. Here, rather, we see a 20
th
 
century development of a middle-ages principle, where crimes were punished in the community they occurred in 
so as to function as a form of deterrent, community redress and an instrument of education.  
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 Clara Tuma, ―Open Courts,‖ 420. 
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 Court TV is an American cable channel dedicated exclusively to the broadcasting of court cases. 
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should adapt. The legal system is, she would argue, consequently out-of-touch with the 
contemporary population.  
 
This view is not only held by journalists. Over thirty years ago, Jack Weinstein and Diane 
Zimmerman, a New York judge and a Professor of Law respectively, also argued that ―it is 
time to let the public really observe their courts through the facilities of mass media‖.411 They 
observed that ―today the legitimacy of television as a responsible interpreter of the news has 
received unquestioned […] recognition‖.412 In Australia, Justice Michael Kirby has long 
argued that broadcasting of the courtroom is an inevitability that law courts should adapt to, 
rather than resist: 
Every sensible person can see that, the technology of information having moved along, courts and 
judges can scarcely expect to keep the cameras out of Australian courts forever. What is the reason for 
our strong principle of open courts? It is the fundamental belief that the courts belong to the people who 
have a right at virtually all times to be there. Their presence, or even their right to be present, puts a 
brake on the potential arrogance of power. It is another means of ensuring accountability so that those 
who judge are themselves constantly subject to judgment. […] And if television is the way that most 
people in Australia nowadays get their news information, it is difficult to see why it should be 
forbidden.
413
 
Kirby‘s attitude is shared by South Australian Chief Justice John Doyle.414 This sentiment is, 
in fact, echoed across most adversarial jurisdictions by many judges and other legal 
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 Jack Weinstein and Diane Zimmerman, ―Let the People Observe Their Courts,‖ Judicature 61.4 (October 
1977): 165. 
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 Ibid., 165 
413
 Justice Kirby also argues that going to court is an outmoded practice: ―[i]t is difficult to justify limiting the 
open court principle to straggling groups of partly-interested schoolchildren or to the new brigade of pensioners 
and foreign visitors who are increasingly brought to sit in the back row to watch our courts until boredom or the 
incessant demands of the tour guides send them on their way‖. Justice Michael Kirby, ―The Future of the 
Judiciary,‖ (paper presented at the Australian Lawyers‟ Conference, Thailand, 9-17 July 1995), unpublished. 
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 ―The public have a right of access to the courts. That means they can walk into the courtroom and listen. But 
these days, in reality, most people exercise that right of access through the media. […] And because I see the 
media as exercising the public‘s right of access I think it‘s important that we help the media as much as we can, 
to give the public what you might call good access, to give them good quality information about what‘s 
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commentators.415 Instead of there being a blanket resistance to broadcasting, as was the case 
in the past, many legal agents are enthusiastic about the potential of broadcasting technology 
to assist in upholding the ideals of the adversarial trial. For example, in the BBC‘s application 
to intercept and transmit the closed-signal broadcast of the Lockerbie proceedings, the 
Scottish High Court judge followed the 1992 guidelines that had been specifically developed 
in Scotland to deal with the question of broadcasting court proceedings.416 These guidelines 
stated explicitly that the previous blanket ban on broadcasting was no longer appropriate. 
Rather, the question a judge should consider is whether there is a ―risk to the administration 
of justice‖.417  
                                                                                                                                                        
happening‖. South Australia Chief Justice John Doyle on ABC Radio National, ―How Courts Interact with the 
Media,‖ The Law Report, 10 November 1998.  
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 In Canada, these sentiments have been expressed by Justice Cory in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney 
General) [1989] 2 SCR 1326, 1339-40 . In Scotland, Lord Hope commented: ―The public have a right to know 
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Scottish High Court Judge, Lord MacFadyen argues in his judgment in the BBC case that 
broadcasting an encrypted signal to remote sites for persons involved in the case (or rather, 
personally affected by the case) poses no kind of risk to the administration of justice:  
In these circumstances, it is in my view realistic to regard the remote sites as extensions of the 
courtroom, and the transmission of the proceedings to those sites as no more than an internal 
arrangement within the court. That is certainly the way the remote sites are presented in the Remote 
Sites Guidelines. The force and effect of the point does not, in my opinion, depend on its being literally 
true that the remote sites are parts of the courtroom. It is sufficient that there is a strong functional 
analogy to that effect.
418
 
Interestingly, the language of Judge Kirkwood in his response to the initial BBC application 
was even stronger. Kirkwood argued that according to the Remote Sites Guidelines the 
extension of the courtroom was not even analogy, but was literal. The remote sites were part 
of the court. Family members viewing the court remotely were consequently present in the 
court. This suggests that in Scotland television can fulfil the function of live presence to the 
satisfaction of legal need under certain conditions.  
 
When the BBC failed in their application, it was because in both appeals the presiding judges 
made a clear distinction between an encrypted signal to those involved in the case, and a 
public broadcast. Lord MacFadyen comments: 
I understand the petitioners‘ view that the most effective, complete and detailed way for them to report 
the proceedings of the trial is for them to broadcast the whole proceedings live. If there were no 
countervailing considerations to be taken into account, that view would be entitled to prevail.
419
 
What this tells us is that there is not a strict dichotomy between the advocates of televising 
courts and legal agents, and that attitudes towards the mediatisation of the courtroom are far 
from simple. Many legal theorists and practitioners have commented on the potential power 
of television to improve and uphold trial ideals, and this is reflected in the wide, if uneven, 
use of cameras in courtrooms across many jurisdictions.420 However, as Lord MacFadyen 
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observes, when it comes to general television broadcasting, there are other considerations to 
take into account. 
 
The Medium and the Message: Acting Up 
Historically, the ‗other considerations‘ referred to by Lord MacFadyen in the Lockerbie 
appeal have been surprisingly consistent across jurisdictions (i.e. the risk of ―interference to 
the administration of justice‖).421 The first queries surrounding broadcasting‘s effect on trial 
proceedings (in this instance, radio) date back as early as the late 1930s in the U.S. A major 
recurring argument as to the effect of broadcasting is whether or not cameras alter a witness‘s 
behaviour; an argument which I believe implicitly revolves around the risk of broadcasting 
‗theatricalising‘ the proceedings.422 According to the terms of the debate, this alteration in a 
witness‘ behaviour can happen in two ways. Firstly, there is the claim that both the physical 
presence and use of technology will directly affect and distort the behaviour of those in the 
court causing them to ‗act up‘, and rendering them less likely to be truthful or ‗natural‘. The 
second charge levelled at broadcasting is the potentially detrimental effect on the outside 
audience who view the proceedings on television. In terms of the first charge—that of the 
impact of technology on trial participants—some legal commentators have argued that 
broadcasting may therefore impair the truth seeking capacity of the court. For example in the 
U.S., in the case of Estes v Texas in 1965, Justice Clark stated, when discussing the possible 
effect of television broadcasting on witnesses, ―[e]mbarrassment may impede the search for 
the truth, as may a natural tendency toward overdramatization‖.423  
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This argument that the presence of television cameras risks dramatising or theatricalising the 
courtroom was still in currency 35 years later in Europe in 2000 when the BBC‘s appeal to 
broadcast the Lockerbie bombing trial was rejected. The Lord Director in that instance 
claimed ―[t]here was a risk that the evidence of witnesses might be affected in a variety of 
ways if the proceedings were televised. A witness might be more affected by nervousness 
than he would otherwise be. He might play to the gallery‖.424  
The potential for ―playing to the gallery‖ is posited not only on the witness performing to the 
imagined audience, but also on the immediate physical stress broadcasting equipment may 
cause in the space of the courtroom. In earlier days, the sheer size of the technology gave 
credence to the argument that witnesses would not be able to behave naturally, as there was 
no way they could forget they were being filmed. Yet this issue of equipment was raised at 
the BBC‘s appeal: 
As was expressly stated in paragraph (b) the criterion was to be whether the presence of television 
cameras in the court would be without risk to the administration of justice. It was to be noted that the 
language of that paragraph concentrated on the presence of cameras in court. That demonstrated that at 
least in part the concern was with the impact of the presence of the equipment rather than with the 
impact of the broadcast output.
425
   
This comment contradicts commentators today who assume that these arguments are no 
longer valid, because cameras can now be so small as to be almost invisible. Media Law 
academic Susannah Barber states that ―[a]rguments that cameras are physically disruptive, 
distracting, and detrimental to the dignity and decorum of the courtroom have been laid to 
rest, as have the rather tenuous arguments that cameras turn witnesses into hysterics, lawyers 
into flamboyant actors, and judges into political sycophants‖.426 Yet, despite the significant 
reduction in size of equipment, its potential for intrusion is still considered relevant by legal 
agents.427  
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What Barber overlooks is that these legal disputes are not about the size of the technology. 
Concerns tend to revolve around the associations that this kind of technology may have for 
the witness, and how these associations will affect them. Ronald Goldfarb argues: 
Sceptics have shifted their criticism of cameras in courts through the years. Several decades ago, the 
most common objections raised against television in courts was that the cameras were obstructive, noisy 
and disruptive. Now that the technology is such that camera coverage of court proceedings is invisible 
and decorous, the argument against television has changed. Today the chief criticism—unprovable, 
though logical and widely held—is that the presence of cameras inevitably changes the behaviour of the 
trial participants in negative ways.
428
  
As far back as 1937, the introduction of press photography was thought to potentially impair 
the seriousness of the proceedings: 
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The taking of photographs 
in the courtroom during sessions of the court or recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting of court 
proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade the court and 
create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted.
429
 
Television (and press photography/radio before it) can carry significant stigma in the eyes of 
the law as it is fundamentally a tool of ‗entertainment‘ turning the seriousness of the court 
into a show, through inappropriate behaviour. Broadcasting equipment, then, according to 
some critics, functions as a behavioural trigger.  
Yet the perceived risk that trial participants will ‗act-up‘ for the audience, and turn the court 
into a show, is only justifiable if one presupposes that the current inherited circumstances of 
the trial are an effective truth-seeking process that allow trial participants to be relatively 
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‗natural‘.430 This runs in contradiction to the concept of a performance of tradition that I have 
introduced in this thesis. Indeed, a study conducted by Paul Mason in 2001 into just such a 
question yielded an interesting result. Observers were asked to watch a witness testify while 
that witness was being openly filmed. The study found that:  
It was […] difficult to determine the effect the camera has on a witness: ‗[...] but I think that they are so 
tense anyway that whether or not there are cameras is not a problem. A witness is really under pressure, 
that‘s also one of the problems with this system, it‘s very good because it‘s balanced, but on the other 
hand the witness gets all the pressure, and you have the accused who is sitting on the chair, comfortably 
watching the proceedings‘.431 
Observers in this study were unable to state with any clarity to what degree the cameras were 
affecting a witness‘ behaviour. This is because it was clear to the observers how affected 
witnesses were simply through being on the stand and in the courtroom. However, this 
accusation is longstanding because it is difficult to dispute George Gerber‘s claim: ―if you 
change the audience, you change the performers‖. 432 
The second charge levelled at broadcasting, as mentioned earlier, deals with the question of 
the audience—the viewing public who watch the proceedings on television. Theoretically, 
these people are the modern version of previous court-watchers. As outlined earlier, many 
journalists and legal agents have argued that watching a trial on television is a simulated and 
comparable version of ‗being there‘ whereby television simply extends the space of the 
courtroom into a viewer‘s living room. Therefore, arguably, this extension facilitates the open 
trial. Yet many legal agents argue that this audience is watching for the ‗wrong‘ reasons, or 
getting the ‗wrong‘ impression of proceedings. Catherine Crier writes in 2006: 
Coverage that focuses on the theatre of the courtroom rather than the substance of the case fails 
Americans for two reasons. First, the adversarial process is reduced to a sporting event, in which 
personal antics become fodder for chattering commentators who are more akin to ESPN sportscaster 
Linda Cohn than New York Times Supreme Court reporter Linda Greenhouse. Americans then view our 
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courts as a perverse form of entertainment, rather than a hopefully fair and civil means of dispute 
resolution. Second, a focus on the legal play rather than the issues at stake deprives Americans of the 
important education that news coverage should provide.
433
  
Crier‘s use of the term ‗theatre‘ echoes old objections to the introduction of defence lawyers, 
as she argues that television broadcasting will bring entertainment and theatricality with it, 
corrupting the courtroom.434 For Crier this means that television broadcasting of trials cannot 
be justified as a tool of education for a civic-minded audience, as journalists have sought to 
do. Robert A. Pugsley too criticises the argument of television facilitating the open trial. 
Writing in 1997 regarding the OJ Simpson civil and criminal proceedings, he commented:  
What was intended, and often realized, as an educational insight for the public into the workings of their 
criminal justice system often devolved—because of the camera‘s presence—into an unedifying 
cynicism-producing spectacle that left many in the audience wondering angrily what any of this had to 
do with ‗truth‘ or ‗justice‘ of a ‗system‘ and just what exactly their taxes were being used for.435 
Pugsley blames television for turning the trial into a form of entertainment. Both Crier and 
Pugsley, admittedly, use extreme examples.436 A more nuanced study that reached the same 
conclusion, however, was the Noisette study done in New York in 2003. This study found 
that 61% of the public surveyed felt that television in the courtroom was a source of 
entertainment, rather than something to increase their understanding of the trial and how the 
criminal justice system functioned.437  
Yet this dichotomy—that because courtrooms on television can be entertaining they cannot 
be educational—flies in the face of the generally accepted premise that criminal courtrooms 
have always been a site of entertainment, to the extent that, at the height of its popularity, 
tickets were issued for seats in the public gallery. Those who attended courtrooms were not 
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necessarily always doing so out of a sense of civic duty.438 If entertainment and justice really 
were mutually exclusive concepts, the criminal trial would have long since forfeited its social 
credibility to resolve disputes.   
The judges in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia are clear that the public have always been 
interested in criminal trials for their entertainment value and this, for these judges, still 
ensures public inclusion in the judicial process.439 These judges do not separate entertainment 
from public justice and transparency as they argue that regardless of the public‘s motives, the 
proceedings are still made more fair by their presence, even if they are only there to watch 
avocados being thrown, or to witness the judge having to have certain acts of oral sex 
explained to him, as happened in the ‗Trials of Oz‘.440 In addition to this, just because an 
audience watching a trial broadcast at home finds it entertaining does not necessarily mean 
that this audience cannot also find the broadcast informative. This is something the Noisette 
report authors in New York do not acknowledge. 
 
As outlined, the two arguments above regarding the risk of broadcasting reveal continuity 
with much earlier arguments that intrusions into the trial process constitute a form of deviant 
theatricality. The inability to either definitively substantiate or refute these claims (perhaps 
ever, and certainly not without more long-term trials and studies) means that the dispute 
remains, although both arguments are based on a categorical misrecognition as to the ‗not-
performing‘ nature of the trial. However, the argument that the courtroom will be 
‗entertainment‘ for a viewing audience does,  arguably, revolve around a more well-founded 
reservation: that television broadcasts will not or do not accurately portray the judicial 
system, as television producers/journalists have a vested interest in creating entertainment. In 
other words, dubbing television and the journalists who produce it as a ―surrogate for the 
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public‖ overlooks the very particular jobs that journalists have and the conditions under 
which they work.  
 
The Journalistic Field  
 
In On Television and Journalism, Bourdieu argues that the driving particularity of the 
journalistic field is its proximity to the market-place.441 The model of supply and demand is 
central to cultural journalistic production. Journalism‘s dependence on economic factors 
means that it has considerably less autonomy than many fields, including the juridical field. 
This means, despite their claims to a ‗free press‘, journalists are largely driven by 
(perceptions of) audience demand. As Daniel Stepniak observes: ―[i]t is difficult to deny that 
ratings rather than the promotion of greater public understanding of judicial proceedings 
motivate many media applications‖.442  
 
To capture an audience requires marketing a show in a particular way. This means television 
broadcasts have an imperative to be entertaining. Although I have pointed out that 
courtrooms have long been considered entertaining, this refers primarily to much older trials, 
as opposed to 20
th
 and 21
st
 century affairs. Beyond the odd moments of fun (or the occasional 
extreme examples such as the Trials of Oz), contemporary court processes tend to be 
extremely drawn out, relatively opaque and rather dull. They have become duller as the 
proceedings have become more and more legalised and subject to intricate and confusing 
procedure (after all, it would have been hard to become bored in a 17
th
 century 20 minute 
trial). This means that journalists must undertake what Bourdieu calls the ―search for the 
sensation and the spectacular‖.443 To screen a trial in its entirety would arguably test the 
patience of the audience (and currently in the U.S. where trials are screened on television 
regularly, Court TV tends to add voice-overs and commentaries to the staid and dull bits of 
proceedings).  
For journalists and/or television producers editing and reframing courtroom processes is 
necessary because they are currently too convoluted and confusing and would bore the 
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audience. Bourdieu argues, however, that the journalistic justification of simply meeting 
audience expectations sidesteps how much television shapes the view of the public: ―one 
thing leads to another, and, ultimately television, which claims to record reality, creates it 
instead‖.444 As George Gerbner notes ―[t]ransporting the sights and sounds of courtroom 
behaviour into a public arena is qualitative change and not merely journalistic enrichment‖.445  
The possibility of alteration through editing or re-framing is noted in the Federal Court of 
Australia‘s TV in Courts report. Recommendation 20 states that:  
It is recommended that as the electronic media's capacity to inform and educate is best served through 
extended coverage, the Court should treat favourably or give preference to proposals for extended 
coverage over those seeking to broadcast sound bites or snippets.
446
  
The risk implied by the above recommendation is that broadcasting trial excerpts out of 
context can potentially mislead the audience as to how proceedings are conducted. Media 
theorist Douglas Kellner argues that broadcasting of a trial, whether in part or as a whole, 
skews the proceedings for the viewer. Writing about the O.J. Simpson trial, he outlines ―the 
triumph of media spectacle over reality and the immense power of media culture to define 
what is real, important, and worthy of attention‖.447 Where Auslander argues that we exist in a 
―televisual culture‖, Kellner argues that instead it is ―technocapitalist‖.448 For Kellner, the 
inability to disregard the economic drives of a relentless mass media culture presents a 
fundamental disjuncture between how television can be used as a ‗conduit‘ and the reality of 
opening the door of the courtroom permanently to a form of media inextricably bound in 
economics and market share. Consequently, the search for the spectacle is an intrinsic part of 
‗sexing up‘ proceedings to enhance ratings. Bourdieu, too, argues that ―television calls for 
dramatisation in both senses of the term; it puts an event on stage, puts it in images‖.449 
In Australia, this tension between entertainment and public information was illustrated in 
1995, when the Victorian Supreme Court broadcast the sentencing of Nathan John Avent, a 
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convicted child murderer. This is one of only two occasions where broadcasting of criminal 
proceedings has occurred in Australia. Justice Kirby (who as we saw earlier is in favour of 
broadcasting courtrooms) had these reservations:   
[t]he very case which Justice Teague chose for his experiment demonstrates the risks of presenting such 
material to the community at large. Why was that case chosen? The answer is because it was so 
newsworthy, even sensational. Why was it newsworthy? Because it involved such a cruel and bloody 
crime by an unlikely perpetrator from a religious family with horrible suffering both for the families of 
the victim and of the accused. If the object were to give a window into the operations of the courts, this 
was scarcely a typical day in the life of the Australian courts. But it was a notable criminal trial in which 
there was a great deal of public interest.
450
  
Kirby‘s critique of the sensationalism of the broadcast above echoes Bourdieu‘s sentiment 
that: ―‗Current events‘ are reduced to an impassioned recital of entertaining events, which 
tend to be halfway between the human interest story and the variety show (for an exemplary 
case, take the O.J. Simpson Trial)‖.451 In other words, something modelled as an informative 
trial broadcast is in fact deliberately chosen for its sensational value. Interestingly in the 
Teague case, it was not that the journalists had edited it, but rather that the transportation of a 
courtroom process into the media realm had somehow vulgarised it. 
This sense of the vulgar is emphasised by Paul Thaler, who argues: ―By embracing the 
courtroom camera, we may have entered into a Faustian bargain, where part of the soul of our 
judicial legacy is traded for what we believe is a measure of progress‖.452 Interestingly, all of 
these writers‘ arguments reveal certain implicit beliefs about the trial. Both Douglas Kellner 
and Bourdieu state that the goals of journalism lead to an inevitable ‗theatricalisation‘ of any 
particular material (Kellner talking specifically about courtrooms, Bourdieu in more general 
terms). This brings them both in line with earlier critics who suggests that journalism brings 
with it entertainment, corrupting the serious nature of proceedings.  
 
                                                 
450
 Justice Kirby, ―Televising Court Proceedings,‖ UNSW Law Journal 18.2 (1995): 485. 
451
 Ibid., 6. ―[a] far greater number of TV-oriented moments were played out in the courtroom to a watching 
world. Besides the verbal clashes in excess of what would probably otherwise have occurred, remember fondly, 
if you will, both sides‘ inevitable efforts to dominate the ‗cliff hanger moment‘ that would leave the world in 
suspense from Friday afternoon until Monday morning. Now, that‘s television‖. Pugsley, ―This Courtroom is 
Not a Television Studio,‖ 380.  
452
 Paul Thaler, The Watchful Eye, xxiii.  
172 
 
Kellner‘s argument is also framed in Marxian terms, whereby there is an underlying real 
event affected by an insidious economic imperative. The projected outcome, for Kellner, is 
that the ‗real‘ event is replaced by the mediatised spectacle. Thaler‘s remarks also do not 
reflect on the trial as anything but a truth-seeking transcendental practice. Although it is true 
that television (in terms of broadcasting trials to the public) is part of the journalistic field and 
subject to various forms of constraint particular to that field, the same is true of the criminal 
trial as a practice of the juridical field.  
Bourdieu, examining the staging of the Olympic Games, observed that televising it involved 
a ―two-step social construction, first of the sports event, then of the media event‖.453 This two-
step construction applies here too. The criminal trial itself is a social construction and a 
cultural production. The television broadcast of the criminal trial is a production of a 
production. Although the criminal trial itself is ‗real‘, in the sense that it is the legal event, the 
dichotomy of ‗real‘ vs. ‗fake‘ used by critics of television broadcasting implies that the very 
existence of the television version threatens the integrity of the ‗real‘ trial. The television 
broadcast may not just be about public justice, but then, neither is the criminal trial.   
Journalism is frequently criticised by Bourdieu for purporting to find the ‗Truth‘ through 
‗common sense‘—in other words, Bourdieu believes journalists expect people from other 
fields to be able to justify their projects in journalistic terms, which journalists misrecognise 
as ‗common sense‘. Bourdieu argues that journalistic discourse is based on a market model 
and has little to do with stating things as they are. Rather it is ―demagogic simplification‖.454 
Yet television producers and legal practitioners share certain assumptions. Along with the 
political field, journalism and law are among the few fields which claim that their particular 
field specific version of ‗Truth‘ applies to and transcends all other fields. Legal agents make 
similar claims regarding trials to those that journalists make regarding television, expecting 
those from other fields to speak in a highly specific language (legal or journalistic) that they 
will believe to simply be ‗reason‘ or ‗common sense‘. Bourdieu‘s critique of journalistic 
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‗truth‘ as simplistic has heavy resonances for juridical truth, reminding us that both are 
constructed and field-specific.  
Although I believe that those who fear broadcasting will corrupt the courtroom overstate the 
inherent integrity of the trial process, legal fears based on the presence of cameras 
theatricalising proceedings or diminishing the court‘s decorum can better be understood as 
rooted in an understandable mistrust of a medium whose effects in the long term can only be 
speculated upon.455 Legal agents do not know the effect of broadcasting in the long-term. 
Most importantly, this medium, as a product of an external field, brings with it the 
transformative potential to affect how juridical truth is produced. The fear of entertainment or 
corruption, rather than being only a case of snobbery (where the ‗real‘ trial is messed up by 
the ‗fake‘ television), reflects deeply held beliefs as to the exclusive right of legal agents to 
determine internally how trials are conducted and received.  
Broadcasting potentially means a diminishing of regulation of a largely internally defined 
practice. As George Gerbner states: ―the basic public issue is, therefore, whether linking 
courts to television will enhance or diminish the integrity and independence of our 
administration of justice‖.456 The mixed range of acceptance of broadcasting suggests that it is 
not the technology in and of itself that is the problem, rather it is the regulation and 
implications of broadcasting trials—including how trial proceedings are interpreted by the 
public and what effect this may have on the conduct of the trial—which  disturbs legal 
agents.  
 
In Australia: Practical Obscurity  
 
The reluctance to remit legal proceedings to another field can be inferred from the current 
state of television broadcasting of trials. In the U.S., despite it being the main broadcaster of 
criminal trials throughout the world, broadcasting is in fact banned federally under Section 53 
of the Supreme Court Guidelines (this means that broadcasting is banned from federal courts 
but not necessarily state courts). There is also legislation banning cameras from courts in 
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England, Wales, Northern Ireland and some parts of Canada. In Scotland broadcasting has 
only been possible since the 1990s. The outlining of these restrictions may seem misleading, 
particularly in regard to the U.S., because, despite the federal ban, broadcasting is permitted 
in some form in 47 states. Some states have been broadcasting trial proceedings for more than 
25 years and, indeed, Americans have a whole cable television channel dedicated to trials, 
most commonly criminal proceedings, summary proceedings or small claims settlement 
courts.   
 
However, my intention is to point out that no adversarial jurisdiction has a uniform 
presumption that broadcasts take place. Rather, where broadcasting is permitted, it is allowed 
on a case-by-case application by the judge. In almost all jurisdictions public broadcasts are 
only permitted on condition that the judge retains at least some regulation over the 
transmission (such as how much is shown and when). As Stepniak points out, even in the 
U.S., which is at the forefront of broadcasting, there is deep reluctance to overturn the federal 
ban on broadcasting: 
The American experience also reveals that a lack of judicial support can in practice severely restrict the 
implications of legal rights to record, broadcast and access audio-visual recordings of proceedings. Thus, 
with few exceptions American courts continue to reject media argument seeking the recognition of a 
presumptive constitutional right to televise proceedings.
457
  
Even in limited (non-public) televising (such as the closed-circuit transmission of the 
Lockerbie trial to the victim‘s families), the courts restrict the recording of the transmission: 
no family member was able to record the proceedings to review them. It was broadcast live 
and only once. All of these provisions surrounding broadcasting detailed above suggest that 
the legal field wants to tightly regulate the transmission of trials to stop them from being used 
out of context.  
 
This is a major feature of Australia‘s experience too. Although courts such as the High Court 
of Australia have permitted live streaming over the internet, and footage has been filmed in 
most kinds of courts, including District and Supreme Courts, this has been on an ad-hoc 
basis. Australia is somewhat distinct from the other jurisdictions canvassed in this chapter 
(New Zealand, the U.S., the U.K. and Canada) primarily because it is the only one that does 
not have any constitutional provision for freedom of speech, such as is found in the U.S. First 
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Amendment, or the Canadian or New Zealand Bill of Rights. The right to an open trial is also 
not enshrined in statute (although it is such a fundamental part of common law—as it is in the 
U.K.—that this is arguably unnecessary).  
 
However, this means the terms of the debate in Australia are a little different. Because there 
is no assumed provision for a free press, or an open trial, the question of broadcasting falls 
under the laws of contempt. These laws were formulated to prevent any form of risk to the 
administration of justice and set out what practices may or may not constitute criminal 
contempt. Daniel Stepniak outlines three forms of criminal contempt he argues are at the 
heart of Australian questions regarding trial broadcasting. One is sub judice which: 
[p]rescribes that, subject to a number of important exceptions and qualifications, it is a contempt to 
publish material relating to ―pending‖ (that is, current or forthcoming) legal proceedings if that material 
has, ―as a matter of practical reality, a tendency to interfere with the course of justice‖.458  
This is the more extreme version of contempt where publication or broadcast of certain 
material would prejudice the trial, or potentially influence the outcome. Another version of 
contempt outlined by Stepniak is ―conduct which has a tendency to interfere with the 
administration of justice generally‖. That is, the argument would be that broadcasting can 
provoke excessive publicity that can affect a case and that identification of witnesses on 
television could make them less likely to testify. Even more strongly enshrined in Australian 
law (unlike the U.S.) is the principle of anonymity of the jury. Broadcasting can be seen as 
detrimental to this, as outlined below:  
While the Federal Court of Australia does not presently conduct trials by judge and jury, the televising 
of jurors in Australian courts should be prohibited. To permit electronic media coverage to show or 
otherwise identify jurors would be contrary to the policy objectives underlying current restrictions on 
media coverage of juries and would expose jurors to potential risks without enhancing the benefits of 
such coverage.
459 
 
This form of contempt also covers disclosure of private proceedings, and anything else that 
may ―undermine public confidence in the judicial process‖.460 Finally and, as Stepniak argues, 
most significantly there is ―contempt in the face of court‖ which primarily deals with 
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―improper behaviour‖ and things that may interfere with ―the conduct of judicial 
proceedings‖.461 These aspects are the ones revolving around distraction, disruption or 
dramatisation in the courtroom. Stepniak argues that our strong contempt laws and absence of 
any bill of rights have significantly discouraged media from pursuing television broadcasts 
and have led to a prevailing ―presumption against broadcasting‖ in Australia.462 None of these 
attendant problems are issues that I am disputing; indeed they are important reservations 
about the consequences and regulation of broadcasting. However, as Daniel Stepniak notes, 
this does not necessarily justify a presumption against broadcasting, as it is precisely 
regulation that would enable the transmission of proceedings without violating a fair trial.  
What I am arguing is that there is more at stake than has been outlined in this debate. The 
trial is predicated on live proceedings. Criminal trials, if they are broadcast, enter into an 
economy of reproduction, where they can subsequently be edited, reproduced, and altered. 
This runs counter to the entire structure of the trial, predicated on the unrepeatability of live 
proceedings, memory and immediacy. Although trials can now be broadcast ‗live‘, this is a 
different kind of live to that of the courtroom, which signifies being there in a literal and 
embodied sense. Live in television terms stresses immediacy (―live coverage‖) but does not 
account for the remoteness of the audience from the place where events are transpiring. The 
audience‘s very remoteness—the question of how the event is received and interpreted—is a 
major reason for distrust on the part of legal agents. The limited/limiting nature of live 
presence, the fact that it disappears, and the fact that almost no one attends the courtroom is 
actually somewhat of a safety mechanism that protects proceedings from being disseminated, 
recorded or altered. 
 
Here we arrive at the paradox of the closed/open trial. As noted repeatedly throughout this 
thesis, although theoretically the great strength of the adversarial trial is its openness to the 
public, in terms of understanding it is almost completely closed to laypersons. In a 2003 
speech about the internet and the right to a fair trial, Chief Justice of the NSW Supreme 
Court, Jim Spigelman, argued that the tension between the right to an open trial and the fair 
trial revolved around the notion of ―practical obscurity‖. That is, that total transparency of 
proceedings is not always the optimum means of conducting a trial and can indeed impair 
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this.463 Justice Spigelman used as an example sexual assault trials and the trauma of a 
complainant confronting their attacker in open court. Many legal commentators have pointed 
out that the open trial, or ―open justice‖, is not perceived as an end in itself. As Justice Kirby 
pointed out in a 1991 appeal:  
Three things at least may be said about the open conduct of the courts. First, it can and does cause pain 
and loss to individuals. Secondly, the open conduct of the courts is not an end in itself: the principle is 
adopted because it is seen as a means of achieving the fundamental end, the proper administration of 
justice. And, thirdly, what is to be achieved is the proper administration of justice but with the least 
harm to those who, in the course of it, will have harm inflicted on them. The issue in the present case is 
how this can be achieved.
464
 
Justice Spigelman used the term ―practical obscurity‖ to describe the necessary gap between 
open justice and protection of trial participants.
465
 I am, however, employing this term in a 
different sense, to describe the experience of attending a courtroom for a layperson. The 
opacity of proceedings belies their apparent open nature. ―Practical obscurity‖ marks, I would 
contend, the gap between popular belief in the transparency of proceedings and how far it 
falls short in practice. The reason why journalists may edit proceedings is not simply a 
sensationalising process; it is also a means of translating an obscure, complex practice to an 
audience even though they are theoretically meant to be already able to understand it.
466
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Broadcasting of trials does not just over-simplify proceedings; it potentially draws attention 
to this gap between practice and public understanding. As Daniel Stepniak puts it:  
Technology and in particular the publication of audio-visual recordings of court proceedings may also 
serve to redress the lack of openness inherent in proceedings in which the proceedings revolve around 
written testimony and legal submissions. Deeming paper trials as unsuitable for televising, in that the 
viewer would experience great difficulty in following proceedings in which the bulk of testimony is 
tendered in documents rather than being presented in person, is tantamount to conceding that such 
proceedings are not subject to public scrutiny, as members of the public who attend such proceedings 
would experience the same difficulties as viewers of broadcasts.
467
  
Stepniak is talking specifically about trials that involve heavy use of depositions. However, I 
believe this lack of openness remains true even for those practices that revolve around oral 
evidence testing. Public attendance in courtrooms and public understanding of the process are 
not the same thing. As Chief Justice of Western Australia, Wayne Martin expresses it: 
―simply leaving the door of the courtroom open is insufficient, of itself, to provide 
meaningful public access to the proceedings in that Court‖.468 
We return now to where this chapter began; the open trial—what it is and who it is for. We 
have seen already that many legal agents advocate greater transparency through broadcasting 
so as to enhance public understanding of legal process. Many legal agents particularly want 
the public‘s legal understanding to increase. Yet there is a risk involved in enabling this. 
Notwithstanding his clear dislike of the journalistic field, Bourdieu argues that growing 
journalistic influence presents a threat to the internal autonomy of various fields. In other 
words, agents are increasingly expected to justify their work in the media, which takes on its 
‗surrogate for the public‘ role. As Justice Spigelman remarks in a keynote speech, the relative 
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autonomy of the juridical field is increasingly being challenged by external influence via the 
introduction of private-sector managerial discourse revolving around ―throughput‖ and 
―service‖:  
There is a clear movement towards managerial judging—the direct involvement of judges in the 
preparation for and the conduct of proceedings. This is in part motivated by new pressures for 
accountability as to how courts spend public resources. Nevertheless, there are very real limits on the 
extent to which such involvement can be taken, consistently with the principles of open justice.
469
 
He goes on to point out that:  
There is no doubt that a much greater volume of cases could be handled by a specific number of judges 
if they could sit in camera, not be constrained by obligations of procedural fairness or the need to 
provide a manifestly fair trial, and not have to publish reasons for their decisions. Even greater 
‗efficiency‘ would be quickly apparent if judges had made up their minds before the case began. There 
are places where such a mode of decision-making has been, and indeed is being, followed. We do not 
regard them as role models. Open justice does not provide the most efficient mode of dispute resolution. 
Nor, indeed, does democracy provide the most efficient mode of government.
470
 
Spigelman discusses the increased bureaucratic emphasis on quantitative measurement of 
―service‖ by the courts. This means, as Spigelman implies, that instead of legal agents being 
able to largely control the flow of information (to some extent, as the higher the profile of a 
trial is, the more the press may be involved), public expectations and the press can fuel a 
different flow of narrative. In the case of public broadcasting of a trial, the ‗open‘ nature of 
the information means that legal agents may forfeit a degree of control over the reception of a 
trial. The public may make determinations of guilt or innocence based on television 
broadcasts and this journalistic pressure will be brought to bear on legal agents The 
broadcasting of trials, whether live or delayed, could raise questions as to how judges and 
juries make their decisions. Whilst public reception is highly unlikely to affect the outcome 
of a specific trial, the public and media can influence how future trial proceedings are 
conducted. 
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Conclusion: Mediatisation without Cameras 
 
As I have outlined throughout this thesis ‗juridical truth‘ is a field-specific construction. 
Legal language (like journalistic language) stresses the passive, neutral and universal. 
However the stylisation of legal rhetoric, a result of centuries of professionalising and relative 
self-containment, has led to a significant and (as Bourdieu reminds us) far from accidental 
gap between the layperson and the legal agent. This gap is needed to maintain the authority of 
the trial, where a judge‘s sentence based on a jury‘s verdict, must be perceived as something 
that is almost entirely free of personal bias, or broad interpretation. Rather the judge‘s 
sentencing and remarks must be believed to be based on an examination of a coherent set of 
texts that is drawn on during the trial process to adduce the just outcome. 
 
The public and legal agents can more easily maintain belief in the criminal trial if they view it 
as a transcendent and independent practice. This is not because it is, but because they need to 
believe that it is. In the end, belief is what is at stake. Legal behaviour is not above reproach, 
but a relative autonomy is necessary for any profession to sustain itself as a viable practice. 
As Bourdieu argues: 
The juridical field is not what it thinks it is. It is not a pure world, free of concessions or politics or the 
economy. But its image of purity produces absolutely real social effects, first of all, on the very 
individuals whose job it is to declare the law. But what would happen to judges, understood as more or 
less sincere incarnations of a collective hypocrisy, if it became widely accepted that, far from obeying 
transcendent, universal verities and values, they are thoroughly subject, like all other social actors, to 
constraint such as those placed on them […] by the pressure of economic necessity or the seduction of 
media success?
471
 
Broadcasting can redress the lack of openness in proceedings. This can foster greater public 
understanding and confidence in the judicial process. However, excessive scrutiny of trial 
proceedings can draw attention to the field specific model of dominance and control 
unconsciously adopted by legal practitioners, as outlined throughout this thesis. Legal agents 
are gatekeepers between the public and ‗The Law‘ and they provide a crucial buffer which 
helps to maintain faith in what is in fact a partial and at times problematic system. Bourdieu 
argues, discussing the political field: 
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The usual buffers (not necessarily democratic) against these pressures are linked to the relative 
autonomy of the political field. Absent this autonomy, we are left with a revenge model, precisely the 
model against which the juridical and even political model of justice was established in the first place.
472
   
Ironically, the very openness that trials rely on is in fact predicated on disappearance. The 
buffer between belief and practice (―practical obscurity‖) is maintained through the 
disappearance of live performance (what performance theorist Peggy Phelan calls its essential 
nature).473 The debate about broadcasting writ large is a question of balance: how much 
transparency is beneficial to aid public understanding, and how much is counterproductive to 
the interests of legal agents within the juridical field? Legal agents must (and do want to) 
retain and increase public confidence in legal proceedings. Yet the relative autonomy of the 
juridical field, sustained by live performance in the trial, must also be maintained to protect 
public confidence in the criminal trial and the legal agents who conduct it.  
 
I end this chapter by reflecting on the concluding irony of this debate. So many articles, 
books and words are dedicated to the study of minutiae around this topic—trying to 
determine precisely how behaviour or public expectation may alter because of broadcasting. 
Yet there is an enormous omission in these studies. They tend to disregard the fact that the 
courtroom is already heavily mediatised without the presence of cameras. Whether or not 
trials are broadcast, public expectations surrounding courtrooms are already formed by 
television. Jurors and trial participants watch television. In a televisual culture where people 
no longer attend trials as a form of popular entertainment, many people form their images and 
ideas of law courts and trials based upon television, whether that be Judge Judy, CSI, Law 
and Order, or any one of the numerous legal franchises.   
 
Discussions as to the merits of trial broadcasting have operated in a climate that has changed 
significantly. In the 1940s, broadcasting of trials may well have been the only real 
televised/broadcast information as to trial practice. Yet today, there are countless television 
shows, ranging from wholly fictional to nominally ‗real‘ that deal with criminal trial 
proceedings. These saturate televisions in the U.S., Australia and the U.K. Broadcasting of 
courts is consequently only a small fragment of a much larger phenomenon of turning 
criminal trial processes into television entertainment.  
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Keeping trial courts away from mediatised influence is a lost battle. Whilst the processes of 
the trial may valorise liveness and its symbolic weight we are, as Auslander observed, living 
in a mediatised world.474 As George Gerbner points out: ―[t]hough television is only one 
source of citizen‘s knowledge about courts and law, it may well be the single most common 
and pervasive source of shared information and images‖.475 Whether or not cameras are 
present in courtrooms is largely irrelevant when we seek to determine the effect of television 
on courtrooms. Leaving aside fictional shows, every trial has the opportunity to be reported 
by the journalists who frequently cover courtroom proceedings. In addition, there is the 
familiar presence in Australia of the courtroom sketch artist (as photography remains banned 
in courtrooms). High profile trials usually become a media event with or without specific 
broadcast access. If there is broadcasting, television shows will edit them substantially. If 
there is no broadcast, television producers will either go as far as to ‗create‘ a courtroom or 
simply create many shows pivoting around the trial, be they panels of legal experts, or review 
of the proceedings in court that day.  
‗Trial by media‘ can come about without broadcast excerpts from the proceedings itself to 
achieve this. Indeed, Daniel Stepniak argues that Lindy Chamberlain‘s hostile reception by 
the Australian public could have been countered by broadcasting sections of the trial.476 As he 
notes: 
Keeping cameras out of the Chamberlain inquest, trial and appeals proved insufficient to avoid trial by 
media […] it could be argued that the reason why so many Australians remain convinced about Lindy 
Chamberlain‘s guilt […] is precisely because the public had been prevented from seeing and hearing the 
proceedings for themselves.
477
   
Stepniak suggests broadcasting would have countered the surrounding media presumption of 
her guilt. 
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Trial participants have long been responding to altered expectations as to trial behaviour. The 
evidence for behavioural influence is already there, in the common experience of boredom 
entering the courtroom; the lack of ‗editing‘ in a real trial means most people are unprepared 
for how long and dull criminal trials can be. Juries and trial participants are also inculcated to 
be aware of how judges and lawyers behave, based on actors playing judges and lawyers. 
This has arguably led to a shifting of behaviour on the part of legal agents to respond to what 
a jury wants, as being able to influence the jury is the major goal of the advocate in the 
adversarial system. Judges and lawyers may well be responding to television shows 
themselves and are certainly not above the influence of the mass media. The somewhat 
precious approach that agents within the juridical field take to preserve internal autonomy 
overlooks the extensive cross-fertilisation that has already taken place.  
In the next chapter, I explore another form of mediatisation: the use of remote Closed Circuit 
Television Testimony (CCTV) as a replacement for a live witness. As CCTV testimony can 
replace all aspects of evidence testing, except for trial participants being in the same place at 
the same time, I will show how the development of this technology has led to legal agents 
articulating for the first time what they believe to be the value of the ‗live‘ trial. Examining 
the most commonly cited examples legal agents use to defend the trial as paradigmatically 
live space—confrontation and demeanour assessment—I will interrogate the  premium placed 
on the live presence of participants in the courtroom as well as how and why the live trial is 
believed to be safer and fairer.  
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Closed Circuit Television Testimony: Liveness and Truth-telling 
 
 
 
 
 
A witness who gives evidence orally demonstrates, for good or ill, more about his or her credibility than a 
witness whose evidence is given in documentary form. Oral evidence is public; written evidence may not be. 
Oral evidence gives to the trial the atmosphere which, though intangible, is often critical to the jury‘s estimate of 
the witness. 
Butera v DPP (Victoria) (1987) 
478
 
 
 
The legal arena may be one of the few remaining cultural contexts in which live performance is still considered 
essential. 
            Philip Auslander, Liveness 
479
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Introduction 
 
The live presence of all trial participants in a shared space is a longstanding feature of the 
adversarial criminal jury trial. Along with this longstanding practice is the equally 
longstanding belief that live presence facilitates truth-seeking. Going back as far as the trials 
by ordeal where a witness‘ body was actually ‗read‘ to reveal the truth, live presence has 
been believed, in various ways, to make the criminal trial safer and fairer. These ideas 
currently most commonly revolve around the concepts of demeanour and confrontation, 
where the presence of bodies and their interaction will help indicate to the jury the truth of 
the matter. These beliefs are, however, largely implicit and generally vague: how and why 
live presence may be valuable has not been clearly articulated until recently. The advent of 
mediatised technology into the courtroom in the 20
th
 century has led to a renewed attempt to 
account for the value of live performance.  
 
In this chapter, I examine how arguments about the value of live performance (whether or not 
the term ‗performance‘ is actually invoked) have been pivotal in debates about the use of 
closed-circuit television testimony (CCTV). I begin by defining CCTV testimony and 
examining its current use in courtrooms as a means of mediation for a ‗vulnerable witness‘; 
that is, a witness who, in the view of the court, would be likely to find traditional modes of 
delivering testimony overly traumatic for a variety of reasons.480 I argue that the introduction 
of CCTV testimony has posed a challenge to deep-seated beliefs about the link between live 
confrontation and truth-telling, as CCTV testimony is able to replace all aspects of the fair 
trial (including its need to be open) with the sole exception of the absence of a witness‘ body. 
This has provoked to legal debate as to what is at stake in the live presence of bodies together 
in the same place. 
 
Using performance theory, I will analyse these debates and discuss the contested meaning of 
‗liveness‘ and its value, arguing that the legal emphasis on empirical evidence to ‗prove‘ the 
                                                 
480
 As I will outline, these reasons include fear of confronting their accuser and the potential of being harassed 
from the gallery.  
186 
 
value of live presence through various studies is problematic as it overlooks the importance 
of belief. As I conclude, it is also these beliefs revolving around live presence that sustain the 
symbolic violence and coercion involved in the performance of tradition.  
 
The Live Trial 
 
In 2006 Peter Underwood, then Chief Justice of the Tasmanian Supreme Court, argued that 
the live trial, where all participants must gather in the same place at the same time, was an 
outdated, costly and unnecessary historical inheritance: 
The process of a modern trial is not something that has been designed, or recently redesigned, to achieve 
the best result for parties in dispute. Rather, its adversarial nature and characteristics of continuity and 
orality have arisen from an historic scenario that, by and large, no longer exists. Yet as I have observed, 
curiously, this process is seldom questioned.
481
 
For Underwood, this emphasis on orality should be set aside as this was primarily for the 
benefit of an illiterate jury, and is now outmoded. It would be far better, Underwood argues, 
to use depositions more freely, which would allow faster, cheaper resolutions of disputes. 
Yet, despite Underwood‘s criticism of the live adversarial trial, he makes it quite clear that he 
is talking about non-criminal matters only: ―I venture to suggest that it is high time the 
process of the trial in civil disputes is reconsidered in the light of today‘s needs‖.482 
Underwood does not claim that this would be appropriate in the criminal trial and does not 
explain his reasons for this discrepancy.  
 
Underwood‘s paper thus echoes a longstanding belief amongst both legal agents and 
laypersons that live bodies sharing the same space make the criminal trial safer, and facilitate 
access to the truth. Like Underwood‘s omission as to why this is so, statutory evidence for 
this belief is available only by implication in Australia. The value of live presence can be 
inferred from the rules regarding the use of depositions in place of witnesses in criminal and 
non-criminal matters. In non-criminal cases, a witness can submit a deposition in lieu of 
being there if they are living more than a distance that would cause ―undue‖ difficulties in 
Australia (or more than 100 miles away in the U.S.). However, in criminal trials the only 
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justification for non-attendance of a witness to give live testimony is if they are either dead or 
dying.483 Within the court rules, no explanation is given for this discrepancy between non-
criminal and criminal process. However, the NSW Law Reform Commission, when 
investigating the rule against hearsay, commented that: 
[b]ecause liberty and reputation are at stake, it is accepted that the law should be tender to the rights of 
the accused, and be more ready to risk the acquittal of the guilty than the conviction of the innocent.  A 
well-known example is the higher standard of proof demanded in criminal cases.
484
 
Any discrepancy between criminal and non-criminal proceedings can be attributed to this 
need for a higher standard of proof. In criminal proceedings, ―the court is not to find the case 
of the prosecution proved unless it is satisfied that it has been proved beyond reasonable 
doubt‖, whereas in civil cases ―the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied 
that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities‖.485 In criminal trials, then, a 
witness‘ live presence is a means of obtaining/ensuring a higher standard of proof. 
Adversarial criminal procedure consequently implicitly suggests a preference for a witness‘ 
live presence. Although in non-criminal matters this is not deemed necessary, once the stakes 
are higher, a witness‘ live presence is seen as essential to facilitate a fair outcome in an 
adversarial criminal trial.486  
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The vagueness of these beliefs is referenced in the 1987 case, Butera v. DPP, cited in the 
epigraph that opens this chapter. The judges in this case seek to explain the preference for 
live oral testimony, by referring to the ―atmosphere which, though intangible, is often critical 
to the jury‘s estimate of the witness‖.487 Here we see quite clearly that although the judges use 
the term ‗oral‘, denoting speech, they are clearly talking about presence and performance, as 
they refer to the importance of the ―intangible‖ atmosphere which relies on the gathering of 
bodies together at the same time.  
 
In the U.S.A., the value of the ‗live‘ trial is enshrined in statute. The Confrontation Clause in 
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favour, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
488
  
The ‗confrontation clause‘ outlines the basic requirements of trial, the most fundamental of 
which is that it be ‗open‘ so that the accused can confront his or her accusers. Here again, 
however, the U.S. Constitution does not spell out what the link between liveness and truth-
telling is. We can ascertain from the above, however, that both Australian and American 
criminal trial procedure strongly suggest that gathering people together in the courtroom is an 
important means of ensuring a fair trial. The most likely explanation for the ellipses in all 
jurisdictions surrounding articulation of the value of live presence is that until recently there 
has been no need to account for it. As Underwood acknowledged, live trials are an inherited 
tradition and there have been no serious challenges to their existence. This has changed in the 
second half of the 20
th
 century with the advent of CCTV testimony.  
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CCTV testimony is where a witness (including a complainant) testifies remotely, rather than 
being physically present in the courtroom. This remote testimony is transmitted live into the 
courtroom where a screen is placed.489 Remote testimony is a two-way transmission, where 
the witness can also see the courtroom.490 Advocates do not share the same space with 
witnesses, rather evidence-in-chief and cross-examination take place by advocates addressing 
the witness via a screen in the courtroom. CCTV testimony is used in situations where the 
judge has decided (on evidence argued by the prosecution, excepting the rare jurisdictions 
where it is assumed) that the presence of trial participants together in the same room may 
present impediments to a fair outcome.491 These impediments most often revolve around the 
concept of the ‗vulnerable witness‘. The vulnerable witness is a person deemed by the court 
as one who would be likely to find the space of the courtroom potentially traumatic to the 
extent that it would adversely affect his/her ability to give evidence.492 The most common 
usage of CCTV testimony occurs in Family Courts, and most rules regarding vulnerable 
witnesses extend from the situation of children as witnesses.493 
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The potential trauma of the courtroom is legally defined as the stress for a complainant of 
sharing the same space as their alleged attacker.494 There is also the possibility of deliberate 
intimidation of a witness by the accused. As a 1997 Australian Law Reform Commission 
report into child witnesses, Seen and Not Heard: Priority for Children in the Legal Process, 
noted:  
Child witnesses are particularly fearful of confronting the accused when they come to court. For many 
child victim witnesses, this may be the first time they have seen this person since the disclosure of the 
alleged offences. The Inquiry was told of instances where the accused attempted to intimidate the child 
witness by making threatening faces or gestures in court.
495
 
Another acknowledged source of stress is ―the trauma of a courtroom appearance‖.496 Legal 
research suggests that all of these factors can potentially cause a ‗revictimisation‘ of a 
complainant through the trial process. CCTV testimony is posited as a way in which 
vulnerable witnesses are still able to give evidence cogently, without threat and the 
concomitant stress that may affect their testimony adversely. 
 
Psychologist Louise Ellison points out in The Adversarial Process and the Vulnerable 
Witness: ―This represents a critical acceptance that in some cases traditional methods of proof 
taking and testing may militate against receipt of the best evidence potentially available‖.497 
The existence of CCTV testimony acknowledges that the circumstances of the live trial can 
be traumatic for some trial participants. Yet the term ‗vulnerable witness‘ demonstrates that 
legal agents frame this resultant trauma (the pressure through confrontation) as a shortcoming 
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of the witness, not the trial process itself. A trial participant‘s weakness or ‗vulnerability‘ 
makes him or (usually) her unsuitable to the trial process.498 As such, they are exceptional, 
and CCTV testimony is a special means to ‗work around‘ them. By defining certain witnesses 
as ‗exceptional‘, what Ellison terms ―traditional methods of proof-testing‖ escape scrutiny. 
 
Consequently, CCTV testimony is only used in ‗special circumstances‘. Yet, as Chief Justice 
Underwood points out, live trials are extremely costly and are often delayed to allow for the 
extensive organisation involved in gathering everyone together. Criminal proceedings, when 
they do finally begin, are estimated to cost around $AUS 20,000 a day.499 A greater use of 
CCTV testimony could allow trial participants to testify remotely and reduce significantly the 
difficulties in organising trial participants‘ presence, saving time and money in the long-
term.500 So why is CCTV testimony only permissible in exceptional circumstances? What is 
the value of the live trial?  
 
Up until the 20
th
 century, the necessity of a live or open trial was ostensibly so that witnesses, 
jury and judges could see and be seen, hear and be heard. The challenge of CCTV testimony 
is that it offers an alternative that no one could have foreseen: a situation where a witness can 
see and be seen, hear and be heard immediately without being physically present in the 
courtroom. The witness is still under oath and must still account for his/her evidence. He or 
she must be in a designated place at a specific time. All that differs is the absence of his/her 
body from the courtroom and other trial participants.  
So how much is the live trial to do with bodies sharing the same space at the same time? Can 
CCTV testimony replace this, and if not, what happens between trial participants in person 
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and in the courtroom that could not happen any other way? As I argue throughout this 
chapter, these questions would never have been raised without the possibility of mediatisation 
as a means of replacement of the live witness. This echoes Auslander‘s claim regarding the 
concept of liveness. Auslander‘s relational approach, arguing that liveness cannot have 
meaning or value except in opposition to ‗mediatised‘, is supported by the fact that the legal 
understanding of the live trial only becomes a subject of debate in the face of CCTV 
testimony.501 The advent of CCTV testimony has led to articulation of beliefs surrounding the 
link between live confrontation and truth-telling.502  
Whilst I believe Auslander is correct in asserting that the presence of mediatisation has 
provoked discussion as to the value of ‗the live‘, mediatisation has not created the legal value 
of the live as a by-product. Beliefs surrounding the live in the history of legal practice are not 
entirely new, and neither are they historically static. The shifting of belief or practice is part 
of the evolution of the criminal trial. Throughout adversarial legal history, the practice of the 
live trial has remained consistent, whilst conscious belief in its purpose has shifted. 
Following Auslander‘s proviso that the live must exist in relation to something else (and has 
no immanent or transcendent meaning), I argue that prior to mediatisation the ‗live‘  in the 
criminal trial was valued in opposition to that which is written and that which is done behind 
closed doors.503 Conversely, the belief in the value of the ‗open‘ or ‗live‘ trial has stayed 
while trial practices have changed. For example, as outlined in the previous chapter, the 
specific literacy required to navigate a contemporary trial process arguably means that the 
present-day trial is less easily understood by a layperson than in the 18
th
 or 19
th
 century. In 
this respect, there is a case to be made that the courtroom is not, in fact, ‗open‘ in the sense 
that the common law intends.  
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In the next section, I examine the beliefs held by legal agents about the value of the live trial. 
Because CCTV testimony does not necessarily interfere with the ‗open‘ trial (because all 
witnesses can see and be seen, hear and be heard), the value of the ‗live‘ for agents within the 
juridical field has altered. The new values of the ‗live‘ involve ‗confrontation‘ and 
‗demeanour assessment‘. As I will argue, these terms can be defined in performative 
discourse as embodiment and presence. I will show how these beliefs are vital for the 
maintenance of the adversarial criminal trial while at the same time facilitating and 
perpetuating the performance of tradition.  
 
Positive Intimidation 
 
In the year 2000, The NSW Attorney General‘s Office released People with an Intellectual 
Disability. This report stated that: 
The criminal justice system assumes that witnesses will not be unduly intimidated by the court process, 
otherwise the meaning and weight to be properly attributed to their evidence may be distorted. It is 
increasingly recognised, however, that some witnesses may be unusually intimidated by the court setting 
or the presence of the accused (and therefore disadvantaged) when giving evidence. Such witnesses 
often include children (particularly where crimes of sexual and/or physical violence are concerned), 
those with an intellectual disability, sexual assault victims, and those from minority cultural and/or 
linguistic backgrounds.
504
 
This report, while technically dealing with vulnerable witnesses, also tells us that legal agents 
openly acknowledge that the courtroom is always a stressful place for a witness to some 
extent, and that this is a necessary part of the process. It is only problematic if the witness is 
―unduly‖ intimidated. That is, general intimidation of a witness aids the truth-telling 
mechanisms of the adversarial criminal trial. This ‗useful‘ intimidation is brought about 
through the ―atmosphere‖ of a courtroom, which is intended (as outlined in the second 
chapter of this thesis) to impress upon the witness the solemnity and authority of ‗The Law‘. 
Positive intimidation is also the primary means of evidence-testing. Cross-examination is 
specifically designed to challenge and discomfort a witness. When a witness undergoes cross-
examination successfully (i.e. when they maintain their credibility and do not make any 
admissions), it is more likely that he/she will be believed: ―it has been suggested that the 
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elimination of some of the trauma of giving evidence (through CCTV) may unwittingly 
remove the distress which is perceived as supporting the veracity of the witness‘s 
evidence‖.505 The passive structure of the sentence means it is not clear who is perceiving 
distress as supporting veracity, whether this is legal agents themselves or if it is what they 
think the jury thinks. Regardless of this, the value of live presence implied here is that of the 
pressure of confrontation, whereby the pressure created through the live trial is more likely to 
lead to the truth.  
 
In America, this belief in truth through pressure is expressed in Maryland v Craig in 1990 in 
the U.S. Supreme Court. In this case, the defendant had been found guilty of child sexual 
assault at his initial trial. The complainant had given testimony through one-way CCTV 
transmission, where the court could see the complainant, but she could not see them. This 
was because, her counsel argued, the complainant was a vulnerable witness. The defendant‘s 
conviction was then overturned by the Maryland Appeal Court, who argued that his right to 
face-to-face confrontation had been violated. The Supreme Court judges, however, reinstated 
the defendant‘s conviction, confirming CCTV testimony as acceptable in the exceptional 
circumstances of a vulnerable witness.  
 
What is interesting about Maryland v Craig is that although the Supreme Court reinstated the 
conviction, they also made explicit that they too believed that the Confrontation Clause in the 
U.S. Constitution (the sixth amendment) was literal and that therefore CCTV testimony could 
only act as a substitute in exceptional cases involving vulnerable witnesses. Although CCTV 
testimony was permissible, it was certainly not preferable. The Supreme Court argued that 
the ‗ideal‘ trial involves literal confrontation, as prescribed in the sixth amendment, despite 
the drafters of this amendment not being able to foresee such a technological development as 
remote, but ‗live‘ testimony.   
 
A dissenting judge in Maryland v Craig, Justice Antonin Scalia, took this literal 
interpretation further, arguing that the value of live testimony was so important that CCTV 
was unacceptable and always contravened a defendant‘s right to a fair trial.506 Scalia quoted 
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from an earlier Supreme Court decision in Coy v Iowa. Here again we see in legal precedent 
the value of positive intimidation that the adversarial model of juridical truth relies on:  
Unwillingness cannot be a valid excuse under the Confrontation Clause, whose very object is to place 
the witness under the sometimes hostile glare of the defendant. That face-to-face presence may, 
unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same token it may confound and 
undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult.
507
 
The case of Coy v Iowa, another sexual assault trial, revolved around the use of screens. In 
this case, the right of a vulnerable witness to use a screen contravened a defendant‘s right to a 
fair trial because the witness was literally hidden from the defendant‘s gaze. Scalia‘s use of 
this extract suggests that he makes no distinction between CCTV testimony and invisibility. 
If a witness is not physically present in the courtroom, they cannot be ‗seen‘. For Scalia, the 
pressure of confrontation puts the onus on witnesses to tell the truth. In other words, placing a 
witness in a court opposite the person they are accusing of a crime is an important part of 
producing juridical truth. He clarified further: the Supreme Court Decision in Maryland v 
Craig ―[is wrong because] the Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence; it 
guarantees specific trial procedures that were thought to assure reliable evidence, undeniably 
among which was ‗face-to-face‘ confrontation‖.508  
 
For Scalia the literal confrontation prescribed by the 6
th
 Amendment in the U.S. Constitution 
is insurmountable, not because a witness‘s live presence ensures a fair trial, but rather 
because, like the hearsay rule in Australia outlined earlier, a witness‘ live presence is a means 
of facilitating this fair trial. For Scalia, when a witness is present, this does not mean that he 
or she will tell the truth, but rather that all the circumstances necessary to ensure the best 
possible evidence are upheld. Again, like the Australian hearsay rule, a witness‘ live presence 
is required in keeping with the ‗higher standard of proof‘ of criminal trials.  
 
Justice Scalia, in effect, is arguing that in a live trial something may happen that could not 
happen any other way (as opposed to will happen). Scalia‘s attitude is also reminiscent of the 
citation I opened this chapter with, where the judges of the High Court of Australia stress the 
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―intangible‖ atmosphere of a trial. These references to ‗possibilities‘ and ‗atmosphere‘ have 
strong echoes in performance theory where part of the valorisation of the live revolves around 
chance and suspense. A live trial, where witnesses are put ‗on the spot‘ creates a fertile and 
charged environment where ‗anything could happen‘ (in Phelan‘s performance-related terms, 
a ―maniacally charged present‖), and for Scalia and the Australian High Court, these 
circumstances are what facilitates truth-telling, not a guileless belief that humans standing 
face-to-face are inherently more honest.509  
 
The rest of the U.S. Supreme Court concurs with Scalia that confrontation does not have a 
magic effect in and of itself, but rather helps optimise a fair trial. As Richard Friedman notes:   
The Confrontation Clause is not a constitutionalisation of the law of hearsay, with all its oddities. It does 
not speak of reliability or of exceptions. The confrontation right reflects a belief, central to our system of 
criminal justice, that a witness against a criminal defendant should give testimony under prescribed 
conditions—under oath, in the presence of the accused, subject to cross-examination, and, if reasonably 
possible, in open court. And this right should be recognized—as the language of the Confrontation 
Clause suggests—as categorical and not subject to exceptions.510 
However, of the members of the Supreme Court in the U.S., only Justice Scalia sees CCTV 
testimony as interfering with the ‗anything can happen‘ circumstances of the live trial. For 
the rest of the Supreme Court, effective cross-examination can be done remotely in the 
exceptional circumstance of a vulnerable witness: ―the majority concluded that the 
defendant‘s interest in face-to-face confrontation must give way to the state‘s interest in 
protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in the courtroom‖.511  
These beliefs in the U.S. are shared by Australian legal agents, as demonstrated by the High 
Court of Australia decision. In Australia, too, the live trial supposedly facilitates the best 
means of cross-examination and consequently ensures the ‗best‘ evidence. Australian studies 
into CCTV testimony draw on these U.S. debates and reach similar conclusions although, 
once again, Australia has considerably less experience in using this technology than the U.S. 
and this has consequently limited, to some extent, debates around specific Australian usage of 
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this technology. Eilis Magner, an Australian legal academic specializing in Evidence Law, 
notes that effective cross-examination, in whatever guise is deemed suitable, is seen as the 
key to a fair trial.512 This is reflected in the hearsay rule, whereby lack of the opportunity for 
cross-examination of testimony will usually lead to exclusion of this evidence from trial.513  
This is also evidenced by the rules surrounding the admissibility of videotape deposition. 
Currently in multiple jurisdictions, a child‘s evidence-in-chief may be given via pre-recorded 
videotape.514 However, the child must be available to be called for cross-examination. This 
cross-examination can be conducted either via video-link, or viva voce in the courtroom.515 
The fair trial then comes down to the importance of live cross-examination. This involves the 
spontaneity of a witness‘s immediate response, and a privileging of the immediate evidence 
as being a more reliable indicator of the truth than, for example, a written statement.516  
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As Jeremy Gans and Andrew Palmer note in Australian Principles of Evidence:  
This preference for oral testimony—which is not shared by civil [non-adversarial] law jurisdictions—is 
probably based upon some or all of the following (questionable) beliefs: 
- A person is more likely to tell the truth if he or she testifies on oath, and subject to the threat of 
prosecution for perjury proceedings; 
- Any falsehoods or inaccuracies in a person‘s account are more likely to be exposed in the person is 
subjected to cross-examination; and 
- The tribunal of fact will be better placed to decide whether or not the person is telling the truth if the 
person is in court so that his or her demeanour can be assessed.
517
  
This suggests that legal agents (excepting Scalia) believe the ‗anything can happen‘ 
circumstances are achieved most effectively through the body of the advocate and the witness 
sharing the same space. Confrontation, then, is largely about being put ‗on the spot‘ or ‗in the 
hot seat‘, relying on this kind of pressure to make a witness less likely to lie, or more likely to 
reveal themselves as lying. There remains a deep-seated belief, at least in criminal matters, 
not only that ―live confrontation can somehow give rise to the truth in ways that recorded 
representations cannot‖, but also that live confrontation is superior to remote, if immediate, 
testimony.518 This is at least partially because construction of adversarial juridical truth pivots 
around utilizing the coercive powers of courts, and placing bodies in the courtroom facilitates 
this.519  
 
As observed previously, although this coercion is most obvious in the case of a defendant, it 
is not limited to them. Louise Ellison states that ―additional assurances of reliability are 
assumed to stem from the oath, the observation of a declarant‘s demeanour, public scrutiny, 
and (to a lesser degree) the solemnity and officialty of the courtroom‖.520 Although Ellison 
states that the ―solemnity‖ of the courtroom only affects reliability ―to a lesser degree‖ 
compared to oath-taking, demeanour assessment and public scrutiny, the aims above are in 
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fact inseparable. Witnesses embody trial imperatives, their habitus triggered by the external 
circumstances in which they find themselves. This has bearing on their testimony, and it is 
the overall effect that allows legal agents to believe that a defendant/witness will be more 
likely to tell the truth in the space of the courtroom (the ―intangible‖ atmosphere of the 
courtroom). Yet a witness being more truthful has no effect if they are not perceived to be so 
by the trier of fact. Consequently, tied closely to confrontation is demeanour assessment. 
 
Reading the Body Revisited: Demeanour Assessment 
 
Demeanour assessment is where the trier of fact assesses the credibility of a witness through 
his/her appearance and manner, as well as the content of his/her testimony. The emphasis on 
the value of pressure suggests that a witness‘s testimony is not limited to what he/she says but 
also to how he/she says it. Assessing a witness‘ credibility is essential for juries to make a 
decision. Yet despite this, demeanour assessment is a highly controversial part of trial 
practice with many legal agents (in Australia at least) arguing that it is obsolete. For Chief 
Justice Underwood, ―the idea that it is possible to sift the accurate oral account from the 
inaccurate oral account from the demeanour of the witness has long been discredited‖.521  
This attitude is echoed by Justice Kirby, who stated in 2000: 
In earlier times, great confidence was placed in the capacity of adjudication to discern the truth on the 
basis of [triers of fact] impression of witnesses. However the trend of modern authority has cast doubts 
on that supposedly unique perceptiveness. That is why many adjudicators now rest their decisions, so far 
as they can, on indisputable facts, contemporary documents and the logic of the circumstances, rather 
than mere impressions.
522
 
Despite these views expressed by such senior judges, in Australia currently, an appeal cannot 
be mounted in a higher court to dispute a finding as to a witness‘s credibility that is based on 
the demeanour assessment of a lower court judge. ―[W]here a case is decided upon a trial 
judge‘s findings based on assessment of a witness's credit or demeanour, the Appellate Court 
will not intervene. Not seeing the witness is said to ‗put[s] the Appellate judges in a position 
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of permanent disadvantage‘‖.523 Unless judges are in the room with the witness at the time, 
they are unable to make decisions based on credibility. This contradicts both Underwood‘s 
and Kirby‘s assertion that demeanour assessment has been long discredited.  
 
This rule also raises questions of documentation in the criminal trial. The embodied 
performance of a witness emphasises the importance of the adversarial criminal trial as an 
unrepeatable live event. This is underlined by the suspicion of mediatisation changing the 
event, as outlined in the previous chapter. Yet currently in Australia although most trials are 
recorded on audiotape, the transcript that is generated from the audio is produced as a written 
text that cannot indicate tone, manner or delivery effectively. Despite this, transcript is legally 
accepted as a reasonably accurate representation of what happened during a trial. This 
suggests a contradictory position towards the value of the live, whereby confrontation and the 
‗anything can happen‘ circumstances are valorised, and yet the reliance on written transcript 
suggests that only limited attempts are ever made to take into account these charged 
circumstances in record-keeping. As Daniel Stepniak points out, the importance of the ‗live‘ 
(what he terms the visual) is entrenched in adversarial procedure:  
The law‘s preference for the visual arguably also explains why, despite access to transcripts of 
proceedings, appeal courts remain reluctant to overrule findings and rulings which were assisted by 
opportunity for first-hand visual and aural assessment of evidence and its veracity.
524
 
One possibility this raises is that by only using written transcript, this contains and makes 
manageable the complexity of a trial for the purpose of documentation. Yet it is impossible to 
fully record and represent the live trial without significantly changing it. The insufficiency of 
transcript to account for the full ‗atmosphere‘ of a trial is acknowledged in Crofts v The 
Queen in 1996 where the judge observes: 
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No rigid rule can be adopted to govern decisions on an application to discharge a jury for an inadvertent 
and potentially prejudicial event that occurs during a trial. The possibilities of slips occurring are 
inescapable. Much depends upon the seriousness of the occurrence in the context of the contested issues; 
the stage at which the mishap occurs; the deliberateness of the conduct; and the likely effectiveness of a 
judicial direction designed to overcome its apprehended impact. As the court below acknowledged, 
much leeway must be allowed to the trial judge to evaluate these and other considerations relevant to the 
fairness of the trial, bearing in mind that the judge will usually have a better appreciation of the 
significance of the event complained of, seen in context, than can be discerned from reading 
transcript.
525
 
As Peggy Phelan puts it, ―the electronic paradigm as an epistemic event represents something 
more than a new way to transmit information; it redefines knowledge itself into that which 
can be sent and that which can be stored‖.526 This is not limited to the electronic paradigm. 
Writing also redefines knowledge, and also translates and alters a live event into something 
reproducible. The problems inherent in this are illustrated by the case of New South Wales 
magistrate Pat O‘Shane. O‘Shane‘s conduct was investigated after she had fined a defendant 
$1,000 for contempt of court. At the defendant‘s appeal, a preliminary review of the 
transcripts led the Court of Criminal Appeal to believe O‘Shane had acted ―in an 
inappropriately adversarial way‖. However, the Judicial Conduct Commission obtained a 
sound recording of the proceedings. They found the transcripts to be ―partly erroneous‖ and 
stated they felt O‘Shane had behaved well under ―extreme provocation‖. The written 
transcript failed to convey the hostility of the defendant, which altered the interpretation of 
the incident.527  
 
The near impossibility of capturing such nuances in writing bears out Peggy Phelan‘s claim 
as to the nature of live performance; it is an event that ―disappears into memory, into the 
realm of invisibility where it eludes regulation and control‖.528 The interesting feature of the 
adversarial criminal trial is that the live event both escapes the law and enacts it. Whilst I 
argued earlier that speech act theory significantly idealises courtroom discourse, there is no 
doubt that judge‘s pronouncements are speech-acts, expressed as live performance, enacted in 
space and time and having concrete effects. The live performance is essential for its authority 
                                                 
525
 Crofts v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 427, 440, 441 (Toohey , Gaudron , Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
526
 Peggy Phelan & Jill Lane, The Ends of Performance (New York: NYU Press, 1998), 8.  
527
 See Makucha v Brian Tucker Associates Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 397. 
528
 Peggy Phelan, Unmarked, 148. 
202 
 
to be recognised and accepted by participants (as outlined before, the performance of 
tradition fundamentally involves a Foucauldian transaction of power through tacit performed 
collective agreement).529 
 
Judgements are passed during the live trial that cannot be overturned without a demonstrable 
error of law on the part of a judge, or new evidence.530 If a decision is formed by a judge as to 
the credibility of a witness this generally cannot be disputed. Legal procedure consequently 
implicitly recognises the richness and complexity of the trial as a performative event. 
Stepniak notes the contradictory attitude of judges wanting to bar broadcasting because it 
would overemphasise the ‗visual‘ or performative aspect of the trial. Yet as he points out, 
―while judges and juries continue to rely on seeing and hearing, to prohibit the broadcast of 
proceedings is to ask the public to accept that justice was done while depriving them of the 
visual and aural elements which undoubtedly influence the decisions of judges and juries‖.531  
 
Stepniak raises the question of how accessible the determination of an outcome in a criminal 
trial is to the general public when nothing remains but a written transcript. In this way, 
judgment in the criminal trial escapes regulation, as the live trial exploits the value of live 
performance, but legal agents cannot be called to account for it. Although this seems a 
cynical position, written transcripts are also (as outlined above, and in the previous chapter) a 
means of protecting judges from claims of being arbitrary because the transformation into 
                                                 
529 ―On paper, the words of Justice Cummins of the Supreme Court concluding his sentencing of serial killer 
Peter Dupas yesterday are unambiguous and condemnatory enough: ‗For the murder of Mersina Halvagis, I 
sentence you to life imprisonment. I refuse to set any minimum term. Life means life. Remove the prisoner‘. 
When these words are illuminated, by seeing them said and hearing them spoken in the context of the 
courtroom, the difference is profound. Facial expression and the cadences of speech add a human side to judicial 
exactitude‖. Editorial, The Age (Melbourne), 28 August 2007.  
530
 The NSW grounds of criminal appeal are fairly typical of the Australian grounds of appeal in criminal cases. 
They include an appeal: ―against the person‘s conviction on any ground which involves a question of law 
alone‖, ―with the leave of the court, or upon the certificate of the judge of the court of trial that it is a fit case for 
appeal against the person‘s conviction on any ground of appeal which involves a question of fact alone, or 
question of mixed law and fact, or any other ground which appears to the court to be a sufficient ground of 
appeal‖, and ―with the leave of the court against the sentence passed on the person‘s conviction‖.  Crucially, an 
appellant cannot appeal on the basis of ―fact‖ alone—that is, any decision reached by the fact-finders during a 
trial from assessment of evidence. See: Criminal Appeal Act 1912 No. 16 (NSW), s 5.  
531
 Stepniak, Audio-Visual Coverage of Courts, 394. 
203 
 
written form allows the judgment to become part of a (relatively coherent) chain of 
precedent.532 How a decision is reached by a trier of fact is nonetheless always to some degree 
contingent and arbitrary, and containing the complexity of live performance in written 
transcripts is one of those possibly ‗undemocratic‘ but necessary buffers between the public 
and legal agents.533  
 
Although continued recognition of the role of demeanour assessment demonstrates, as 
Auslander asserted, that the law is an ontologically live practice, this valorisation of the live 
event does not explain why the live is privileged as more likely to access the truth in this day 
and age.534 It is plain enough that assessing someone‘s demeanour in person is likely to be 
more reliable than trying to assess demeanour from reading a written transcript of a live 
event. Nevertheless, can juries really assess whether someone is telling the truth through 
his/her demeanour on the stand? For a juror to believe this requires him/her to believe that 
there are certain relatively fixed signs that indicate honesty or dishonesty. Yet this disregards 
the cultural context within which the signs of a ‗performance‘ are interpreted. In 2006, the 
Sydney Morning Herald carried this story: ―Garry Coombe‘s downfall was his stutter. 
Charged with assaulting his wife, his speech impediment in court was mistaken for 
dishonesty. He was convicted after the magistrate did not believe his evidence because there 
was ‗a noticeable tremor in his voice‘‖.535 In this example, a stutter was misinterpreted as an 
indicator of deceit. Another pertinent example is the reception of Aboriginal Australians on 
the stand where the way juries often interpret silence by Aboriginal Australians as a sign of 
lying, whereas this silence within the context of Aboriginal culture may not necessarily 
indicate deceit as it is believed to in white Australian society.536  
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Demeanour assessment is consequently a fraught and contradictory area, where legal agents 
disclaim its value, yet trial practice confirms its validity. In 2004, the New South Wales Law 
Reform Commission released Blind or Deaf Jurors.537 The authors were specifically 
commissioned to find out if being blind or deaf hindered a juror‘s ability to assess the ‗truth‘. 
Consequently, the report spends a considerable amount of time weighing the pros and cons of 
demeanour assessment. Although the report‘s authors, like Kirby and Underwood, reject the 
ability of a juror to use demeanour assessment to find the ‗truth‘, they still argue that blind 
people should be excluded. The report claims demeanour assessment is limited yet 
―essential‖:  
It is essential to realise that demeanour is relevant to an understanding and assessment of a witness‘ 
testimony in at least two senses. First, the witness may use demeanour, as people commonly do in 
communication, to convey the meaning of what he or she is saying through body language, gestures, 
smiles, frowns, nods, hesitations, inflexions and the like. This mode of communication can be used 
deliberately, but is often unintentional or perhaps instinctive. It can be as powerful as the spoken word 
that it accompanies. For example, it can turn a ‗yes‘ into a ‗no‘ and vice versa.538 
A blind person cannot ‗read‘ a witness‘s body language, which excludes him or her from 
performing his or her role as a juror. Yet this suggests that there is a legal presumption that 
anyone who is not blind can ‗read‘ body language or, to reconfigure it using a non-literary 
metaphor, jurors are expected to be able to interpret and judge the credibility of a witness 
through their embodied performance on the stand. The assumed ability of jurors to know is 
not because there is proof that they do know, but because certain other people cannot know.   
 
The link between live presence and authenticity, which runs through adversarial trial practice, 
is based on assumptions or, as Auslander claims, untested suppositions. These suppositions 
are general claims that live presence is ‗more‘ reliable. This is justified not by defining why 
live presence is authentic, but rather why mediatised testimony is not. Undoubtedly, part of 
the reason for these assumptions is tradition. By linking the live trial with truth-telling, legal 
agents do not necessarily believe that the current trial process is flawless; however, it is a 
time-tested method which legal agents are (unsurprisingly) reluctant to tamper with. Just as 
with questions surrounding the long-term effects of television broadcasting, the long-term 
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effects of CCTV testimony are relatively unknown, whereas the live trial, if expensive and 
slightly unwieldy, still ‗works‘.  
 
Beyond inherited tradition, however, the relationship between live presence and authenticity 
also facilitates and perpetuates the performance of tradition. Although legal agents have 
argued the trial must be live because it allows for confrontation and assessment of 
demeanour, one can equally invert this and argue that legal notions of confrontation and 
demeanour assessment exist because of the necessity of a witness‘s live presence. Despite all 
the alteration in legal practice and belief throughout the centuries, the one thing that has 
remained constant is the necessity of having all witnesses‘ bodies in the courtroom, 
particularly the defendant‘s. Placing a person‘s body in the space of the courtroom is always 
a signal of submission to the process, and through this, a submission that aids the 
manufacture of the power of ‗The Law‘. In the next section of the chapter, I will examine 
studies that attempt to determine the ‗real‘ value of live performance. As I will argue, these 
studies, by trying to empirically assess what the ‗real‘ value of live performance is, frequently 
overlook the importance of belief in creating and sustaining this value.  
 
Speculation and Evidence: The Audience.  
 
The live trial has no inherent value for juridical truth without the critical interpretation of a 
jury. Whether someone is telling the truth or not in court only matters in as much as he/she is 
perceived to be telling the truth. Consequently, jury assessment of CCTV testimony is central 
to debates as to its usage, and there is an understandable desire to know how the jury will 
interpret remote testimony. The legal assumption, as outlined above, is that the ideal trial is 
live, because a human being in a room with another human being will be able to reach a more 
reliable outcome. Studies have therefore tried to determine how deleterious the effects of 
CCTV testimony are on the perceived authenticity of live presence. Are they minor and 
surmountable? On the other hand, could they permanently alter interpretations of credibility, 
critical in juror decision-making?   
 
It has proved extremely difficult to conduct empirical studies analysing nebulous concepts 
such as demeanour assessment and confrontation. Many different approaches have been tried: 
some have arranged for ‗witnesses‘ to tell a group of ‗jurors‘ identical stories either through 
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CCTV testimony or in person, and then handed out questionnaires, while others have done 
the same but have only asked legal agents and judges.539 Others still have conducted mock 
trials, using CCTV testimony at all stages in an attempt to determine if and when CCTV 
testimony makes a difference. These larger studies also focus on whether a final verdict is 
affected by the medium used for testimony.540 Most of the studies conducted have used child 
witnesses, as this remains the primary use of CCTV testimony. Study participants are usually 
asked to assess the witness‘ credibility, reliability and honesty both in mediatised testimony 
and in live testimony.  
 
Ultimately, these studies, like those assessing the effect of broadcasting in the previous 
chapter, are remarkably ambivalent. It would be highly difficult to determine the 
appropriateness of CCTV testimony based on the studies done so far, with many of the study 
results cancelling each other out. For example, one common finding is the consensus that 
CCTV testimony is significantly less stressful for both child and adult witnesses. This is 
evidenced by many studies, including Cashmore and De Haas in the ACT in 1992, O‘Grady 
in Western Australia in 1996, and Wilson and Davies in England and Wales in 1999 (drawing 
on their 1995 study for the London Home Office).541 All of these studies showed that, to some 
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extent, the witness either reported being (or was perceived to be) far less anxious during the 
proceedings, less likely to be confused, and more likely to recall information when testifying 
via CCTV.   
 
Many studies, nevertheless, indicate that a witness‘ credibility (as determined by a trier of 
fact) is reduced through the usage of CCTV testimony. The Orcutt study found: 
In summary, children testifying via CCTV were seen as less accurate, less honest, and less attractive 
than children who testified in open court, and jurors were less likely to convict the defendant when the 
child testified via CCTV. Jurors did not report feeling significantly less empathy for the defendant or the 
child. Thus, testimony via CCTV appeared to result in a more negative view of child witnesses as well 
as a small but significant decrease in the likelihood of conviction.
542
  
There were similar findings in an Australian study by Eaton et al. in 2001.543  
 
Eaton et al. analysed CCTV testimony (which is transmitted immediately), live testimony and 
videotaped testimony (where the witness‘s testimony is pre-recorded; during this recording, 
advocates and the witness are in the same place).544 In their results, jurors displayed a similar 
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reception to both video and live testimony. Yet jurors‘ reception to CCTV testimony was 
different. The study noted that 
[v]ideodeposition use, compared with court-given evidence, did not affect child-witness credibility and 
that videodepositions do not appear to prejudice the defendant‘s case, but conversely resulted in the 
defendant being viewed as more defmitely innocent. Jurors also believed that videodeposition use 
enhanced both child-witness psychological well-being and ability to testify, compared with court-given 
testimony, which harmed both factors. Jurors in the present study rated the child witness as significantly 
less credible when she gave evidence via videolink [ie CCTV testimony] than in court. They also saw 
the defendant as more definitely innocent when videolink was used, rather than court-given evidence.
545
 
This finding suggests that having the advocate and the witness share the same space was a 
significant indicator of reliability and, in fact, more significant than having the witness share 
the same space as the trier of fact. An additional complexity in the findings is that, although 
witnesses were deemed more credible in live court, this did not necessarily mean that jurors 
were more likely to convict a defendant. Some studies showed defendants were more likely 
to be convicted if the witness testified in open court.546 Others, such as that by Holly Orcutt et 
al. in the U.S., found that this did not make a difference. Orcutt et al‘s study showed that 
although jurors were more inclined to convict before they officially deliberated, after the jury 
had been secluded, any possible effects of the medium seem to have been neutralised.547 
 
In Melbourne in 1995, Judy Cashmore and Kay Bussey found there was no compelling 
evidence that use of CCTV testimony affected jurors‘ perceptions of child witnesses 
deleteriously.548 A Western Australia Ministry of Justice survey conducted in 1995 also found 
that jurors did not have difficulties understanding the purpose of CCTV, and that this did not 
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affect their ability to reach a verdict.549 The most recent study, undertaken in 2006-2007 by 
the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, again assessed the effect of remote 
testimony in the Children‘s Court, finding that there was no pronounced negative effect on 
jurors witnessing remote testimony, rather than live testimony.550  
 
This means that there is no clear indication either way of whether or not jurors‘ perceptions 
regarding credibility through the medium would affect their decision. Studies that asked 
jurors to self-assess on this particular question almost invariably resulted in them reporting 
not being biased either way claiming the medium did not affect their decision.551 Yet self-
assessment is arguably of limited use, as it is always problematic to ask someone precisely 
how he or she reaches a decision. What is interesting is that despite the ambivalence of the 
studies above, the main source of resistance to CCTV testimony seems to be coming from 
legal agents. Other agents directly involved in child proceedings, such as social workers, 
support the use of CCTV testimony. However, it is trial lawyers who object on the basis of 
what they perceive a juror‘s reaction might be, despite this not necessarily being reflected in 
juror studies.  
 
Studies specifically targeting legal agents found that legal agents held concerns about 
whether remote testimony would dilute the impact of testimony on the jury.552 This is echoed 
by Murray‘s 1995 study, which found that legal agents preferred witnesses to be live in the 
courtroom. This preference, however, did not actually affect the outcome of the study.553 
There seems to be a reluctance to ‗risk it‘, then, on the part of legal agents, suggesting that 
legal agents preserve the belief in the ‗live‘ because there is no specific reason to jettison it. 
Tampering with the coercive powers of cross-examination facilitated by shared space and 
                                                 
549
 Western Australia Ministry of Justice, Strategic and Specialist Services Division, Results of a Survey of 
Jurors in Western Australia Conducted Between November 1994 and February 1995 (Perth: Western Australia 
Ministry of Justice, 1995), 36.  
550
 Judith Cashmore and Lily Trimboli (NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research), ―Child Sexual Assault 
Trials: A Survey of Juror Perceptions,‖ Crime and Justice Bulletin 102 (September 2006).  
551
 See, for example, Cashmore and DeHaas, ―The Use of Closed-Circuit Television: Child Witnesses in the 
ACT,‖ supra n.550. 
552
 Natalie Taylor and Jacqueline Joudo, The Impact of Pre-Recorded Video and Closed Circuit Television 
Testimony by Adult Sexual Assault Complainants on Jury Decision-Making: an Experimental Study, Research 
and Public Policy Series No. 68 (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2005).  
553
Murray, Live Television Link, supra n. 543. 
210 
 
immediacy could have unforeseen effects. Legal agents‘ responses suggest that they do not 
necessarily believe jurors‘ self-assessment and are more interested in evidence indicating that 
live testimony is perceived to be more reliable.  
 
Studies into CCTV show that the live trial has undoubted value to jurors, although it is 
difficult to assess whether juries need to share the same space as trial participants, or whether 
it is sufficient for advocates to be examining a witness in a shared space, and for this to be 
viewed on videotape later. Studies also suggest significant ambivalence for triers of fact 
towards CCTV testimony. For example, the Australian Institute of Criminology study found 
that:  
Although no systematic differences were found in pre-deliberation perceptions or propensity for jury 
verdict between face-to-face, CCTV and video conditions, some jurors in the CCTV condition expressed 
the view that they would have preferred the complainant to be physically in the courtroom. These jurors 
stated that they felt unable to make an accurate assessment of her character, demeanour and truthfulness 
on the screen and that they would have liked her to be in the courtroom so that they could watch her 
non-verbal actions and whether she looked at the accused in giving her testimony.
554
 
An Australian Law Reform Commission report, People with an Intellectual Disability, cited a 
number of reasons for this ambivalence, including that CCTV testimony is potentially 
dehumanising and will affect a jury‘s perception of a witness. On the other hand, the ALRC 
report notes that it has also been suggested that the status of television means that, 
conversely, CCTV will be overly authoritative and have undue influence over a jury: ―[I]t has 
also been questioned whether CCTV actually enhances the status of the evidence by making 
it seem more authoritative than conventional oral testimony‖. 555  
 
There is also the potential problem of distortion of visual images, through an inability of the 
triers of fact (whether judge or jury) to assess the scale of the image, or through the inability 
for a trier of fact to see the remote room in its entirety. In the case of child witnesses, because 
it is often the case that their evidence-in-chief is allowed in video form, the jury and court 
may never see the witness in person. The report notes: ―CCTV may not permit the jury to see 
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the size of the child and so it may leave the jury unaware of the vulnerability of the child as 
against the accused‖.556 
 
Yet again, these debates attempt to assess what is problematic about CCTV testimony 
without querying what might be problematic about live testimony. Because the value of live 
performance cannot ever be measured and definitively ‗proven‘, studies that try to assess 
CCTV testimony‘s effects cannot clearly distinguish which effects are particular to CCTV 
testimony, and which may be more general reactions to any form of cross-examination. As 
Orcutt et al.‘s study observed: 
[T]he reliable cues discriminating liars from truthtellers are uncontrollable signs of arousal (e.g., pupil 
dilation) and are not signs of lying per se […] Cues revealing fear and arousal can be useful in situations 
where a person should not show fear if he or she is being truthful. In a courtroom, however, a witness 
afraid of not being believed or a witness afraid of con- fronting an abuser may display a number of the 
same behaviours as a liar afraid of being caught.
557
 
Even when studies involve so-called ‗control groups‘ that only view live testimony, there is 
no means of knowing how a juror‘s preference is reached, particularly in an adversarial 
culture that advocates the importance of demeanour assessment.  
 
The other problem in these studies‘ approach is that they, crucially, overlook the importance 
of belief in the value of live testimony. Many of the studies outlined above do not clarify 
whether or not confrontation does make witnesses more truthful, or whether they are simply 
more likely to be believed because the jury thinks confrontation makes witnesses more 
truthful (a kind of circularity of belief). If people believe confrontation is inherently more 
truthful, they are less likely to doubt a witness‘ veracity. This means that they only confirm 
their own beliefs, rather than ‗prove‘ the link between liveness and truth-telling. Whether 
liveness makes people more truthful is not only unprovable but also, arguably, somewhat 
irrelevant. Popular and juridical beliefs perpetuate a particular model of truth-telling which 
presupposes that confrontation of bodies in a shared space is more likely to lead to the truth. 
This consequently has those effects, either because people who believe that courtrooms are 
places where they must tell the truth are more likely to tell the truth, or because people will 
be assumed to be telling the truth.  
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This circular discussion is similar to debates in Performance Studies regarding the inherent 
value of live performance. In these debates, theorists such as Phelan have tended to argue for 
an intrinsic ‗magic‘ to live presence, whereas others such as Auslander have argued that the 
live can only exist in opposition to the mediatised. Yet, as I have argued following Bourdieu, 
the transience of Performance Studies‘ object of study (the disappearance of live 
performance) can be overcome to some extent by recognising the value of the belief itself. 
That is, it is not about proving whether the live is magical, special, or, in the above case, 
inherently more likely to facilitate the truth. What does matter are the real effects that 
collective belief in it has. Even Auslander concedes the value belief in the magic of the live 
may have for a performer.558  
 
This belief, which sustains faith in the adversarial criminal trial, relies on the ‗authenticity‘ of 
presence, a politically problematic concept that is again a subject of debate in Performance 
Studies. As long ago as 1972, Joseph Chaikin stated: ―When we as actors are performing, we 
as persons are also present and the performance is a testimony of ourselves‖.559 This 
performance of self is often described in performative discourse as a kind of revealing.560 Just 
as acting theory, such as that canvassed in the previous chapter, posits putting on a character 
as a form of stripping away so does much performance theory emphasise the ‗nakedness‘ of 
live presence, as it were. The human body, which is not hidden behind or altered by 
mediatisation, is posited as inescapably itself, and consequently somehow ‗authentic‘. For 
Phelan ―presence can be had only through the citation of authenticity, through reference to 
something called ‗live‘‖.561 Live performance is therefore more authentic than mediatised 
performance. It is performance‘s ‗present‘ that allows presence—where the live body 
announces its own authenticity and corporeality even while (through performing) 
symbolically representing something else. Mediatisation seeks to present itself as a viable 
substitute for the ‗live‘, despite only being a recording that has altered irrevocably the effect 
of the content, considerably diluting the ‗presence‘ of the present. Phelan‘s theory of 
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presence depends on absence and disappearance, and her definition of liveness (as Auslander 
has argued) depends on mediatisation.  
 
However in trial practice, the inherent authenticity of a body has been a feature of the trial for 
centuries. Since the trials by ordeal, where a body in suspension revealed the true nature of 
the soul within it, the body has done more than simply be a vehicle for a person‘s oral 
testimony. Rather, the body itself has been a site for scrutiny and judgement. Trials remain 
trials of the body today. The symbolic value of the live that the trial depends on pivots on the 
authenticity of the body in the site of the courtroom. Yet as Auslander has also pointed out, 
the concept of inherent authenticity is politically dubious, with its link to concepts such as 
‗charisma‘ and ‗magic‘ which suggest an audience spellbound and unquestioning of the 
political framing of the event.562 The manufacturing of mysticism is (and has been, over 
centuries) exploited by legal agents consciously and unconsciously.  
 
By now, there is entrenched popular belief in the inherent value of live presence in the 
courtroom as facilitating the truth. This was evidenced recently in NSW. The state 
government passed laws in 2007 allowing for inmates to give testimony via CCTV to avoid 
transport fees. Although defendants are still required/allowed to attend a trial in person, 
CCTV testimony will now be used for committal proceedings and preliminary hearings for 
those in NSW gaols. An article, titled ―Day in Court is a Fading Right‖ in the Sydney 
Morning Herald recorded dismay at this decision: 
Thousands of defendants may be robbed of their day in court and forced to give evidence by audio-
visual link from jail after the NSW Government rushed through a law designed to cut the costs of 
transporting detainees to court. The radical changes reverse the existing presumption that an accused 
person has the right to be physically present in court in significant proceedings.
563
  
This article articulates an apparent ‗right‘ of the defendant to be actually present for his or her 
day in court. This situation is distinct from that of the vulnerable witness, for whom CCTV 
testimony was primarily intended. Nevertheless, the performance of tradition relies on the 
unconscious exploitation of this ‗right‘—the popular belief in the authenticity of live 
presence. What Phelan might term authenticity of the body here is also a body being 
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repressed and manipulated and used to, as Foucault said, ―perform functions, emit signs‖ that 
shore up the authority of the trial.564 
 
This is reflected in legal research into CCTV testimony. One of the only things of which we 
may be relatively certain regarding CCTV testimony is that its usage (using real children‘s 
testimony rather than mock trials) resulted in vastly improved outcomes for the testifier; 
where the child witness was much more able to cope with his or her surroundings, retain 
information and respond to questioning. This was because such witnesses felt less pressured 
without physical confrontation; either in terms of being in the court, or in front of their 
accuser, or in front of an advocate cross-examining them. CCTV testimony usage means that 
child witnesses, and others classed as ‗vulnerable‘, are probably more likely to come forward 
and testify. As Cashmore and De Haas‘ report notes, the argument that ―confrontation and 
cross-examination increases the likelihood of truth-telling by witnesses‖ overlooks how much 
pressure through confrontation may decrease the truth-telling likelihood.565  
 
Altering how witnesses testify in order to relieve the pressure on them (and potentially 
increase their ability to tell the truth) risks diminishing legal control over a witness‘ narrative 
and threatens basic assumptions as to the production of juridical truth. This is because the 
ideal means of the production of adversarial juridical truth is not believed by witnesses to be 
the ideal circumstances in which to tell the truth. Witnesses may not necessarily believe they 
will tell the ‗truth‘ under pressure. This is not because they will deliberately lie, but because 
the coercive nature of cross-examination as well as the complexity of legal discourse may 
result in confusion as well as (as outlined in Chapter 4) a witness being limited in being able 
to tell his or her story. Yet legal agents believe that pressure and some degree of intimidation 
will have a positive effect on reliability and function as a safeguard of truth-telling: 
Some prosecutors say that a child's evidence will be seen by a jury as less credible if not adduced in the 
traditional manner. In addition, some prosecutors are said to believe that the appearance of a visibly 
distressed child witness makes a jury more likely to convict.
566
 
Visible distress is, it seems, a marker of credibility. Yet maintaining the coercive powers of 
the court does not simply uphold juridical truth; it also exploits the symbolic value of the live 
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to sustain the trial process. Legal agents unconsciously use the symbolic value of live 
performance to bolster their own authority, not only in the trial, but also in the broader social 
world itself. This is done by exploiting (unconsciously) and sustaining the collective belief in 
the authenticity of live presence.  
 
Conclusion  
 
For legal agents, bodies sharing the same space, immediacy and the pressure of confrontation 
aid the production of juridical truth. This belief is based on assumptions as to the authenticity 
of live presence. Putting a body under pressure is a means of stripping away the ability to lie 
and revealing what really happened. In legal discourse, this is framed as an inherently more 
reliable human-to-human contact that is based on tropes of understanding and insight (where 
traditional methods of evidence-testing are the best means to determine the ‗truth‘). However, 
this argument can only be maintained by downplaying evidence that suggests the courtroom 
is a site of stress and pressure that may in fact decrease the ability to speak the truth through 
intimidation, and a place that uses symbolic violence and coercion to signify its authority. 
The performance of tradition manufactures and maintains the power of the law through the 
exploitation of live performance. Ultimately, live testimony has a currency which legal agents 
are not willing to yield up as, like television broadcasting, it potentially limits the self-
regulation of the trial by legal agents.  
 
The relative newness of CCTV testimony technology and its increasing use in Australia and 
elsewhere suggests that CCTV testimony is valued as important. However CCTV testimony 
is only used as a functional substitute, maintain the trial as an ontologically live event. The 
problem with only assessing CCTV testimony in terms of itself and not interrogating live 
testimony more fully means that we continue to assume that there are no endemic problems 
in the adversarial model of juridical truth. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, seeing 
CCTV testimony as only useful for ‗vulnerable witnesses‘ contains the shortcomings in the 
witnesses. Yet as has been articulated in this thesis earlier, the manipulation and exploitation 
of witnesses coupled with their inability to control their own narrative is a routine practice in 
the adversarial criminal jury trial.  
 
216 
 
As I will argue in the following chapter, vulnerable witnesses are not ‗exceptional‘, rather 
their particular experience makes more visible the underlying symbolically violent practices 
involved in the current model of adversarial juridical truth. It is these problematic practices 
that are the focus of the next chapter, which examines sexual assault trials and sexual assault 
law reform. I argue that sexual assault law reform exemplifies and makes visible the 
performance of tradition, including the relative autonomy of the law, exploitation of liveness 
and authenticity, the burden of performance and the emphasis on coercion producing juridical 
truth.  
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Confrontation and Sexual Assault Legislation in NSW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defence counsel You weren‟t in shock, you were having consenting sexual intercourse on the lounge 
room floor weren‟t you.  
  
Complainant  I was not 
 
Defence counsel  You see this is a tissue of lies by you isn‟t it? 
 
Complainant It is not (crying) a lie—why would I go to the police station and make a 20 page 
statement and be there for 8 hours and go through hell for this! (screaming). 
Heroines of Fortitude 
567
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Prologue 
 
―Ass of a law means the rights of rapists override those of their victims‖ shouts the headline 
in my copy of today‘s paper—the Sydney Morning Herald. It is the 6th of September 2004 
and I am flicking through the paper as I sit and wait in the public gallery of the Supreme 
Court of NSW. Although I should really say ‗row of seats‘, not ‗gallery‘. This is not exactly 
the Old Bailey. For all of its grand title, the space itself, in the new Supreme Court high-rise 
building, resembles nothing so much as a lecture theatre, cluttered with unopened books, 
unused computers and bored people slouching in their chairs.568  
 
Today is the day that two brothers found guilty of gang rape will appeal their conviction and 
the appeal has stirred up so much interest that outside, six storeys down, the Rape Crisis 
Centre is holding a demonstration as we sit and wait. The brothers, MSK and MAK, 
dismissed their barristers and represented themselves, provoking such a reaction in the press 
and public that the law of the state was altered. Looking around the courtroom however, the 
general expressions on people‘s faces do not reflect that level of interest at all: rather there is 
a lethargy and slackness of expression that my barrister friend terms the ‗I thought law was 
exciting but now I‘m trapped in a boring courtroom‘ look. The other thing I notice is that the 
majority of people in this room, including the barristers, solicitors and clerks, are women. 
What I will not find out until later is that amongst them sits one of the raped women. The 
defence desk, however, stays ominously empty—surely, they will not still be representing 
themselves? 
 
We all rise as the three judges, wigged, in bright red, file out from the door behind their 
bench. As they stand in front of their chairs, we bow to one another. Then the door on the 
right hand side of the court that I have not really noticed before opens and in walks a police 
officer followed by people whom I take to be barristers—two men in dark suits with gentle 
but serious expressions. As I wait for them to be followed by the defendants, the door closes 
behind them and the penny finally drops.  
                                                 
568The ‗new‘ building is not particularly new, dating from the early 1980s. However, it is ‗new‘ in comparison 
to the ‗old‘ Supreme Court building that stands across the street and dates from the 1820s.  
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I have read about these brothers—at their trial they were deliberately threatening to their 
alleged victims, heckling their questioners, laughing throughout the proceedings and leering 
at the gallery.569 What I see today are two men who look older than I imagined, who bow and 
sit quietly and respectfully. I had expected to feel threatened and exposed. I feel let down. 
These men seem so unassuming, and so like people I know, that it completely throws me. I 
want them to behave badly.  
 
The judges ‗give leave‘ for the defendants to present their submissions, which is done 
entirely by the elder brother, MSK, while MAK sits silently on the chair in the dock next to 
him.570 MAK looks at his hands, occasionally looks at his brother and only speaks two or 
three words in total to the judges throughout the appeal. MSK is given no table and instead 
must pile his papers on the floor next to him. He reads out the grounds of appeal quite 
laboriously and confusingly. He seems to be repeating himself and I am having difficulty 
recording it. What I do understand is his repetitious assertion that ―section 249a of the 
Criminal Procedure Act is invalid” because the right of cross-examination was ―cruelly taken 
away‖ from the appellant. If a defendant ―wishes to defend himself in person‖ he cannot 
cross-examine a complainant effectively, therefore the ―trial is unfair and any conviction 
should be quashed‖.  
 
MSK talks about the ―absolute right‖ of cross-examination and the disadvantages to 
defendants if they are restricted from defending themselves. I cannot help feeling he has a 
point here—not regarding his ―absolute right‖ to bully complainants, but regarding the 
question of self-representation. The odds are so heavily stacked against someone wanting to 
do this, with a quagmire of legal procedure and jargon that would make little sense to a 
layperson, even with the best intentions of the judge who has a duty of assistance. Surely, 
someone representing him/herself should not be treated with horror, amusement, and 
disbelief if it remains his/her legal right?  
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 Their two younger brothers, also convicted gang rapists, were underage at the time of the offence; 
consequently all four brothers are referred to only by their initials. Even in 2008, the elder brothers were still 
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What is particularly odd about this appeal is that although MSK and MAK have chosen self-
representation I am sure that they have not written this material themselves. It is full of 
reference to precedents they cannot pronounce, including cases and words with which they 
are not familiar. It is a quasi lawyer‘s document read by a layperson—a combination of 
repetition and impenetrable reference that renders the entire appeal almost nonsensical. The 
submission goes on for nearly three hours. The long jacketed judge‘s aides are all nodding off 
and yawning. Alarmingly the police officers and two sheriffs are also drooping.  
 
MSK was described by Paul Sheehan in the Sydney Morning Herald the next day as 
grandstanding.571 Possibly. I also felt that there was a total lack of understanding of the appeal 
process by MSK. Eventually the appeal was dismissed. When the judges read out their 
remarks, they clearly read from a document they have had prepared earlier from the written 
submissions. The oral appeal has not altered what they have to say in any way. So why did 
everyone bother?  
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that designating certain witnesses ‗vulnerable witnesses‘ 
suggests that any problems with evidence-testing that may occur during a trial originates 
within the witnesses themselves. The witness‘ shortcomings make them unsuited to the trial 
process. This means that legal agents who use the term ‗vulnerable witnesses‘ do not see the 
need to question traditional methods of evidence testing. In this chapter, I extend this 
argument by examining sexual assault trials, routinely identified as ‗exceptional‘ because 
(due to the high level of trauma these women report) sexual assault complainants are classed 
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book.  
221 
 
as ‗vulnerable witnesses‘.572 I argue, however, that much of this ‗trauma‘ is in fact due to the 
focus on confrontation that is central to all forms of adversarial criminal jury trial. In other 
words, above and beyond the traumatic experiences of sexual assault that these complainants 
have (allegedly) lived through, the trauma experienced during trial is a fundamental 
characteristic of adversarial practice. Rather than being ‗exceptional‘, sexual assault trial 
practice in fact makes explicit the (often burdensome) performance imperatives of trial 
participants in the adversarial model of criminal trial.  
 
In a sexual assault trial, the alleged rape victim is forced to occupy the same room as her 
alleged rapist as well as to undergo cross-examination by the defence. Because the 
complainant is often the only witness (besides the defendant), her credibility forms the crux 
of the trial; consequently cross-examination by the defence advocate plays a major role in 
sexual assault proceedings. This results in a collision with the complainant who has no 
representation of her own.573 In addition to this, the complainant must relate a personal event, 
and her account of this will be assessed through a jury and judiciary who have continually 
been found in studies to believe in gendered, stereotyped ‗rape myths‘ that influence their 
decision-making. Whilst the gendered nature of sexual assault trials is particular, I argue that 
this is partly because the concept of the ‗reasonable‘ or ‗fair-minded‘ person who is the 
symbolic bellwether of public opinion has traditionally been male. There remains, 
consequently, some difficulty interpreting what is ‗reasonable‘ behaviour in situations of 
gendered crimes—in this case, a crime that is perpetrated primarily by men against women.  
 
I begin this chapter by analysing a piece of legislation passed by the New South Wales 
Parliament in 2003 preventing two accused gang rapists, MSK and MAK, from cross-
examining their accusers directly.574 It is not my intention to condone in any way the actions 
of these two violent convicted rapists. However, on paper this legislative reform undermines 
basic assumptions regarding what is required for effective and fair cross-examination. This 
potentially disadvantages both defendant and complainant by failing to acknowledge legal 
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agents‘ and laypersons‘ deep-seated belief in traditional methods of evidence testing. I 
conclude by considering the questions sexual assault law reform raises regarding the 
longstanding adversarial methods of evidence testing and juridical ‗truth‘, both in terms of its 
sustainability in sexual assault trials and more widely in the adversarial criminal jury trial.  
 
The Special Case of MSK and MAK 
 
In 2003 four brothers—MMK, MSK, MAK and MRK—were committed to trial for 
aggravated sexual assault, along with a fifth man, RS, who later committed suicide.575 The 
two eldest brothers, MSK and MAK, dismissed their legal representation and elected to 
represent themselves (the two younger brothers‘ and RS‘ lawyers immediately asked for a 
separate trial, which was granted). MSK and MAK‘s decision became a matter of intense 
media attention. Their choice of self-representation is something seen rarely in criminal 
procedure.576 This is because, since the 19
th
 century, not having a lawyer is believed to put a 
defendant at a considerable disadvantage. The lawyer is a form of protection (a ‗right‘ of the 
defendant).577 As observed in earlier chapters, an advocate provides a means of entry into the 
peculiar space of the trial both symbolically and linguistically.578 
 
However, the media attention surrounding MSK and MAK‘s upcoming trial was not focused 
on the lack of lawyer as mediator between the defendant and the court. Instead, what became 
crucial in the ensuing controversy was the lack of lawyer as mediator between the defendant 
and the complainant. This was because MSK and MAK planned to cross-examine the 
complainants directly. This was within their legal rights as matters stood at the time. As 
observed in previous chapters, the right of a defendant to ‗confront‘ his/her accusers has 
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standing in Australian common law even if it lacks the statutory weight of enshrinement in 
the American Constitutional clause.  
 
If a defendant represents himself, he has the right to perform the same function as his 
lawyers—that is, to test the prosecution‘s evidence. However, the prospect of alleged rapists 
cross-examining alleged rape victims on the stand shocked the community (once the media 
disseminated it widely) and caused public outcry. Consequently, legislation was rushed 
through the State Parliament of NSW. This legislation was an amendment (294A) to the 
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), and it banned self-represented defendants from 
directly cross-examining the complainant in sexual offence cases.579 Amendment 294A was 
passed and added to the law on the 3
rd
 of September 2003. The trial process for these brothers 
was scheduled to start on the 11
th
 September 2003, and began on the 16
th
 September.  
 
There is little doubt that this amendment was passed with MSK and MAK‘s particular case in 
mind.580 The NSW Shadow Attorney-General, Andrew Tink, made this clear: ―The Bill has 
been introduced with great speed. The reason for that, and it is a matter of public record, is 
that the legislation be applied in a trial that commences in approximately two weeks‖.581 
Section 294A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) expressly states that ―the 
complainant cannot be examined in chief, cross-examined or re-examined by the accused 
person, but may be so examined instead by a person appointed by the court‖.582 The 
amendment goes on to outline that if such a case happens, the judge must warn the jury not to 
infer guilt, explicitly stating that the examination of the complainant by a court-appointee 
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enacted in the U.K. in 1999 in Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (UK) c 23, s 34. The alternative 
arrangements are outlined in ss 38, 39. As I will note later, in the U.K. a legal representative is expected to 
cross-examine the complainant. If the defendant refuses to appoint one, and the court finds that cross-
examination is necessary in the interests of justice, then the court itself appoints a legal practitioner, which it 
pays for. This is unlike Australia where there is no specification that the person appointed by a defendant be a 
legal practitioner and no obligation on the court to appoint anyone should the defendant refuse.   
580
 MSK argued that this law was directly tabled with he and his brother in mind, however this is incorrect. As 
Justice Wood pointed out: ―[t]he law was the product of weighty consideration by the Law Reform Commission, 
whose members acted on a reference from the Attorney General dated 27 March 2002, i.e. before the very 
offences for which the appellants stand convicted‖. R v MSK (2004) 148 A Crim R 453, 468.  
581
 See Paul Sheehan, Girls Like You, 66. 
582
 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 294A(2). 
224 
 
must be given the same weight by the jury as any other witness examination.583 The brothers 
refused to appoint someone to question the complainants during their trial, and consequently 
the complainants in their trial were never cross-examined.  
 
The brothers‘ refusal to appoint a questioner was possibly more out of a perverse desire to 
extend proceedings than from any perceived sense of injustice. Yet, what if they had done so, 
forgoing direct cross-examination? What are the effects of altering traditional methods of 
evidence testing? Amendment 294A is an amendment for ‗exceptional‘ circumstances 
involving vulnerable witnesses, as all sexual assault legislative reform is.584 Yet the 
identification of all of these reforms as exceptional involves tacit admission that these 
circumstances are not commensurate with traditional methods of proof testing. Rather, these 
amendments identify a less than ideal situation that, because of its special nature, can diverge 
from accepted means of evidence testing to some degree. This may create a degree of 
uncertainty as to the reliability of the evidence in these cases.  
 
In this case, the pertinent question is whether effective cross-examination (as legal agents 
understand it themselves) is theoretically possible under the terms of amendment 294A? For 
legal agents, cross-examination involves the construction of a narrative—storytelling, as 
advocates often term it. This involves building themes extrapolated from witness‘ responses, 
which I have already described, via Gibbons, as a master narrative constructed out of satellite 
narratives. Effective cross-examination also includes and responds to the immediacy of a 
witness‘ response. Yet under amendment 294A, how questioning takes place is unclear. All 
the amendment specifies is that a third party is to question the complainants. There are no 
directions as to specifics. It is unclear whether a questioner asks a question, returns to the 
defendant for more information and then asks the next question, or whether he/she has a 
prepared list of questions.585  
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Either of these possibilities severely limits the chances of constructing a narrative, or exerting 
control over a witness‘s responses. The drafters of the amendment consequently overlook the 
dialogic nature of cross-examination that is so intrinsic to (primarily destructive) cross-
examination. An advocate‘s duty is to respond to a witness‘ answer at the time and improvise 
around the narrative he/she has already decided on. This involves a ‗judicious‘ use of 
confrontation—exploiting the pressure from the immediacy of circumstances when 
questioning a witness. As the New South Wales Law Reform Commission, examining the 
proposed amendment, noted: 
This procedure [questioning under s 294A] is also quite artificial. The dynamics of cross-examination 
are impeded where a third person relays the questions to the witness. The process is stilted and the 
impact of the evidence is altered. Further, where each question is asked first by the accused and then 
repeated by the intermediary, the complainant would have time to deliberate before answering the 
questions. This may put the accused at a disadvantage.
586
 
As I have previously outlined, the linkage of confrontation and truth-telling is longstanding 
and central to adversarial procedure. Amendment 294A risks impairing this, both by making 
cross-examination ‗stilted‘ and by lessening the immediacy of questioning, raising doubts 
about the witness‘ honesty if she has time to ‗prepare‘ her responses during this ‗stilted‘ 
questioning. I have elsewhere criticised the uninterrogated association between confrontation 
and truth-telling. However although this association is problematic, and potentially leads to 
many abuses, strong belief in the value of this form of evidence-testing through immediacy 
and pressure means that the implementation of legislation such as this at trial may decrease 
faith in a defendant‘s or a complainant‘s evidence. For example, should a defendant appoint a 
questioner who is not a legal practitioner and therefore lacks the skill to effectively cross-
examine a complainant, this may cause a jury to doubt the defendant. Yet, conversely, in the 
same scenario a jury may sympathise with the defendant and be more critical of a 
                                                                                                                                                        
supplementary questions are to be put. The probable necessity to have the jury absent whilst forms of questions 
are settled‖. See [2003] NSWSC 849 (Sully J) and Chris Craigie, ―Unrepresented Litigants: The Criminal 
Justice Perspective,‖ Online paper. Retrieved 12 June 2008 from the NSW Public Defender‘s Office: 
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complainant for not having undergone cross-examination sufficiently to support the veracity 
of her claim. 587  
 
Another factor at play concerning amendment 294A is the disadvantage, both real and 
symbolic, of self-representation. The New South Wales Attorney General at the time, Bob 
Debus, suggested in parliament that a questioner under 294A could be a judicial officer‘s 
assistant or associate, a court officer or a person employed by the Attorney General‘s 
Department.588 This illustrates a wholesale belief in the neutrality of the court, including the 
assumption that a defendant‘s own barrister will do nothing to skew this neutrality.589 Yet 
during the course of my attendance at the MSK and MAK‘s appeal in September 2004, 
outlined at the beginning of this chapter, it became quite clear at what a disadvantage the 
brothers were at for representing themselves. During this appeal, as I have mentioned, MSK 
spent half of his time shuffling through sheafs of papers on the floor, as he was not given a 
table. This presumably reflects the disadvantage that would have also been apparent at their 
trial. This is characteristic of the positioning of the body of the defendant as subjected to the 
will of the state. However when a defendant is also his own advocate, it is difficult to 
reconcile these roles, particularly as it often means the defence mounts their case from a 
dock. As Chris Craigie SC, NSW Deputy Senior Public Defender points out:  
The theory that a fair trial, from the viewpoint of both the accused and the Crown can always be 
obtained with a trial judge neutrally conducting proceedings, whilst also satisfying a complex range of 
explicit and implied obligations to the accused is an ideal not easily achieved. In practice, the absence of 
legal representation in an adversary system has the potential for grave mischief to all interests.
590
 
Craigie goes on to argue that the greatest risk of disadvantage runs against those defendants 
who are ―uneducated, inarticulate, unattractive, intellectually limited, mentally ill or disabled 
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 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 2 September 2003, 2958 (The Hon. Bob 
Debus, NSW Attorney General). 
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Epping). 
590
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accused. At best, such an accused is incapable of making any real contribution to his or her 
own case and may for reasons of personal characteristics, rather than the strength of the 
evidence, be in peril of conviction and dire penalties‖.591 As the brothers, MSK and MAK, 
themselves argued in their appeal, self-representation means that they may look guilty, 
regardless of whether they are or not.  
 
The Attorney General‘s outlining of amendment 294A in parliament also does not recognise 
the particularities of language and status that are alien to a layperson in court.592 It is not 
specified anywhere that the third party-questioner should be a legal practitioner. Indeed the 
Attorney General at the time, Bob Debus, specifically suggested otherwise when outlining the 
amendment to parliament.593 According to Debus, the nominated questioner‘s role is repeating 
questions entirely devised by the accused. As the accused has chosen self-representation, he 
should not have access to any special legal assistance when devising the method of cross-
examination. Consequently, ―[n]o specific benefit would therefore be achieved by requiring 
the intermediary to be a legal practitioner‖.594  
 
Yet any form of evidence testing, including cross-examination, requires specific skills.595 As 
observed in Dietrich v The Queen:  
[t]he proper conduct of an accused‘s defence calls for a knowledge not only of the criminal law but also 
of the rules of procedure and evidence. Skill is required in both the examination in chief and the cross-
examination of witnesses if the evidence is to emerge in the best light for the defence. The evidence to 
be called on behalf of the accused, if any, must be marshalled so as to avoid raising issues which will be 
damaging to the case for the Defence. A decision must be made whether the accused is to give evidence 
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on oath, is to make an unsworn statement or is to remain mute. Competence in dealing with these 
matters depends to a large extent upon training and experience.
596
 
Advocates are, amongst many things, translators rather than simply protectors. Speaking in 
court requires legalizing actions into juridical codification—for example rape into ‗sexual 
assault‘, resistance into ‗lack of consent‘. To do this requires an embodied naturalization of 
legal language. To presume that a self-represented defendant does not need any legal skills 
perpetuates a wide misrecognition that trials are as open in understanding as they literally are 
to the public, rather than a practice of a particular field with their own highly refined and 
particular rules. Whilst there may be incompetent defence lawyers, and skilled laypersons, 
the very specific skills acquired in advocacy training (whatever form it takes) involve years 
of training and an ability to navigate the social universe of the law. Without this, one must be 
considerably disadvantaged.597 
 
The potential for disadvantage to the defendant embedded in the amendment, however, is 
insufficient grounds for appeal, as MSK and MAK discovered when their appeal was 
dismissed. As Justice Wood notes, after summarising the brothers‘ grounds for appeal, such 
criticism of legislation is a misinterpretation of the role of the courts when it comes to legally 
determining the application of a statute under the Australian constitution.598 He goes on: 
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These ―uncertainty‖ complaints are really thinly-disguised criticisms of the policy of the legislation. As I 
indicate below, this is not a basis of invalidity under our constitutional law. In any event, courts can and 
must resolve these and any other issues of interpretation and application of novel legislation.
599
  
As Justice Wood makes explicit, statutes are, by necessity, not overly prescriptive, allowing 
the crucial role of interpretation by the judiciary that is central to the function of common law 
jurisdictions.600 Alongside this flexibility is the irreducible fact that judges and courts cannot 
criticise decisions by the legislature.601  
 
MSK and MAK‘s appeal could consequently never have succeeded. However, their appeal 
also revealed something else pertinent to the question of the disadvantaging of the defendant 
and exceptional legislation: that is, that any disadvantage to the defendant does not in itself 
necessarily prevent a ‗fair trial‘ from taking place. In the Supreme Courts‘ summation of 
MSK and MAK‘s appeal, the judges note: 
There is a substantial public interest in ensuring that witnesses are not subjected to procedures that might 
be oppressive or humiliating although they must answer all questions that fairly test their evidence. This 
is not only to ensure, as far as possible, that potential witnesses are not bullied into giving untrue or 
inaccurate evidence, but also because such conduct must undermine public confidence in the 
administration of justice. Without these protections for witnesses, the court would be an instrument of 
injustice rather than an instrument of justice. The crucial question therefore is not whether the interests 
                                                                                                                                                        
himself with the court appointee person‘, what will happen if ‗improvisation‘ is necessary in the detail of 
questioning, how rulings about the appropriateness of particular questions will be addressed and how the 
accused communicates with the appointed questioner‖. R v MSK (2004) 148 A Crim R 453, 462 (Wood, CJ).  
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Kable v DPP (1996) 189 CLR 51, 73, 74.   
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of the accused might be prejudiced but whether the fairness of the trial might be called into question if 
an unrepresented accused is prohibited from cross-examining a complainant in person.
602
 
As observed in the previous chapter dealing with closed-circuit television testimony, 
legislative reforms relating to vulnerable witnesses are not just about a defendant‘s rights, but 
are rather predicated on them being able to ‗strike a balance‘ between the needs of particular 
witnesses and the rights of a defendant.603 However, this question of ‗striking a balance‘ is 
problematic at best, as the difficulties with amendment 294A make clear. 
 
When the judges in MSK and MAK‘s appeal drew attention to the potential for injustice 
arising from witnesses being ―bullied into giving untrue or inaccurate evidence […] because 
such conduct must undermine public confidence in the administration of justice‖ they made 
the presumption that this potential existed only in direct cross-examination of a complainant 
by their alleged attacker. This presumption is shared by the NSW Law Reform Commission: 
[t]o accommodate the accused‘s wish to cross-examine the complainant personally is to confer an 
inappropriate advantage on the accused […] the most likely motive for refusing representation is the 
desire to obtain an advantage by virtue of the intense character of direct personal confrontation. This 
advantage has never been part of the function of a trial. 
604 
Yet confrontation is central to the production of juridical truth. The only question is how 
much the direct nature of it alters the experience for a complainant.605  
 
Having summarised the terms of the debate surrounding 294A, I would like to leave MSK 
and MAK‘s appeal and return to sexual assault trials more generally. The furore surrounding 
MSK and MAK‘s trial was because their case was special/exceptional: they (unusually) 
defended themselves, and thus they would have unduly traumatised the complainants should 
they have been permitted to cross-examine their alleged rape victims. Yet by concentrating 
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all this attention on the ‗special‘ nature of the brothers‘ trial, most participants in the debate 
overlooked how traumatic any form of cross-examination is for a sexual assault 
complainant.606  
 
I do not mean to make an easy comparison between the two forms of cross-examination. 
There is no doubt that direct cross-examination of an alleged rape victim by an alleged rapist 
would be extremely traumatic.607 However, the amendment 294A debate/discussion (in both 
parliament and the Supreme Court) demonstrates the misrecognition by legal agents and 
politicians of what cross-examination entails. In this debate, cross-examination is either 
posited as the creation of a coherent narrative by a skilled practitioner (overlooking the power 
and control I have outlined in chapter 4 of this thesis), or presented as a means of adducing 
truth that does not require any form of skill.608  
 
Neither approach acknowledges the symbolic violence and exploitation of confrontation that 
is vital to any discussion of sexual assault trial practice, and that is a fundamental 
characteristic of adversarial practice. Section 294A consequently illustrates the problems of 
exceptional legislation that does not seek to address more systemic problems with the current 
model of juridical truth: most specifically, the belief in the link between live confrontation 
and truth-telling and consequently the performance imperatives of trial participants. In the 
next section of the chapter, I examine sexual assault trials, routinely identified as 
‗exceptional‘. Legal discourse explicitly attributes the ‗special‘ nature of sexual assault to the 
‗special‘ nature of the vulnerable witness. Whilst I do not seek to diminish in any way the 
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232 
 
terrible trauma frequently endured by complainants in sexual assault trials, I do want to 
problematise this notion of internalised vulnerability that tends to paint women in legal 
discourse misogynistically by emphasising their vulnerability, frailty or potential for 
‗hysteria‘. Instead I argue that it is the ―burden of performance‖ for a complainant in a sexual 
assault trial that causes trauma; a burden characteristic of adversarial trial.609    
 
The Special Case of Sexual Assault Trials  
 
Politicians and the media frequently cite sexual assault trials as being intensely traumatic for 
complainants; far worse than most other criminal proceedings. Government and non-
government reports into sexual assault trials consistently identify cross-examination and 
confrontation as the major sources of trauma for a complainant. These are, however, a 
requirement for all adversarial trials, forming the crux of how legal agents and jurors 
determine juridical truth. So what makes sexual assault trials worse?  
 
What is important to sexual assault trials is that a complainant is also often the sole witness.610 
It is highly unusual for there to be indisputable medical proof of sexual assault. Even if there 
is DNA evidence it is difficult to prove, in the absence of substantial physical trauma, that 
sexual assault involved force. In a situation where a man rapes a woman, fighting back can 
put the woman‘s life at risk. Many women have been educated over the years not to put 
themselves in more danger. This makes rape cases more difficult to prove.611 Even more 
important to consider is that the vast majority of reported rape is at the hands of a partner, 
relative, or someone known to the complainant, rather than a violent stranger, despite this 
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being the pervasive myth of what constitutes ‗rape‘ in public opinion.612 All of this means that 
the complainant‘s evidence-in-chief is sometimes the only evidence tendered in court. Sexual 
assault trials consequently come down to the issue of consent:  
The role of consent makes adult sexual offence trials different from most other criminal proceedings. 
Behaviour which is ordinarily legal becomes illegal in the absence of consent. Where the alleged offence 
occurs in private, it often comes down to the word of the complainant against the word of the accused. 
Even where supporting evidence is available, sexual offence trials often turn on the credibility of the 
complainant.
613
  
In practical terms, this means sexual assault trials pivot around the word of the complainant 
versus the word of the defendant as mediated through his counsel (where the burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is on the prosecution). 
 
A complainant‘s testimony has to be convincing and credible enough so as to convince jurors 
beyond this reasonable doubt. Because cross-examination of the complainant is the only 
means of defence, a complainant will be cross-examined at length, often in graphic detail.614 
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May 2005, 15518 (The Hon. Henry Tsang, 
Parliamentary Secretary). The significance of the graphic language obviously depends on the complainant 
herself. Although it may be relatively humiliating and/or embarrassing to most women, certain cultural 
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The prosecution, too, is solely reliant on the complainant‘s account to convince a jury. The 
credibility of the complainant becomes the major focus of the trial, with satisfaction of the 
burden of proof resting on one person‘s testimony.615 Ultimately the sexual assault trial 
becomes about the complainant and whether she is lying, rather than whether the accused is 
lying.616 In broad terms, the prosecution must present the complainant to the jury as 
unimpeachably honest, and the defence advocate must convince a jury that the complainant is 
confused, malicious or dishonest.617 What makes a sexual assault trial ―worse‖ is the ―burden 
of performance‖ for a complainant.  
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Detailed below is an excerpt from a sexual assault trial in 1995. This transcript was taken 
from Heroines of Fortitude, a report published by the NSW Department of Women.  
 
 
Defence counsel   You asked if he would like some toast? 
 
Complainant   I did. 
 
Defence counsel   And what he‟d like on it? 
 
Complainant   I did. 
 
Defence counsel   Why? 
 
Complainant   I was in shock, I don‟t know why 
 
Defence counsel   Oh come on, you can do better than that! 
 
Complainant   I was in shock! (screaming) 
 
Defence counsel   This is a man who‟d raped you the night before you‟ve told us 
 
Complainant   I was in shock. 
 
Defence counsel              Who had forced you to have non-consensual intercourse. 
 
Complainant   I was in shock. 
  
Defence counsel   Who‟d stuck his fingers in your vagina without your permission? 
 
Complainant   I was in shock (crying). 
 
Defence counsel   And you‟re making him coffee and toast the next morning? 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Bureau of Statistics: Sydney, 2004). Alternatively, a defence advocate alleges that a complainant is in search of 
financial gain. Complainants are frequently quizzed as to whether they have ever, or will ever, apply for 
compensation.  
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Complainant   I was in shock. 
 
Defence counsel   You‟re going to stick to that, are ya? 
 
Complainant   Yes I am (screaming). 
 
Defence counsel   Are my questions annoying you? 
 
Complainant   Yes they are. 
 
Defence counsel Was it annoying you on the night when you said he had non 
consensual sexual intercourse and put his fingers in your vagina? 
 
Complainant   Yes. 
 
Defence counsel   Does it annoy you as much as my questions? 
 
Complainant   Yes. 
 
Defence counsel   Well, why didn‟t you yell? 
 
Complainant   Because I was in shock and I was scared. 
 
Defence counsel   You‟ve been yelling at me haven‟t you? 
 
Complainant   Yes. 
 
Defence counsel You think your mother would‟ve heard you if you said things in the 
same loud voice that you‟ve been using here? 
 
Complainant   I don‟t know. I didn‟t scream. 
 
Defence counsel Yes but you know your mother would‟ve heard you if you said 
things in the same loud voice that you‟ve been using here. And you 
didn‟t scream because you didn‟t want them to come out did you? 
 
Complainant I was in shock, I was embarrassed, I was humiliated, I felt dirty 
(crying).
618
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I have reproduced this excerpt in full as it highlights one of the most contentious aspects of 
sexual assault trials—hostile cross-examination. In the above transcript, we see what must be 
considered appalling and brutal questioning by a defence counsel. The defence counsel is 
deliberately trying to provoke the witness to make an admission and to cast doubt on her 
behaviour. This is evidenced by his repeated questions even when she does not change her 
answer. Instead of moving to another subject, he re-couches his inquiry in increasingly 
graphic language. The entire line of enquiry seems carefully constructed to provoke the 
complainant to react and perform in a certain way: by making her angrier and angrier and 
more upset the advocate can then provoke her to yell and then clearly imply that if she was 
truly attacked she would have yelled just as she is doing now. Therefore, she would have 
been heard. Ergo, she is lying and she was not raped.619  
 
This careful construction of narrative by the defence counsel involves attacking credibility 
through the witness‘ behaviour and performance at the time and on the stand. Firstly, he 
raises questions as to her behaviour immediately after the alleged assault. He clearly 
questions her justification of being ‗in shock‘: ―You can do better than that!‖ Yet having 
raised questions as to her behaviour after the assault, he uses her behaviour in the courtroom 
to raise questions as to her actions during the alleged assault. The defence counsel provokes 
her to yell and to scream, and then clearly implies that this is what she should have done 
during the assault (if it really took place).  
 
I would argue, in contrast to the NSW Law Reform Commission‘s claim (that ―the most 
likely motive for refusing representation is the desire to obtain an advantage by virtue of the 
intense character of direct personal confrontation. This advantage has never been part of the 
function of a trial‖), that this transcript is full of the advantage of the ―intense nature of direct 
personal confrontation‖. Although the NSW Law Reform Commission meant, literally, the 
alleged rapist and complainant, the encounter between complainant and defence advocate is 
confrontational in and of itself. It is in the interest of the defence counsel to exploit the 
pressure of live confrontation to cast doubt upon a complainant‘s account.  
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What is essentially happening in a sexual assault trial can be read as a high stakes legal game 
that takes the form of a performance for the interpretation of the crucial audience: the jury. In 
the transcript, the crown prosecutor wagers on the outcome—that the defence barrister‘s 
performance is in fact turning the jury against him due to his brutal mode of questioning. 
From the perspective of the prosecution, allowing this distressing line of cross-examination is 
potentially more helpful in securing a conviction than any intervention on behalf of the 
complainant would be. Her victimization will increase sympathy because she is now helpless 
and distressed—a positive performance marker for her in her ‗rape script‘.620  The defence 
barrister, on the other hand, is hoping the jury has made another kind of performance 
analysis; that the jury will condemn the complainant for not playing her role as a credible 
witness effectively.  
 
Corey Rayburn, writing about the ―burden of performance‖ of rape complainants, argues that 
complainants are forced to play many different culturally prescribed roles during the trial:  
The burden of performance is the difficulty witnesses have in persuading a jury by the force of their 
testimony. The persuasion that takes place is not based on logic or reason. Rather, it depends on the 
ability of the witness to define her character role and provide a cogent story with fidelity to the jury. To 
successfully overcome the burden of performance the narrative must fit within the script of the trial and 
the larger rape metanarratives.
621
 
I would argue that this overstates the autonomy of the complainant and her scope to define 
her own role. Importantly, legal counsel constructs a narrative through a broader social lens. 
In the previous transcript cited, the defence counsel refers to an assumption that could be 
made by many jurors: that a complainant in a situation of being raped would ‗scream‘ and 
that she would not make toast for her attacker the next day. For a jury to believe this 
behaviour is aberrant relies on them having preconceived ideas as to how she ‗would‘ 
behave.  
 
                                                 
620
 Shannon Jackson, writing about muggings and sexual assault, coined the term ―rape script‖ when writing 
about muggings and self-defence classes for women in the U.S. I find this a very useful term when considering 
what exact role a complainant is meant to play in a trial. Shannon Jackson, ―Representing Rape: Model 
Mugging‘s Discursive and Embodied Performances,‖ The Drama Review 37.3 (1993). 
621
 Corey Rayburn, ―To Catch a Sex Thief,‖ 460.  
239 
 
An Australian Institute of Criminology study conducted in 2005 (primarily assessing the 
impact of CCTV on jurors in sexual assault cases) came to some surprising conclusions. 
Although their goal was to obtain details as to whether the use of CCTV affects a juror‘s 
decision-making, what they found was that the mode of presentation made little difference. 
What did, however, make a profound difference was the pre-existing attitudes jurors had 
before entering the courtroom:  
One of the key insights obtained during this study was the high degree to which many jurors believed 
many of the ‗myths‘ which surround rape in general. Acceptance of these myths means that many jurors 
have strong expectations about how a ‗real‘ victim would behave before, during and after an alleged 
sexual assault. These expectations impact on their perceptions of the complainant‘s credibility.622 
The study found that belief in these rape myths was predominantly, although not exclusively, 
found amongst male jurors, suggesting that there is a difference between male and female 
jurors as to what they believe constitutes ‗normal‘ female behaviour in situations of sexual 
assault.623 Women complainants have their behaviour weighed and questioned by jurors as to 
how it corresponds with what they believe is ‗normal‘, despite rape, as a vicious and 
traumatic assault, being an experience and a crime not equally shared by both genders.624  
 
For example, the Criminal Justice Sexual Offences Taskforce (CJSOT), commissioned by the 
NSW Attorney-General in 2004, summarised a study done by Melanie Heenan in 1997. 625  
This study found that factors influencing jury-decision making in a sexual assault trials 
included: ―location, the level of physical injury sustained by the victim, admissions of guilt 
by the accused, whether a medical examination was conducted and community attitudes 
towards sexual violence‖.626 The CJSOT report went on to note that: ―[t]he factors outlined by 
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Heenan seem to be consistent with myths about what constitutes real ‗rape‘. They may both 
reflect and reinforce stereotyped assumptions about women and women‘s sexuality‖.627 
 
Corey Rayburn acknowledges these preconceived ideas as to what ‗normal‘ behaviour during 
a rape is, or who a ‗normal‘ rape victim is. He associates these ‗rape myths‘ with an 
American culture he argues is ―saturated with rape imagery and pornography‖.628 For 
Rayburn, construction of ideas of victimhood and sexual assault is primarily determined by 
television. He argues that every day potential jurors are surrounded with crime shows that 
often portray highly aggressive and fantastically brutal cases of sexual assault. This means 
that a jury‘s expectation of what sexual assault is or how a woman should behave is not being 
met because of the overblown ―rape pornography‖ of crime shows. Rayburn argues that 
defence counsel use these larger cultural myths and norms to attempt to place the 
complainant within a certain role: ―defence attorneys use the predefined roles and certain 
rhetorical techniques to compare a particular complainant‘s experience with those in society‘s 
collective consciousness‖.629  
 
However, although Rayburn discusses only defence lawyers, the prosecution is also 
attempting to portray the complainant in a certain way—as a victim. A complainant‘s 
credibility will be largely determined by how well she can fit the mould of what a jury would 
consider a credible ‗victim‘, despite having limited scope to determine her own performance. 
The more of a victim a complainant seems, the more likely she is to be believed. For 
example, the CJSOT study noted that: 
Cases were significantly more likely to proceed when: the victim was injured; the victim physically 
expressed non-consent; the assault was more severe; there was additional evidence linking the defendant 
to the assault; the defendant used force; the defendant was non-Caucasian; and the defendant was a 
stranger.
630
 
However, when a complainant‘s behaviour is not sufficiently victim-like according to 
prevailing social myths, this can affect whether or not the matter proceeds to trial. As the 
CJSOT study noted, again drawing on Heenan‘s study: ―As the probability of conviction 
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relies on the victim‘s ability to articulate the events and convince a jury that a crime occurred, 
prosecutors will be reluctant to proceed if the complainant‘s credibility, character or 
behaviour is questionable, or open to adverse inference‖.631 Stereotypical beliefs about what 
‗appropriate‘ victim behaviour is can damage the credibility of a complainant during the trial. 
  
Credibility 
 
Denise Lievore conducted a survey of Crown Prosecutors across five Australian jurisdictions 
where prosecutors were specifically asked what enhanced a complainant‘s credibility in a 
sexual assault trial. 632  The most important factor for prosecutors was confrontation, where a 
complainant must ‗face off‘ her accusers. Following this, consistency was considered vital: 
consistency in her statements, consistency between her statements and other witness 
statements (if there are any), and consistency of her ―post-assault behaviour‖. For the 
prosecutors this consistency was best communicated by not ―gilding the lily‖, and by giving 
her account as simply as possible.633 
 
The prosecutors‘ survey suggests that they believe a complainant telling the story as simply 
as possible shows that ―she is herself—she acts, speaks and dresses as she usually would‖.634 
However, as we have seen, consistency in terms of legal memory is a relatively artificial 
construction.635 The complainant‘s examination-in-chief, while seemingly less fettered than 
cross-examination where she is answering the questions of a hostile defence lawyer, still 
involves their satellite narrative being made to ‗fit‘ the master narrative of the prosecutor. 
Cross-examination is therefore not as much an attempt to distort their true memory as to 
attempt to impose a new interpretation—a new master narrative on the witness. This may be a 
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highly confusing experience for any witness as it bears little relationship to what might be a 
more appropriate understanding of memory as partial, complex and fragmented.  
 
The legal model of truth seeking presupposes that legal memories must be retrieved in order, 
and intact.636 Any contradiction from a confused witness allows counsel to imply that the 
witness does not remember at all, or they are lying. A complainant telling her story as simply 
as possible involves translating experience into an artificial chronological frame. There is 
nothing natural about this. A complainant must seem to answer honestly, simply and 
immediately, but this is achieved by previous rehearsal of her ―spontaneity‖.637 Yet according 
to prosecutors, it cannot be overly rehearsed: ―internal consistency is important, but little 
inconsistencies can add to veracity rather than detract from it. Everyone uses somewhat 
different words from one time to the next of telling a story, but if the victim‘s story doesn‘t 
budge from a rote form, it could give rise to the suggestion of fabrication‖.638  
 
Here we see the spectre of theatricality being raised by prosecutors: where women are 
accused of ‗performing‘ in the courtroom, rather than telling their story ‗simply‘. The 
requirements here reflect the desirability of immediacy of a witness‘ response. Consequently, 
according to prosecutors, a complainant must perform her story as if she were reciting it for 
the first time. The complainant must behave ‗like herself‘. Yet how she performs, while she 
relates a traumatic, artificially constructed story in the presence of her alleged rapists, under 
the eyes of numerous people, and under cross-examination, is highly prescribed and suggests 
playing to the jury/audience. For the prosecutors, a complainant must be emotional so she is 
not perceived as robotic, but she is not allowed to become ―hysterical‖ because this will 
affect the appearance of her consistency. She cannot be overly angry as this potentially 
overshadows her emphasised position as ―victim‖. 639 
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Ultimately, in a sexual assault trial the ‗rape script‘ a witness/complainant is expected to 
follow is contradictory. As the victim, she must be sympathetic and emotional: that is, she 
must play her part in front of the jury as a wronged, upset, traumatized woman. She must 
unequivocally gain the sympathy of everyone in the room as a victim of unwanted sexual 
violence. Yet as a witness, she must primarily be credible and cogent and she must relate 
what happened to her in clear, perfectly consistent chronological order that is easy to follow. 
However if she is upset and therefore inconsistent the defence barrister‘s job is to leap on any 
inconsistency and try to draw an admission by demonstrating that the complainant has lied or 
her memory is at fault. This will potentially discredit her before the jury. And it is important 
not to forget that above and beyond all of this the complainant is relating something highly 
traumatic and intensely personal in a room full of strangers, but too much confidence or too 
much fear will reflect badly on her as well. 
 
To diminish the complainant‘s credibility, a defence advocate must construct his or her cross-
examination around the issue of ‗consent‘—essentially, what he or she must do is debunk the 
complainant‘s alleged status as a victim of a crime. For instance: 
 
Defence counsel   Didn‟t it all start when you got between that man‟s legs Miss? 
 
Complainant   No. 
 
Defence counsel You drove up and down the western suburbs with you sitting 
between that man‟s legs in the passenger seat…and during none of 
this time do you remember where his hands were? 
 
Complainant    They weren‟t on me.  
 
Defence counsel It didn‟t matter to you that in order to sit in front you had to sit 
between a strange man‟s legs? 
 
Complainant   No.
640 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
withdrawn or numbed by having to recall and relate the offence‖, and she ―informs herself about how to 
withstand cross-examination‖. Ibid., 4. 
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In the transcript above, the defence counsel uses the complainant‘s prior behaviour to 
intimate that she had behaved suggestively and consequently provoked the alleged attack. 
The advocate clearly implies that most women would not sit between a ―strange man‘s legs‖, 
because they would know that this was a sexual invitation. The defence counsel later 
deliberately rephrases this to ―sitting on his lap‖ to suggest that the complainant knew she 
was sitting on ―his penis‖, and consequently was already participating in some form of sexual 
foreplay.641 By doing so, the defence counsel constructs a narrative where there is prior 
consensual sexual contact before the alleged attack; consequently, there could not have been 
a later sexual assault.  
 
Denise Lievore goes on to say that ―a jury might accept that a young woman left a party with 
a stranger because she is naïve and takes men at face value, whereas an older woman might 
be expected to be more aware and less trusting‖.642 Again, it is primarily the complainant‘s 
responsibility to keep herself out of ‗harm‘s way‘. For instance, the prosecutors in Lievore‘s 
survey also stressed how important it was that a complainant did not underestimate her 
alcohol consumption as this would be used to portray her as less innocent by the defence.643 
Alternatively, defence counsel may take another approach, and imply that a complainant is 
acting: faking the emotional impact to ‗milk‘ her ‗victim‘ status:  
 
Defence counsel   Has it been suggested to you how to give your evidence? 
 
Complainant   No Sir. 
 
Defence counsel Has anybody suggested to you that in giving your evidence you 
should let your emotions hang out—has anyone suggested that? 
 
Complainant   No Sir.  
 
Defence counsel Has anybody suggested to you that if you become upset you should 
let it all hang out?  
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Complainant   No Sir. I have just been told to hang in there.
644
  
 
Again, we are presented with the idea of deviant theatricality, whereby if a woman 
complainant‘s testimony deviates from presupposed ideas of how she should behave on the 
stand, she is being ‗theatrical‘ and therefore is probably lying, rather than being ‗natural‘ or 
‗who she is‘ on the stand. The dichotomy of female behaviour constructed in the above 
extract—the victim or the vamp—is exacerbated by an adversarial system that relies on 
partisan narrative construction. This is reflected by the long history of questioning about the 
sexual experience or dress of the complainant at the time of the offence. Such questioning is 
technically disallowed but nonetheless continues: 
 
Defence counsel   You also had the white top on that‟s shown in the photograph? 
 
Complainant   Yes. 
 
Defence counsel   That material is rather flimsy—is that true? 
 
Complainant   Yes. 
 
Defence counsel   And you had a body suit underneath the shirt? 
 
Complainant   Yes.
645
 
 
This line of questioning is a very simplistic attempt to debunk a complainant‘s credibility as a 
victim by again implying that, as the complainant was wearing ‗provocative‘ clothing, she 
was tacitly consenting to sexual intercourse. Although defence advocates are technically no 
longer allowed to cross-examine the complainant on what she is wearing, by integrating it 
into the background narrative, many are able to argue that this is illustrative of post- or pre-
alleged assault behaviour and consequently goes to issues of consent and credibility. Indeed, 
in 1995 Heroines of Fortitude observed that Crown Prosecutors often allowed this line of 
questioning, in the hope that its callousness would turn the jury against the defence.  
 
It is only in 2008 that, for the first time, there has been discussion about introducing measures 
to make a defence advocate accountable if he or she harasses a witness on the stand. The need 
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to institute this accountability reflects the ineffectual nature of prior legislative reforms.646 For 
example, when in 2005, the ―improper questioning‖ provision of the Evidence Act 1995 
(NSW) was replaced with s 275A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), an onus was 
for the first time put on the presiding judge to stop questioning relating to sexual history or 
experience. However, judges were frequently reluctant to intervene, as they did not wish to 
give grounds for later appeals by the defence over unfair restrictions on cross-examination.647  
 
This leads us to an important point: the complainant stands alone. She, unlike the accused, 
has no mediator or representative to speak for her. It is the crown‘s goal to secure a 
conviction, not to protect her from undue trauma. Consequently, although a prosecutor elicits 
a master narrative of the complainant‘s experience, the prosecutor is not an agent for her. 
Rather the prosecutor acts for the State. What is particularly difficult about a complainant‘s 
role is that it is in her interest to have no agency and to let herself be cast as a victim (even 
though she has little say in the process). Every chance she has to win her case (never very 
high) relies on her being a victim.648 Her credibility can only be sustained if she is painted as a 
                                                 
646
 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 41 protected against ―improper questioning‖ which included ―misleading‖ 
questioning or ―unduly annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive or repetitive‖ questioning. This 
provision was replaced in August 2005 with s 275A of the Criminal Procedure Act (1986) NSW, outlined 
below.  
647
 Amendment 275A includes two additions to the usual ―improper questioning‖ including forbidding 
questioning a witness ―in a manner or tone that is belittling, insulting or otherwise inappropriate‖ and using 
questions that have ―no basis other than a sexist, racial, cultural or ethnic stereotype‖. Even more importantly, 
the language in s 41 of the Evidence Act states that the court ‗may disallow‘ improper questioning, whereas 
275A states clearly that a court ‗must disallow‘ improper questioning. However, although this puts the onus on 
the courts, if an ―improper‖ question is asked and no one objects at the time, an appeal cannot be mounted on 
the basis of this. Two public defenders provided written submissions to the NSW Law Reform review of Section 
275a, arguing that judges already have sufficient power to protect complainants from unwarranted questioning: 
―An unrepresented accused is not given free rein when questioning a complainant. Improper questioning is 
already covered by section 41 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). Both the prosecution and the judge have the 
opportunity to prevent abusive or inappropriate questioning and no further protection is necessary‖. NSWLRC, 
Unrepresented accused in sexual offence trials, [3.41] (footnote 83).  
648
 ―The Australian Bureau of Statistics estimates that 20% of women who are sexually assaulted report the 
assault. In 2005, there were 9,500 reports of sexual and indecent assault made to NSW Police. It is therefore 
estimated that 47,000 sex offences were committed in NSW in 2005. There are less than 450 convictions for sex 
offences annually. This means that about 1% of sex offences result in a conviction‖. NSW Rape Crisis Centre, 
247 
 
victim who had no agency at the time of the alleged crime and very little on the stand as well. 
It is not surprising then that a complainant might find the process revictimising as the 
adversarial criminal trial by default creates female sexual assault victims who are passive, 
helpless, and emotional (although not hysterical).649  
 
At the end of her survey of prosecutors, Denise Lievore concludes that: 
This study cannot rule out the possibility that prosecutor‘s assessments of victim credibility may be 
influenced by gender stereotypes, as even prosecutors who do not consciously ascribe to stereotypes 
may operate on unexamined suppositions. For example, interviewees commonly noted that consistency 
in post-assault behaviour is an important criterion in assessing credibility. However, as there is no 
―typical‖ response to sexual assault, it is possible that typifications of appropriate post-assault behaviour 
may be based on stereotypical assumptions.
650
 
Lievore, while acknowledging the dominance of these myths, claims in her study that 
―overall the prosecution and the defence don‘t use gender stereotypes to sway the jury; we 
would get short shrift from the judge‖.651 However, I would dispute this. It seems more likely 
that because legal agents operating within the juridical field do not operate in an ethical 
vacuum, the preconceived ideas of jurors are to some degree shared by advocates in court. 
Although these advocates are testing evidence as they have been trained to, this unfortunately 
means it is in their interests (and to some degree their responsibility) in sexual assault cases to 
use these stereotypes to obtain acquittals for their clients.652 
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The Burden of Performance 
 
The trauma of sexual assault trials is often argued to be the result of bad behaviour by 
defence counsel. Greens senator Lee Rhiannon commented in parliament: ―Questioning by 
the defence is designed to be intimidating. It can be aggressive and humiliating in the hope of 
portraying the complainant as either ‗asking for it‘ or lying‖.653 Whilst not seeking to excuse 
defence counsels‘ behaviour, ‗positive intimidation‘ (or, as we can recall from the NSW 
Barristers‘ Rules, ―judicious use of the coercive powers of the court‖) and the use of ‗rape 
myths‘ are part of an advocate‘s arsenal when pursuing ‗persuasive storytelling‘. In their 
quest to convince a jury, advocates can misrecognise the symbolic violence of this process 
because of their naturalisation of adversarial forms of evidence testing.  
 
However, for advocates to disclaim all responsibility for traumatising or harassing witnesses 
by arguing that they are simply trying to win over a jury unfairly diminishes their 
responsibility for perpetuating these ideas. It is true, though, that this exploitation of rape 
myths only has efficacy if the jurors believe the myths the lawyer is tapping into: that of 
‗asking for it‘, or ‗secretly wanting it‘. The trauma of cross-examination is not wholly 
reducible to bad behaviour by counsel because the success or failure of forms of evidence-
testing can only be measured by the findings of a jury. This problematises claims by 
politicians that the juridical field entirely responsible: ―the problems women face in sexual 
assault trials often stem from the defence team and the judiciary, not the audience in the 
courtroom‖.654 Although jurors‘ expectations are largely formed prior to entering the 
courtroom, they are activated by the ‗storytelling‘ symbolic violence of the advocate.655 
 
I do not seek to excuse the behaviour of the defence advocates cited in this chapter, however 
it is worth considering that at least to some degree these advocates are doing what they have 
been taught to do. That is, they must uphold their duty to the court through correctly 
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observing appropriate adversarial procedure, and they must ‗robustly‘ pursue a client‘s best 
interests and act in accordance with the standards of evidence-testing in the adversarial 
system. If a defence barrister‘s (conscious) duty to his or her client is to secure an acquittal, 
he or she will pursue this through what he or she has learned is the method of eliciting the 
truth—pressure and confrontation, and attempts to secure admissions/impeachment. Rather 
than attributing the trauma experienced by victims of sexual assault under cross-examination 
to the lack of humanity of defence counsel, it is more useful to consider that the brutality 
routinely identified in sexual assault trials can at least be partly attributed to the fact that there 
is frequently a sole witness whose testimony is the only evidence tendered. Although one can 
choose to view this factor as making sexual assault trials exceptional, one can also argue that 
these trials are actually a far more revealing prism through which to view the sustained 
symbolic violence of cross-examination characteristic of adversarial practice. 
 
The continued emphasis by the court on the ‗special‘ nature of complainants as ‗vulnerable 
witnesses‘ is misleading. This frame continues to internalise ‗shortcomings‘ within sexual 
assault complainants. By doing so, this classification to some degree implies that sexual 
assault is a crime that an adversarial system finds difficult to try. By extension, a 
complainant‘s experiences become framed as aberrant, outside the normal scope of 
experience. To some extent, this must reflect the problem of common law having been 
accrued over centuries of systematic inequality between men and women. The weight of case 
law is oriented around male experience as it is men who traditionally constituted jurors, 
litigants, legislators and legal agents.656 Hence, ‗exceptional‘ provisions are often required to 
deal with crimes perpetrated by men against women.657  
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However, I argue that the ‗special‘ nature of sexual assault trials stems largely from cases 
coming down to the issue of consent, and there only being one witness (or two, including the 
defendant if he testifies). This means that live cross-examination in an open courtroom is the 
only form of evidence testing a jury witnesses.658 Rather than making sexual assault trials 
unusual, in many ways sexual assault trials expose the framework of adversarial evidence 
testing. Without medical evidence, or expert testimony, the assumptions underlying the 
construction of juridical truth, based on symbolic violence and degrees of coercion, are laid 
bare. The gender stereotypes relying on women being classified as ‗victim‘ or ‗vamp‘ is 
largely due to the adversarial system of partisan structure of the trial that, by default, tends to 
create a binary opposition between the two possible scenarios of the prosecution and the 
defence as to what happened during an alleged sexual assault. The presupposition that a 
female rape complainant must be wholly innocent or wholly guilty is perpetuated in the 
mechanisms of adversarial trial.  
 
The difficulties arising from sexual assault trials are not due to the weakness of the 
complainant. Rather the difficulties are to do with the contradiction at the heart of the 
adversarial trial. Confrontation and live cross-examination are the primary sources of abuse 
and trauma for sexual assault trial complainants in the courtroom. Yet it is these moments of 
performance—the most traumatic aspects of trial—that the jury latches onto, in terms of how 
they determine the outcome of a trial.659  
                                                                                                                                                        
and women, know very well the various ways in which some men occasionally behave‖. Consequently having 
‗reasonable‘ knowledge of male behaviour should mean a woman ought to ‗put up with it‘. As Margaret 
Thornton argues, the male experience in the work place and in the courtroom is the benchmark in terms of what 
is and is not ‗reasonable‘ and a woman must adapt her behaviour to accommodate this. See Hall v Sheiban 
(1989) 20 FCR 217; Margaret Thornton, ―Sexual Harassment Losing Sight of Sex Discrimination,‖ Melbourne 
University Law Review 22(2002). 
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 However, as the CJSOT report recommended, new provisions since 2006 allow for the closing of the court 
when a sexual assault complainant testifies (Criminal Procedure Act 1986 [NSW] s 291) and automatic use of 
CCTV testimony (Criminal Procedure Act 1986 [NSW] s 306ZB. These changes will be discussed at the end of 
the chapter.  
659
 ―The worst thing, if you‘re acting for a bloke, the worst thing to see in front of a jury is to have an 8 year-old 
girl crying while she‘s talking about Daddy sticking his fingers up her bum […] I‘m in favour of it because I 
think it will help me get a bloke off‖. Christine Eastwood and Wendy Patton, The Experiences of Child 
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The burden of performance, where it hinges on complainants being able to convince a jury of 
an accused‘s guilt or innocence despite high levels of constraint on their autonomy, poses 
serious impediments to the possibility of meaningful reform. Returning to the beginning of 
this chapter, then, amendment 294A rightly suggests that an accused rapist questioning a 
complainant would be unnecessarily traumatic. But the NSW Law Reform Commission and 
most other legal professionals, by treating the case of MSK and MAK as ‗special‘, continue 
to overlook the very real trauma sustained day to day by every complainant who goes to 
court. This is not an exceptional situation; the ―burden of performance‖ lies at the heart of 
collective belief in adversarial juridical truth.  
 
The Way Forward 
 
The impetus for significant reform has only arisen relatively recently, with an influx of new 
legislation over the last five years.660 In 2006, the NSW Bar Association held a meeting to 
educate barristers about the changes in sexual assault law. On arriving, each barrister 
received a thick booklet detailing the numerous changes occurring since 2003—when the 
Sydney ‗gang rape trials‘ took place.661 The booklet canvassed all the major reforms, which 
include provision for CCTV testimony, limitations on appropriate questioning, making sexual 
assault trials closed to the public, readmission of previous trial testimony via affidavit, and 
allowing a complainant a support person while they testified. After going through these 
amendments, a voice came from the back of the room:  
                                                                                                                                                        
Complainants of Sexual Abuse in the Criminal Justice System, Trends and Issues Report No. 250 (Australian 
Institute of Criminology: Canberra, 2002), 76.    
660
 There have been other sexual assault law reforms prior to this in NSW since the 1970s, such as the Crimes 
(Sexual Assault) Amendment Act (1981), which defined different types of sexual assault. However, since 2003 at 
least 10 pieces of sexual assault law reform have passed through parliament, with more imminent at the time of 
writing (July, 2008). These reforms are arguably a direct result of the attention paid to the gang rape trials held 
in NSW in 2002 and 2003. Not long after these trials and the passing of 294A (amongst other reforms), the 
Criminal Justice Sexual Offences Taskforce was commissioned. Their report in January 2006 led to a series of 
further legislative changes. 
661
 Alongside the trials of the K brothers, there was another notorious gang rape trial that saw one defendant, 
Bilal Skaf, sentenced to 55 years in prison. This was later reduced on appeal. For more information about the 
gang rape trials, see Kate Gleeson, ―From Centenary to the Olympics, Gang Rape in Sydney,‖ Current Issues in 
Criminal Justice: Journal of the Institute of Criminology 16.2 (2004). 
252 
 
 
―Why bother having a trial?‖  
 
The barrister‘s question—why bother having a trial?—voices, in very blunt terms, the crux of 
the problem when it comes to sexual assault trial procedure. This is not a question of the lack 
of political will to change the law. As I have outlined, law reform is not only possible but, in 
New South Wales, relatively frequent in recent times. Since 2003, there have been multiple 
changes to the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) and the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).662 
These amendments include such varied alterations to trial procedure as provision for a 
support person for a complainant when she gives evidence, admittance of previous trial 
testimony of a complainant should the trial be abandoned midway through proceedings, the 
automatic use of CCTV testimony for a complainant, and increased restrictions on ―improper 
questioning‖.663  
 
However, all of these provisions attempt to minimise the burden of performance by 
downplaying the adversarial characteristics of our criminal trial.664 In so doing, these reforms 
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 The Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) contains amendments relating to sexual assault trials between ss 
290-306ZP. To track when these amendments were passed, go to: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/ 
consol_act/cpa1986188/notes.html  
663
Sections 306A-306G of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), adopted in 2005, allow the use of 
‗recycled‘ complainant testimony in re-trial processes. This amendment means complainants do not have to 
repeatedly testify again in open court, should there be a mistrial or a re-trial. This amendment was extended 
even further in 2006 from re-admittance of trial testimony to all evidence tendered by a complainant. As 
previously noted, cross-examination was also reformed with amendment 275A implemented in 2004 which 
significantly widened the terms of what was ‗inappropriate‘ questioning as well as put the onus on the court for 
the first time to prevent such questioning taking place. This was modified again to make barristers accountable 
for breaching the provisions of the amendment. 
664
 For example, after the passing of amendment 294A (the restriction banning direct cross-examination of a 
complainant by an accused) the first major piece of sexual assault legislative reform passed by NSW parliament 
was provision for ‗alternative arrangements‘ for complainant testimony, either via CCTV testimony or via 
screens. The amendment passed in 2004 allowed a complainant to have sway over who is in her line of vision 
when testifying and is specifically designed so that a complainant does not have to see the defendant when 
testifying, although he can still see her. Although some provision existed prior to this amendment, it was largely 
dependent on the technological capabilities of the courtroom and had to be specifically argued for by the 
prosecution. Amendment 294B of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) was passed on 12 August 2004. 
This is because, prior to this Heroines of Fortitude, for example, found that CCTV testimony (although 
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tamper with long-standing means of evidence-testing that are central to legal and popular 
belief as to how ‗truth‘ is determined in the trial. Stephen Odgers SC, president of the NSW 
Bar Council observed when commenting on the automatic provision for CCTV outlined in a 
2003 amendment: 
Some Crown prosecutors would prefer it if complainants testify, partly because they might be concerned 
that a jury will draw an adverse comparison with an accused who does go in the witness box in front of 
them and testifies, and partly because I think they think that you'll get more empathy with a complainant 
who's actually in front of the jury, who they can see clearly, and assess their body language, particularly 
in response to cross examination.
665
 
Odgers is a defence barrister and an outspoken critic of sexual assault law reform. However 
his comment that a ―jury will draw an adverse comparison with an accused who does go in 
the witness box‖ highlights the difficulty of sexual assault law reform. Minimisation of 
confrontation is a double-edged sword, as observed in the previous chapter. The lessening of 
trauma sustained by the complainant is offset by the possibility that jurors are less likely to 
believe her if she is not present in the courtroom when testifying. This risks harming the 
complainant‘s chances of securing a conviction.  
 
An alternative possibility mooted in regards to sexual assault trials has been the formation of 
a specialised sex court, similar to the Family Court. The danger with this idea is that it is 
again internalising the problem as being the fault of ‗vulnerable witnesses‘. The increasing 
number of people being classified as ‗vulnerable witnesses‘ means that there is no limit to 
this kind of reform and that eventually there may be a kind of splintering of criminal trials 
into numerous specialised courts. Alongside the potential discrediting of a complainant is the 
opposite, equally undesirable, effect: further disadvantaging of the criminal defendant. The 
right of a defendant to ‗confront‘ witnesses against him or her is so entrenched in our values 
surrounding the trial (and, of course, within common law) that reforms tampering with this 
confrontation can severely discredit the apparent fairness of a trial as well as the presumption 
                                                                                                                                                        
available as an option) was only used in 4 out of 108 cases. NSW Department of Women, Heroines of Fortitude, 
135. There was a further provision added in 2006 which outlines the  automatic ‗right‘ of vulnerable witnesses 
to testify via CCTV. See: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 306ZB. 
665
 Stephen Odgers SC quoted in: ―Sexual Assault Victims Need Not Face Court, Report Says,‖ The World 
Today, ABC Radio, first broadcast Tuesday 22 November, 2005. Transcript retrieved 10 July 2008 from: 
http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/ content/2005/s1514197.htm 
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of innocence. Attempts to increase the conviction rate through specialised sex courts may see 
higher conviction rates at the cost of belief in their ability to determine a trial fairly. As 
Arthur Chesterfield Evans observed, when debating the merits of amendment 294A:  
It is of concern that we continue to debate reactive legislation. If a bill is introduced because of a 
specific case, it may be that it has not been thought through as carefully as it should have been. In this 
case it is a question of balancing the rights of the accused with the rights of the victims. As in all these 
cases, we must be careful to ensure that the rights of the accused are not destroyed by the assumption 
that he must have committed the offence and, therefore, we want a painless conviction—an assumption 
that prejudges the situation.
666
 
There seem to be no satisfactory answers here. Judge Knox of the District Court of NSW 
commented at the Bar Association meeting that sexual assault law reform was the fore-runner 
of any kind of law reform. He claimed that ―the dimensions of criminal law are being 
stretched‖ and that sexual assault law reform was the ―vanguard in the way trials are 
conducted […]‖. He concluded by saying: ―I believe we‘ll move away from the adversarial 
system‖.667 
 
It is well beyond the scope of this thesis to predict the future direction of the adversarial 
criminal trial, but it is certainly true that sexual assault law reform raises far broader 
questions than how to deal with a small and ‗exceptional‘ part of criminal legislation. 
Christine Eastwood observes that:  
It is interesting that some lawyers consider the legal system to be so fragile, that any suggestion of 
reform is seen as a threat. Perhaps the central paradigms of traditional jurisprudence are not as 
unassailable as some would argue. The falsity of claims that the law is objective and neutral, that there is 
equal treatment of all before the law, and that the truth in any matter can be determined by legal 
reasoning have been exposed by numerous legal scholars […]. Such a view is self-deluding and 
indicative of law‘s overinflated view of itself. 668 
Yet as I have outlined throughout this thesis, both legal agents and laypersons believe in the 
model currently in practice. Eastwood suggests that resistance to reform comes from wilful 
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 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 3 September 2003, 3030 (The Hon. Dr 
Arthur Chesterfield Evans). 
667
 Remarks made by Justice Brian Knox at a NSW Bar Association Meeting, June 2006.  
668
 Christine Eastwood and Wendy Patton, The Experience of Child Complainants of Sexual Abuse in the Justice 
System, Report No. 23 (Canberra: Criminology Research Council, July 2002), 131.  
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blindness, but the role of habitus is a better way of understanding how we have all to some 
degree naturalised, relatively unconsciously, methods of evidence-testing based on 
confrontation. Sexual assault trials are not exceptional, rather  they expose the centrality of 
performance in the production of adversarial juridical truth, as well as the concomitant abuses 
that associations between ‗truth‘ and ‗performance‘ may carry with it. 
 
Instead of treating sexual assault trial experiences as exceptional, effective reform would 
need to reconsider the adversarial model of juridical truth, and question the association 
between liveness, confrontation and truth-telling. However, this is not simply a matter of 
‗reactive‘ legislative reform, it also involves dismantling beliefs entrenched over nearly a 
thousand years. The misrecognition of how important performance is to adversarial criminal 
trial (due at least partially to a conscious distaste of its association with acting) seriously 
impedes sustainable reform to trial procedure.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance implicates the real through the presence of living bodies. 
                         Peggy Phelan
669 
 
 
[T]here is something deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser 
as essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution […] It is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person ―to 
his face‖ than ―behind his back‖. 
Coy v Iowa
670
  
                                                 
669
 Phelan, Unmarked, 148. 
670
 Coy v Iowa, 487 US 1012, 1017 (1988). 
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Trials, Truth-telling and the Performing Body 
 
The role of performance in the adversarial criminal jury trial goes well beyond ‗mere‘ 
theatrics. Rather, live performance is a constitutive feature of criminal trials. The method by 
which evidence is presented and tested in the adversarial system is predicated on an 
underlying belief in the link between ‗liveness‘ and truth-telling. This linkage means that we, 
including both members of the public and legal agents, put great store in evidence that is 
tested live in the courtroom and testimony that is delivered in person in front of other people. 
We also believe that a jury is best positioned to ascertain the truth of a matter by being able to 
see trial participants and legal agents in person.  
 
As I have shown throughout this thesis, however, the evidence for this underlying belief in 
the link between live presence and truth-telling is essentially inferential. This is partly a 
question of terminology. As I stated at the very beginning of this thesis, the term 
‗performance‘ simply does not enter the legal lexicon. Instead, the legal value of what I 
consider ‗live performance‘ is embedded in arguments regarding ‗oral evidence-testing, ‗the 
open trial‘, ‗immediacy‘, ‗demeanour‘ and ‗confrontation‘. Largely, however, the lack of 
direct discussion about the value of live performance is because it is only when traditional 
means of evidence-testing that rely on live performance are interfered with that people begin 
to articulate what value they perceive these practices to have. When this happens, we hear 
voices begin to try and account for what might happen in this shared collective performative 
space that could not happen any other way.  
 
Often these reasons can be quite vague. For example, studies into the use of mediatised 
technology have shown that, we are, on the whole, more inclined to believe in someone‘s 
evidence if they are in front of us, rather than if they are testifying remotely, but that we 
cannot necessarily explicitly identify why this is so. The reasons can also be slightly esoteric, 
such as when the U.S. Supreme Court judges in Coy v Iowa, (as cited in the epigraph to this 
chapter) argue that it is ―human nature‖ to believe that it is more difficult to lie in person 
rather than remotely. Yet even the most rational legal agents, who dispute any simplistic link 
between liveness and truth-telling, concede that the live presence of all participants in the 
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same space is a safeguard that generally functions to make the trial safer and fairer. For 
example Justice Michael Kirby, who disavows any ‗magical‘ belief in the jury to assess the 
demeanour of a witness, also argues (in another context) that 
[t]he principle of an open trial in public, which is such a hallmark of our system of justice, is not a 
shibboleth. It exists for a purpose. That purpose is publicly to demonstrate to all who may be concerned 
the correctness and the justice of the court's determination according to law.
671
 
For Kirby, and many other legal agents and members of the public, the continued enactment 
of the live adversarial trial is a means of ensuring the fairest outcome possible. As Kirby 
makes explicit, too, the ‗open trial‘ does not just ensure a fair resolution to a particular 
conflict. The open trial is a public demonstration of the justice of adversarial practice in 
general. Repeated enactment of the live trial both sustains and perpetuates public and 
juridical belief in the trial as source of justice.  
 
The trial is thus a collective performance of belief. Yet, as the analysis of sexual assault trial 
practice in the previous chapter makes explicit, this collective performance is not a 
transparent demonstration of democratic principles. The repeated performance of the trial 
maintains and naturalises the inequities between lay and law that is embedded in trial 
procedure. The trial involves a significant degree of symbolic violence, coercion and 
relatively unconscious exploitation by legal agents of laypersons‘ dependence. This 
performance of tradition results in sometimes brutal experiences for trial participants. 
Ultimately, this potential for trauma and brutality may actually militate against the best 
means of evidence available. The use of intimidation can result in witnesses being unable to 
maintain their credibility in a courtroom and consequently lead to an unjust outcome.  
 
What is truly problematic about this inequity is that it is very difficult to resolve. Adversarial 
evidence-testing is not merely a methodology, or a series of tools to get to an outcome; rather 
it is at the heart of collective belief in truth-telling. So long as we believe live confrontation 
and evidence testing is more likely to lead to the truth, meaningful reform is doomed to fail. 
Alongside this, so long as legal agents fail to understand their own behaviour as coercive, the 
symbolic violence of evidence-testing will continue unabated. Ultimately, reform can only 
occur with the alteration of belief. Yet this is an enormous ask. Because of the preconscious 
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Gradidge v Grace Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 93 FLR 414, 417 (Kirby P).  
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nature of habitus, the reflexivity required for agents to be able to examine the logics that 
operate within their own field is rare. So it is unlikely legal agents will question the methods 
by which they construct narratives in the courtroom. The trial is also ‗practically obscure‘—a 
practice at times arcane, and generally opaque in understanding to non-legal agents. This 
means laypersons are unlikely to question their dependence on legal agents. Beliefs that have 
been shaped over a thousand years of practice cannot be altered overnight. 
 
In addition to this, finally, there are the positive effects of the performance of tradition. I 
have frequently stressed that ‗The Law‘ is not a reified ideal, but rather formed by the 
interactions of juridical agents and consequently fallible and contingent. Similarly, the trial is 
not a transcendental institution of justice. Rather it is a practice of a particular field with its 
own specific rules. But we must believe that the trial is more than this if ‗The Law‘ is to fulfil 
its purpose. It is absolutely necessary for ‗The Law‘ to maintain its exalted status if we are to 
continue to invest and reinvest social belief in legal processes that are valued as 
representative of a liberal and democratic society. What, in the end, is the alternative? This 
leaves us with no easy answers: so much of our collective belief in the trial relies upon the 
continuation of the present model of evidence-testing. This very model is also what continues 
to marginalise and silence defendants and other lay participants in the trial. Ultimately, as I 
have emphasised in this thesis, what is at stake is collective belief. In the adversarial criminal 
jury trial, live performance is a double-edged sword. 
 
I cannot end this thesis with any simple summation or suggestion as to how trial procedure 
might be improved, as alterations in collective belief cannot come about overnight. I can, 
however, end on a slightly optimistic note. While I have been critical of the ways in which  
performance is simultaneously exploited and overlooked in this thesis, many positive aspects 
of the courtroom process—openness and degrees of accountability—are also ensured by the 
trial‘s emphasis on the ‗live‘. It is easy to overstate the ‗openness‘ of the ‗open trial‘, but our 
collective believe that live presence leads to a more ‗truthful‘ outcome means we still keep 
the courtroom doors open; this, at least, will always be one of the means by which we 
distance ourselves from the worst excesses of totalitarian governments. As Sadakat Kadri 
commented: ―Every prosecution is a performance of communal ideas about justice—and 
exploitable though the display is, the risks of a show trial are incomparably preferable to the 
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silence of a no-trial‖. 672  
   
  
                                                 
672
 Sadakat Kadri, ―Better and Worse Worsts: The Trial in American Life by Robert Ferguson, a Review‖, 
London Review of Books 24 May 2007, 17-18. 
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